Planners from hell – Taken to the cleaners

The Next City
June 21, 1998

 

Taken to the cleaners

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Excerpted from the Summer 1998 issue.

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RICHARD MORANTZ, A WINNIPEG PROPERTY MANAGER, recently bought an apartment building whose previous owner had been providing laundry facilities to tenants at no charge. He didn’t mind that so much. But then Morantz realized that many tenants were having friends and relatives over to use the washers and dryers, which also helped explain why the machines and rooms were so run-down. So Morantz made a deal with a laundry-service company to redecorate and put in new equipment. For a year the service would cost 25 cents each per wash and dry; after that, prices would go to $2 a load, the going commercial rate.

It seemed like a good idea at the time: The modest charge would limit unwanted traffic, improve the facilities, and increase revenues down the road. But little did Morantz know that his plan would attract the ire of Manitoba’s rent control police. First, the authorities ordered him to apply in advance for permission to make the change. To add injury to insult, they informed him that the “withdrawal application” would trigger rent reductions in his new building of as much as $20 per month per tenant. Morantz put the withdrawal application, as well as his hopes of being a proud landlord of a respectable property, “on hold,” as had others before him in Canada’s 30-year history of rent control.

You don’t have to be Adam Smith to figure out what rent control does. It kills the construction of moderately priced units, and it leads landlords either to put existing apartments to non-residential uses, or to let them deteriorate, or to abandon them outright as they run out of the resources (and morale) necessary for maintenance. In New York City, where rent control was introduced as a temporary wartime measure and still hangs on, landlords have abandoned whole neighborhoods, with small investors especially bankrupted by aggressive bureaucrats. In Toronto every year, on average, about 60,000 people move in. Yet a mere 20 new rental units were built there in 1996. Before rent control, during the 1960s and early 1970s, an average of 26,000 new units were built in Ontario annually, most of them in Toronto, where a third of the province’s population lives. Since rent control began in 1975, private rental starts in Ontario have declined to about 2,000 a year.

Ontario’s Conservative government passed legislation to tackle the problems almost a year ago. But the new law, which decontrols rents only once an apartment is empty, will do little to dismantle the regulatory apparatus that has stopped the construction of affordable new rental housing. Once the space has been leased, the new price falls back under the jurisdiction of the bureaucrats, whose annual edicts specify upper limits on increases (no more than 2.8 per cent in 1998). They even capped rent increases to pay for improvements at 4 per cent a year for a limit of three years. A tenant survey conducted by the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation found that 11 per cent of Toronto’s rental buildings need substantial work, and the Fair Rental Policy Organization, a landlord-backed advocacy group, estimates the current cost of repairing “major structural problems” at $10 billion. Few seriously believe that this nickel-and-dime relief will address the problems.

Unlike previous Conservative administrations, many regard Premier Mike Harris’s government, whose limited-government rhetoric brought it to power in 1995, as market oriented. Why its compromised approach to rent control?

A clue can be had in neighboring Manitoba where Winnipeg dominates its province even more than Toronto does Ontario. Rent control arrived in the autumn of 1970, courtesy of Manitoba’s first New Democratic Party government, at a time when strong demand and Pierre Trudeau’s inflationary monetary policy sent rents skyward. Two elections later, in 1980, the Conservative minister responsible for housing, recognizing rent control’s inherent folly, began dismantling it. The next year, apartment-dwelling voters in Winnipeg constituencies turned the Conservatives out of office.

That minister, Gary Filmon, has been Premier of Manitoba since 1988. But the consequences of his 1980 misadventure so shook him that he has not dared decontrol again — even though apartment demand and rents in Winnipeg are falling of their own accord and likely to stay low for the foreseeable future.

For several reasons — most involving the bloated bureaucracies in Winnipeg’s postamalgamation civic government and school system — Winnipeggers pay among the highest property taxes in North America. This has reduced house prices, further tilting residents away from renting and toward ownership. On top of this, low inflation and interest rates are turning window-shoppers into buyers.

Premier Filmon has ignored a side effect of rent control that could turn homeowners — until now unconcerned with the issue — into active rent control opponents: Rent control has raised their property taxes. Because rent control erodes the worth of apartment buildings, assessments slip, and the city loses revenue. To compensate, the city has shifted the property tax load onto homeowners. By some calculations, this costs the average Winnipeg home-owning family $600 to $700 a year extra.

Overall, rent control has not helped the poor. The unregulated portions of the market — in Manitoba’s case, apartments less than five years old and units priced above the rent control ceiling — charge dramatically higher rents. So a price gap now faces potential renters. Uncontrolled apartments charge prices that only the very well off can afford. Controlled apartments are inexpensive but deteriorating rapidly. Construction of moderately priced, middle-income multiple housing units stopped completely in Winnipeg soon after rent controls began. Except for publicly built or subsidized apartments (most commonly for seniors), not one has been built in 25 years. Only luxury apartments go up, leaving common folk with no choice but to meet government qualifications for public housing or live in a dump. (In some cases, that amounts to the same thing.)

In the early 1970s, Manitoba politicians compensated for the effects of rent control by increasing the stock of public housing, building tacky projects that soon turned into crime-infested ghettos. Many sit empty because renters refuse to risk the safety of their families. To encourage new stock, provincial and civic governments now follow the well-trodden path of public-private cooperation. But after accounting for bureaucratic overhead, tax exemptions, and capital subsidies, the new quasi-private housing units cost two to three times as much as genuinely private ones. Higher taxes pay for this waste, and scarce public resources are diverted from useful activities.

Despite all the drawbacks, once a government heads down the rent control path, it doesn’t turn back. The one exception is the government of Nova Scotia, which terminated its rent control program in 1993 without suffering at the polls. The original legislation, passed in 1975, allowed the cabinet to exempt any properties it designated by special order. Eighteen years later, faced with high vacancy rates and rents below the controlled limits, the cabinet exempted virtually all properties. Rent control legislation is still on the books but only for trailer park tenants, who can appeal increases to a review board.

Peter Holle

There’s no peace in the valley

AFTER THE RECESSION OF THE EARLY 1990S and recent overbuilding of its industrial park infrastructure by its government, the region of Hamilton-Wentworth in Ontario is awash in empty, serviced industrial land. The smokestacks are still there, but in the last 20 years Hamilton’s once bustling bayfront has lost half its workforce. Business parks sit idle, waiting for buyers to cover the cost of development charges.

It wasn’t supposed to be this way. In 1984, a study of the region’s economy by Currie, Coopers and Lybrand warned of an impending shortage of industrial growth room. The consulting group’s solution: Build a new, six-lane freeway up the Niagara Escarpment to open Hamilton’s “mountain” to development by 2001. Agreeing, regional traffic planners and the local government chose a six-lane route through the Red Hill Creek Valley. Wrangling with the province over funding delayed the start of its construction until mid-1998.

The passage of time shows the various planners and consultants to have been optimistic. In 1990, with engineers admitting that a need for two extra lanes was “not even on the horizon,” they scaled back the six-lane expressway to four. And based on current rates, rather than facing a shortage, Hamilton and her sister communities have 700 years worth of empty, freeway-accessible industrial lots. Even under a fast economic growth scenario, another road up the mountain would not be needed until 2021, and improvements to a nearby provincial highway would handle any additional escarpment traffic volumes even further into the next century.

The public has passionately debated the expressway since the project’s conception in the 1950s. Building the road would mean paving over much of the Red Hill Creek Valley, the largest remaining natural area in Hamilton’s industrialized east end. Residents, anxious about losing their ravine lots, found allies among environmentalists concerned about the destruction of biologically rich habitat. (Home to over 20 species of mammals, the valley is a major migration route for birds, and metre-long Chinook salmon spawn in the creek.)

In the executive summary of the current regional budget, in which the expressway represents 75 per cent of new capital spending, Hamilton-Wentworth financial staff warns of “debt implications” and suggests “delaying or eliminating some of the projects.” Despite the best advice from its own staff, regional council passed the 1998 budget, expressway included.

Anti-expressway councillors, a minority, predict doom for Hamilton-Wentworth: The region’s debt will double in the next two years, raising borrowing costs; property taxes (already among Ontario’s highest) will increase by 5 per cent this year; and the chronic deterioration of the region’s infrastructure continues (funding for road and sewer maintenance has been below “sustainable levels” since 1990).

Raymond Dartsch

Written in stone

ADAM ALEXANDER THOUGHT HE WAS DOING HIS COMMUNITY A SERVICE last year, when he spent months chipping away at the ugly pebble-dash façade of his heritage home in England, to reveal the original stonework underneath.

The listed Victorian country cottage had fallen victim to the pebble-dash craze of the 1960s and was, until Alexander’s hard work, an esthetic outcast in the Gloucestershire village of St. Briavels. With the pebble-dash gone, not only did the cottage blend in with its 11th-century neighbor, a hunting lodge, but it at last matched the porch and garage, Alexander’s addition, which the Forest of Dean district council had required him to build in original stone rather than cladding. Alexander and his wife, Julia, were sure the whole village would approve.

But it seems nothing in the world of planning is that simple. Despite English Heritage ministers having fought against pebble-dash fronts and having given district councils authority to stop people from modernizing period homes, the council swiftly ordered Alexander to replace what he removed or face prosecution.

The reason? Under English law, listed buildings must be kept in the same condition as when they were first listed. Alexander’s home was listed in the 1980s, pebble-dash coating and all.

Alexander, a television documentary producer, called the order “a complete joke,” and more than 200 citizens of St. Briavels signed a petition agreeing with him. “My neighbors who signed the petition think the planning department is run by idiots — and you have to wonder whether they’re right,” he said.

English Heritage, invited to look at the cottage, agreed that the coating looked horrible but then insisted that the stone would look more “authentic” if it were lime-washed even though the village has no other lime-washed buildings.

Richard Stagg, the council’s planning head, said that many owners wanted to restore listed buildings to their original façades, but, for the sake of historical integrity, “owners cannot put them back to how they looked in a previous age. . . . The fact that we asked him to build the extension and porch in bare stone doesn’t matter. The combination of limewash and stone will work.”

Alexander’s planning application to keep the pebble-dash off was considered in February. The Forest of Dean district council inspected the site, as did the planning department. “Nineteen people came out in 10 cars, all of whom would be claiming expenses,” says Julia Alexander.

Next came a full-district council meeting, where, in less than a minute, the council voted to leave the façade as non-limewashed stone.

A victory? Well, not yet. “Just as a rather spiteful action,” continues Julia Alexander, “the council said, ‘yes, you can keep the house in stone, but you must remove the paint from the lintels and sills.’ To take the paint off the sandstone would damage the sandstone, so now we’re in another battle.”

Rondi Adamson

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Editorial – Too much privacy can be hazardous to the person

Lawrence Solomon
The Next City
June 21, 1998

 

WITH VAST COMPUTER NETWORK DATA BASES storing detailed information about our private lives, many of us are becoming uneasy about invasions of privacy. Already, computers track our daily activities, time-stamping every credit and debit card transaction, monitoring who we call on the telephone or visit over the World Wide Web. Many businesses snoop on their employees, many municipalities film activities on city streets to cut down on red-light runners and other violators. Soon, every highway will be tolled, recording our comings and goings; and so will every neighborhood road — satellite technology today tracks the movement of London cabbies, the better to dispatch them; tomorrow these satellites will economically track private automobiles, the better to bill their owners.

Some privacy concerns revolve around bothersome junk mail and unwanted telemarketing calls: Air mile and other cards let marketers analyze your personal shopping habits, opening you up to an avalanche of targeted offers. Other concerns — particularly access to your genetic code, which contains intimate details about you and your likely future life — are anything but frivolous. A recent study by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Computer Security Institute found that “most organizations are woefully unprepared . . . [making] it easier for perpetrators to steal, spy, or sabotage without being noticed and with little culpability if they are.” After sampling 400 sites, the study found 42 per cent had experienced an intrusion or unauthorized use over the past year. Even sophisticated agencies are vulnerable. Pentagon computers suffered 250,000 attacks by intruders in 1995, 65 per cent of whom gained entry to a computer network. That same year, the London Sunday Times reported that the contents of anyone’s electronic health record could be purchased on the street for £150.

Because the dangers — ranging from financial exploitation to, in the worst case, a police state — can be profound, legislation of various types is being proposed. Some argue that all personal information should be our own private property, to prevent marketers from storing and exchanging information about us without our consent; others would severely restrict or even prohibit the collection of sensitive personal data. These approaches miss the mark. The collection of data — the accumulation of knowledge — is almost always desirable. The relevant question is, when does the information belong in the public sphere and when in the private?

The claim that we somehow have property rights to our personal information does not stand up to scrutiny. We all exchange information about others — “Did you see Andrea’s new car?”; “I hear Jim got a promotion” — in our daily routines without requiring their consent, and a democratic society that respects free speech could not do otherwise. Even if we did enact laws to restrict or ban data banks from collecting information about us, it would generally backfire. Junk mail is unwanted precisely because it is indiscriminate and useless. If marketing succeeds in sending us useful, targeted information, many of us would have our goal of restricting unwanted mail. In one survey, 71 per cent of 18- to 24-year-olds wanted mail on products that interested them; in another, 52 per cent of consumers wanted to be profiled if that would lead to special offers. Those who don’t want the mail or the offers will only need to make their views heard: Few companies would defy their customers by selling their names.

Valid restrictions governing free speech — such as slandering others or violating their copyright on personal works — are properly limited. But we should add one other restriction — control over the use of our genetic code, where privacy should take precedence over free speech.

THE FIELD OF GENETIC INFORMATION PROMISES TO BE the greatest boon to science and medicine in human history. We suffer from at least 4,000 genetic diseases and conditions — everything from Huntington’s disease to depression — that may one day be treated or cured as science unravels the mysteries of the human genome. Even today, reading our genes can guide us in making decisions about our future, revealing whether we have predispositions for cancers or alcoholism, medical conditions that preventative measures could ameliorate. The information in your genetic code amounts to a probabilistic future diary that describes an important part of a unique and personal character — not just about your physical and mental health but also about your family, especially your parents, siblings, and children.

Yet this field also promises to lead to invasions of privacy unprecedented in their nature and scale. Unlike your personal diary, in which you might reveal your innermost secrets, the information in your genetic code may become known to strangers but not to you. From our own experiences, we know that there are no shortages of people with motives to acquire such information. Insurers and employers would value this information for business purposes. Political operatives might want to discredit opponents, as might combatants in divorces or other domestic disputes. Even where stakes aren’t high, people may have malicious curiosities about their friends, neighbors, co-workers, or romantic rivals.

Until the turn of the century, our privacy was recognized as a property right and consequently given great legal weight. Our diaries and our secrets, particularly our medical secrets, were our own, in the United Kingdom as in North America. The genetic code, the epitome of that which is personal, is both a present document and a future diary. Giving each of us clear rights to our genetic code and requiring those who would use it to first obtain our consent would provide a necessary and indispensable ingredient to protecting our privacy.

MOST DAY-TO-DAY CONCERNS THAT PEOPLE HAVE about privacy will evaporate. Those who don’t want consumer data collected on them can avoid air miles-type marketing. Those seeking anonymity in making a phone call or a toll road trip can purchase prepaid cards; other technologies will foil telemarketers and e-mail snoops. Those who value record keeping — primarily businesspeople who bill their time or track it for other purposes — will see this data collection as an added-value service. Most of us won’t care much one way or the other.

In private spaces — banks, convenience stores, office buildings — we have accepted cameras, taking little notice of them and worrying about their misuse even less. We understand the proprietor’s motives — to protect his property and the security of those who use it — and accept them as valid. Though we want similar protection in our public spaces, we are less trusting here, not because we value public property and security less but because we know the proprietor — the state — may have mixed motives. Too often government officials have used privileged information — whether medical data or income tax files — for self-serving ends. We do need safeguards governing surveillance in public spaces to allay legitimate public fears over the advent of the police state. Less privacy, ironically, would be one such safeguard.

MANY CRIMINAL LAWYERS BELIEVE THE POLICE STATE ARRIVED some time ago, that law enforcement authorities effectively frame individuals whom they believe to be guilty. Guy Paul Morin is a case in point: Convinced of his guilt, police fudged the facts. When conflicting evidence frustrated their efforts — Morin left work too late to have travelled the 30 miles home in time to have murdered 9-year-old Christine Jessop — police ingenuity overcame this shortcoming.

Morin has plenty of company — Donald Marshall, David Milgaard, and countless others have been convicted of murder and lesser offences because they could not establish where they were at some fateful time. Put another way, they were victims of their privacy. The vacuum of reliable information about their whereabouts created the opening for overzealous or overlazy police officers and prosecutors. Overzealous and overlazy authorities will always be with us, but vacuums of reliable information are increasingly becoming scarce. Had Jessop been murdered today, and had Morin travelled along an electronically tolled road such as Ontario’s Highway 407, a record of when he got on and where he got off the highway would have established his whereabouts. The injustices perpetrated by the criminal justice system on this young man would never have occurred. Highway 407 was built too late to help Morin, but not for future travellers, whose record of their comings and goings — unbeknownst to them — adds a touch of security to their lives. So do new advances in DNA analysis, which eventually proved Morin innocent, as they are now doing for others around the world who were also falsely imprisoned.

A world in which we can verify our daily movements — the very world that has been unfolding for decades — diminishes the number of miscarriages of justice that can occur. To fill a void with false information has always been easy; to rewrite data showing that someone drove 30 miles at a particular time along a particular electronic toll road involves reconstructing an alternate route and time, which involves alternate billing, which involves replacing the old invoice with a new one, and on and on. The effort required to spin a web of false information and then overlay it upon an existing factual network without getting tangled up would be so daunting as to virtually never occur. The very data base networks that some fear will usher in the police state, in the end, are really the best protection against it.

Lawrence Solomon
Editor

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The virtues of voting often

Filip Palda
The Next City
June 21, 1998

Taking the law into our own hands will give us the governments we deserve

THE TIME IS MARCH 1997, AND THE CITIZENS OF TORONTO’S SIX MUNICIPALITIES are out of luck. In one month, the province will make an amalgam of them and call the product “megacity.” In a last-minute burst of desperation, the municipalities organize plebiscites asking citizens whether they agree with the province’s plan to merge. Of the 28 per cent who turn out, more than 70 per cent shout, “No!” They should have saved their energy as did the more savvy 72 per cent who saw the plebiscite as just an opinion poll, with no ability to tie politicians. But citizens would have foiled the amalgamators had Toronto been in Switzerland, where a political device known as the rejective initiative can force a popular vote that either approves or rejects government law. Since 1874, the Swiss have held 122 rejective initiatives. Half of these forced government to withdraw its law.

Fast-forward now to August 1997. Ontario Hydro, North America’s largest energy utility, declares that it needs to zap ratepayers for at least $7 billion to make its nuclear operations safe. Outside experts estimate the true cost of setting things right at two or three times that amount. Had Ontario been Washington state, Ontario Hydro would have avoided this sorry pass. In 1981, Washington citizens passed Initiative 394, to require voter approval before public agencies can issue bonds to build major power plants. The initiative also subjects new nuclear plants to studies to determine their economic merits. Wall Street investment firms, labor unions, and the nuclear power industry tried to defeat the initiative by spending $1.25 million on advertising. The grassroots movement pushing the initiative spent only $204,000 but won. In so doing, it may have saved Washington taxpayers billions of dollars in stranded nuclear plant costs. Ontario has no such luck. Without popular initiatives, Ontarians passively accept whatever the Ontario Hydro monopoly hands out, including a debt that exceeds $3,000 for each of the province’s 10 million inhabitants. Their elected leaders are no help. Instead of representing the people, they bow before Ontario Hydro’s special interest pleadings.

SINCE CONFEDERATION, POLITICIANS HAVE DONE LITTLE to help citizens participate in political life. A Canadian Rip van Winkle who had fallen into a coma in the early part of the century would be bowled over by today’s social and technological advances. But at election time, he would have nothing to learn. Today, as then, he would mark the ballot with a pencil, then forget about influencing government for the next four years. One election every four years might have been fine early this century, when governments in industrialized nations spent only one dollar in eight of their countries’ GNPs. Today, that average approaches one dollar in two, and governments at all levels now regulate commerce and social life in ways that despots of old could only have dreamed about.

Politicians, meanwhile, are unchanging in their desire to evade public control. In a 1991 British Columbia plebiscite, a resounding 83 per cent of citizens demanded the power to propose laws and to recall elected officials. To thwart the public will, a legislative committee toured the country for the next two years to find out what citizens “really” wanted. As in a scene from Kafka, it then denied citizens the rights they had won in the plebiscite through signature requirements so high as to guarantee these rights would never be used. Likewise, at about the same time, Ottawa’s $20-million Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing recommended that government muzzle free speech by forbidding private citizens and groups from spending more than $1,000 to advertise their opinions at election time and by forbidding the media from publishing opinion poll results 72 hours before balloting.

Twenty years ago, technologies emerged to permit citizens to vote from home. Today, the

U. S. group Government by the People, the department of political science at Auburn University, and the Electronic Congress in Pennsylvania have made these technologies — everything from smart cards to Internet voting — safe, confidential, and cheap. Even the kitchen telephone has the power to spoil the best-laid plans of a government that would rather not listen to its people. In 1994, North Vancouver Reform MP Ted White sponsored what he called Referendum ’94, a referendum on the Young Offenders Act. White mailed each registered voter in his riding a confidential Personal Identification Number. By dialing a 1-900 number and paying $2, citizens could key in their PINs and then their yes or no answer to each question. Only 6.8 per cent of registered voters cast their ballots in White’s experiment in teledemocracy. It was, after all, a mock referendum, and it cost to vote.

The real thing occurred in Ontario’s rural communities of Severn, Gravenhurst, and Tiny, with their large population of cottagers. To the cottagers’ distress, the timing of municipal elections — in November when they were a two- or three-hour drive away — had effectively snuffed out their vote, leading to hard feelings when the towns passed bylaws that harmed cottagers’ interests. To the towns’ credit, they opted for teledemocracy, giving all residents of the community a 10-digit PIN that let them vote by telephone from their year-round residence, or wherever they happened to be, 24 hours a day during a 10-day period.

Using the same techniques, electronic voting can remove the gap between elections, when politicians may feel tempted to abuse their power. Citizens could change their support for a party or a representative whenever they felt their views were no longer being represented. They would still only have one vote, only now that vote could be given at any time and revoked at any time. In effect, elections could now be continuous, forcing politicians to think harder about ways to win continuous support. They could do this by hammering platforms that hang together in the long run, instead of dazzling voters over 40 days of an election campaign with promises that cannot be kept.

MOST VOTERS WOULD NOT WANT TO VOTE ALL THE TIME. Ironically, reforms that put more power into the hands of citizens by letting them vote more often allow citizens to participate less in politics than they do now because few elections would assume cataclysmic proportions. At the same time, such reforms give the views of citizens more force. In Switzerland, voter turnout is lower than in any other western democracy because the Swiss do not need to turn out. For fear of unleashing a citizen initiative, their representatives must respect a wide variety of competing interests and, at the same time, add a touch of moderation to popular proposals before crafting laws.

As put by Oxford political scientist Vernon Bogdanor, while all western European democracies view popular sovereignty as fundamental, “with the single exception of Switzerland, the people play a strictly subordinate role in public affairs. . . . Switzerland is, indeed, the only country in Europe that Rousseau would have regarded as genuinely democratic.” As a result, citizens tend to support laws proposed by the legislature. So, too, in California — the powerhouse of American direct democracy, where citizens initiate and pass less than one per cent of all state laws.

Citizen initiatives exist in 26 U.S. states and in hundreds of Swiss communes. Like any unconstitutional law, citizen laws may be blocked by the courts, but they cannot be disputed by the legislature. But far from emasculating politicians, initiatives make them better servants of the public by better defining their roles.

Direct democracy can also better define the roles of other players in the political field — political specialists such as Maude Barlow of the Council of Canadians or Steven Harper of the National Citizens’ Coalition. In the teledemocracy voting that occurred in Canada last November, some voters simplified their lives by giving their PINs and voting instructions to their spouses or friends, much as they might give their spouses the PIN to their debit card. If you’re worried that free trade will gut Canada’s economy, why not entrust your political PIN to Barlow? Or if you’re worried that government is spending too much, perhaps Harper should get your PIN. By transferring our votes to trusted specialists, the majority of citizens can tap into the expertise of people with superior knowledge and a sense of civic spirit that matches their own. Or, citizens who trust a particular political party could let it exercise their vote — something we now do by default when we cast our ballot in the present system.

Under the present all-or-nothing approach to selecting government policies, the benefits of political specialization are lost. Most governments campaign on a bundle of services that includes health, education, welfare, transportation, the environment, and security. One party may be good at protecting the environment, but terrible at health care. Its rival may be good at health care but reprehensible on the environment. Instead of voting for a party while holding our noses, unbundling public services allows us to vote with a clear conscience, at all times.

Direct democracy — any form of voting that bypasses representatives — has another benefit, too; it allows voters to correct individual laws that representatives have passed to their detriment, without getting rid of the government. In April, hepatitis C victims lost their claims for compensation in our federal Parliament, their appeals falling on the deaf ears of a government riding high in the public’s esteem. If Canadians had the right of initiative, they might have succeeded in repealing the law, giving the public both the government and the laws it wanted, without the anguish that followed.

Direct democracy will not just correct arrogant politicians — it will stymie well-connected capitalists, who today — through the use of lobbyists and political contributions — effectively buy the support they need in Parliament. Consider a cable TV baron who wants to jack-up his monopoly rates further. If the increase were worth a million dollars to him, he would be willing to spend close to a million dollars to get the rate hike approved (and studies show this is precisely what happens). But in a direct democracy system, where the victims outnumber the monopolists, the capitalist would be beaten before he started. For this reason, corporate interests fear and revile citizen action. Pointing to the U.S. sugar industry, which a government-backed cartel of domestic producers controls, Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman asked how long the cartel would survive if citizens could vote on the following question: “Do you want the government of the USA to continue protecting the sugar cartel so that you pay twice the world price for sugar?”

While many fear moneyed interests, and not the citizenry, will inevitably dominate referendum campaigns, experience to date shows just the opposite: Referendum expert David Schmidt found that money was a decisive factor in only 23 per cent of the 189 state-level initiative campaigns in the U.S. between 1976 and 1984. Money also counted little in municipal initiatives. Poorly funded environmentalists defeated well-funded real estate development companies in two-thirds of the campaigns. In his study of citizen initiative over the last 35 years, University of Southern California economist John Matsusaka found that direct democracy did not lead to more government favors being granted but rather to fewer. The 1992 federal referendum on the Constitution — the Charlottetown accord — provides an example of Canada’s elites — business, social, and political — going down to defeat. The referendum was meant to ratify an agreement between the provinces and Ottawa and, backed by big business, designed to keep Quebec in Confederation. But the Charlottetown accord did more, too. To get union backing, the referendum proposed to enshrine collective rights in the Constitution, which might have made a small non-union firm competing with a large unionized firm guilty of violating the union members’ collective rights to earn a sound living. The referendum also proposed to give social programs constitutional protection. The government and the special interests pushing for a yes vote on this grab bag of proposed changes spent 10 times as much as the no side to promote their views. Yet the no side, whose only powerful spokesman was Pierre Trudeau, won.

Capitalists and other special interests have powerful allies in their opposition to direct democracy — politicians, who would lose their stranglehold on writing new laws. University of California at Berkeley political scientists David Butler and Austin Ranney, who organized a worldwide study of referendums for the American Enterprise Institute, concluded that politicians dislike referendums because they “take decisions out of established hands, and elected leaders can never control — or be responsible for — their outcomes.” To justify keeping direct democracy in the closet, politicians argue that the public is too ignorant to make decisions directly. The American author of The Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton, the elder statesman of this view, argued that “When the deliberative or judicial powers are vested wholly or partly in the collective body of the people, you must expect error, confusion, and instability.”

The evidence contradicts Hamilton. Instead of producing instability, confusion, and error, direct democracy tends to produce small, responsible government in which politicians hop to the attention of citizens. Economists Werner Pommerehne and Friederich Schneider looked at Swiss municipalities with and without direct democracy. They found that communities with direct democracy would have spent 28 per cent more had they been unable to check their elected leaders. Another study by John Matsusaka compared government finances between the 26 U.S. states with citizen initiative and the 24 states without it. Initiative states spent 12 per cent less per citizen at the state level and 10 per cent more at the local level than non-initiative states. With the help of initiatives the people took fiscal power out of a distant state capital and brought it down to eye level in their communities. Initiative states also had taxes that were lower by 8 per cent and user fees that were higher by 7 per cent. User fees prevent redistribution of money by forcing those who play to pay.

Direct democracy would also clarify non-financial issues. Witness the immense confusion over the wording of the various Quebec referendums on sovereignty association and the like. At the moment, only the party in power may put a referendum question to the people. Better to allow the people to put the question to themselves. Instead of Quebec referendums, we could have Quebec initiatives in which diverse questions about separation have a chance to be heard. Some groups would petition to have a question asking for limited separation, others might ask for either complete separation or, if the answer is no, for a 20-year moratorium on further separation questions. The initiative would unfold over two rounds. In the first, voters would choose the question; in the second, they would vote on it. This type of two-stage direct democracy would allow Quebeckers to spell out their preferred relationship with the rest of Canada. It would also cut out the political middlemen who make careers out of controlling the referendum agenda.

Switzerland, long a patchwork of languages and cultures, shows how moving power toward the people can stabilize politics. In the 19th century, tensions between ethnic Italian, French, German, and Romansch citizens led to a civil war. After the war, the Swiss adopted direct democracy to keep the peace. By letting ethnic pressure diffuse through direct democratic channels, Switzerland has become one of Europe’s most tolerant countries.

DIRECT DEMOCRACY WORKS WELL AT HIGH LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT, but its greatest potential may lie at the municipal level, which most affects citizens in their daily lives. The government of Ontario senses this and plans by the year 2000 to give municipalities the power of referendum and initiative. To pave the way, Ontario is cleaning up municipal finances, a muddle that provides municipalities with subsidies totalling a third to a half of their financing from the province and Ottawa. If a city mismanages itself, another government is there to make better-managed cities pay for its mistakes. In the past, the province regulated and dominated local government in order to keep down mismanagement. The price to pay for this control was unaccountability — spending power was removed from the local level, where people could see it, and hidden in a provincial capital. When cities shed their subsidies and gain greater power to charge user fees — as is happening in Ontario — local government becomes truly local, and local democracy, especially through direct democracy, becomes truly democratic. If Ontario’s experiment works, citizens of other provinces may demand the same changes. Some hope also lies in Quebec, where citizens may block municipalities that want to borrow money for construction projects. Unfortunately, Quebec citizens seldom use this power because higher levels of government pick up a large part of the tab for municipal blundering. Montreal’s 1976 Olympic stadium fiasco — which contributed greatly to the decline of that extraordinary city — is but one sorry example of the wrong-headed decisions that arise when those making decisions aren’t fully accountable for the consequences and when the costs are hidden from citizens.

THE PRESIDENT OF SWITZERLAND, THE WORLD CAPITAL OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY, is an unknown who goes to work on the tram but keeps his country going like clockwork. Because frugal, low-profile government is too much for our grandstanding leaders to bear, elites on the left and right of politics, claiming that the people don’t know what to do with power, join hands when facing the threat of direct democracy. It is natural that our leaders, whose desire for the limelight and susceptibility to special interests have produced grandiose plans, crippling debts and crumbling health and education systems, should resist direct democracy. Referendums and initiatives cut these middlemen out of power and let people decide issues for themselves. It is also natural for the public to continue its methodical, cautious, centuries-old drive for greater political freedom. They temper democracy’s worst aspects — the unaccountability of politicians — and bring out what is ultimately its best — the common sense of the common people.

Letters

1.Simon Threlkeld  Toronto, responds: July 14, 1998

2.André Carrel Rossland, British Colombia, responds: July 21, 1998

3.Filip Palda Thornhill, Ontario, responds: December 27, 1998

4.Miha Ahronovitz Toronto, responds: January 19, 1999

5.Simon Threlkeld

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Simon Threlkeld, Toronto, responds: July 14, 1998

As Filip Palda notes, in jurisdictions from California to Switzerland, citizens who gather the required number of petition signatures have the right to initiate binding referendums. Unfortunately, referendums are ill-suited for the informed decision making necessary for meaningful democracy and are heavily skewed in favor of wealth and power. Canada needs a better method of citizen lawmaking.

Groups of citizens chosen by lottery largely ran the Greek democracies of the fifth and fourth centuries BC; and in England, the United States, and other common-law countries, randomly chosen citizens make up trial juries. Adopting this basic idea from classical Greece and from the Anglo-American legal tradition can give citizens an effective say in lawmaking today.

Referendum voters may be unrepresentative of the citizenry: A mobilized minority can defeat a majority’s interests and preferences, especially where voter turnout is low. Or, men may vote more than women or the upper-middle class more than the poor, and so on. But randomly selected juries ensure a representative cross section of the citizenry. The larger the random sample, the more accurate the cross section. For example, a jury made up of 1,000 randomly sampled citizens has the same proportion of people with a given characteristic as the general population, within 4 per cent 99 times out of 100.

Stratification can further increase jury representativeness. If for example, 51 per cent of the citizens are women, then 51 per cent of the jurors can be randomly chosen from women and 49 per cent from men. Jury selection can also easily account for age, income, race, and residence.

For their efforts, jurors should be paid enough to let them work full time for the days, weeks, or months necessary to become well informed about a proposed law. By having a capacity to make an informed decision combined with being a representative cross section of the public, a jury expresses the informed will of the public — the highest democratic mandate a law can have.

Each year there can be a deadline for citizens to propose laws. All of the proposals, together with supporting arguments, can be posted on a web site. This serves as a notice to potential opponents who can publish their arguments on the same site.

Next, the supporters and opponents of the proposed law appear before a jury for a short preliminary hearing. The jury decides by majority vote whether to reject the proposal or to refer it to full in-depth hearings.

Hearings consist of presentations by the proposal’s supporters and opponents, of the jurors asking any questions they may have, and of the jury breaking into smaller subgroups to deliberate the proposal’s merits. If several mutually exclusive proposals are made on the same topic at the same time, they can all go before the same jury for consideration. If a jury approves the proposal by a majority vote after a full hearing, the proposal becomes a law. In this way, laws supported by the informed will of the public can be brought into effect even if the elected government opposes or ignores them — a giant step forward for citizen sovereignty.

The cases for and against the proposed law need to be under capable and unified direction. If the opponents of the proposed law cannot agree on who will direct their case, the various people or groups who wish to be in charge can appear before a jury for a short hearing. This jury, of perhaps 15 citizens, would base their decision on who can do the most thorough and effective job. If several citizen groups propose the same law, then who will direct the case in favor can be decided in the same way.

A special jury commission can devise the best possible arrangements and procedures for juries on an ongoing basis. Having a jury, rather than politicians, democratically choose each member of the commission for a set term would prevent patronage and political manipulation. The jury commission’s decisions can also be subject to jury approval, ensuring that its decisions are themselves in accord with the informed will of the citizens. Elected governments should not be involved in this process since they have a serious conflict of interest — specifically, keeping legislative power for themselves and preventing it from falling into the hands of citizens.

In the initiative and referendum, citizens only learn about proposed laws in their spare time, as the spirit moves them, and often rely on summary TV coverage or on even more superficial 30-second TV ads. Also, the more numerous the proposals, the less likely citizens will become informed about them. The cost of running an effective campaign, whether for or against a proposal, is far beyond the means of the vast majority of public interest groups, regardless of how sound their ideas may be. The media can further skew the process by a deliberate or accidental bias that favors one side over the other.

By contrast, juries meet face to face with the supporters and opponents of the proposed law. Capable public interest groups with little in the bank are on a far more level playing field with the rich and powerful since appearing before a jury costs far less than running a referendum campaign. Jurors get the benefit of the best available arguments, not just those that are well financed, or that appear in TV ads or in news coverage. Further, no matter how many laws are proposed, each receives a jury’s full-time, focused attention.

With referendums, onerous requirements to gather a large number of petition signatures within a set time restrict access to the ballot. Where paid petition circulators are allowed, the wealthy can buy their way onto the ballot by paying for an army of petition gatherers. Poorer groups, no matter how good their proposals may be, can only get an issue onto the ballot by mobilizing a sufficiently large and effective force of volunteer petition gatherers.

Sometimes, politicians make the signature requirement so burdensome that no one can get an issue on the ballot. For example, in Mike Harris’s draft referendum legislation, citizens have 180 days to gather the signatures of 10 per cent of the eligible voters in all of the seven regions into which the draft legislation divides Ontario. That’s about 670,000 signatures, all of which must, under the legislation, be collected by volunteers. No public interest group, coalition, or popular movement will be able to meet this requirement. The Ontario government purports to be opening the door to citizen-initiated laws, but its signature requirement locks up that door like a Fort Knox vault. With juries, the first stage is not a petition drive but rather a preliminary hearing. Jurors decide whether a proposed law gets further consideration based on its merits, not on who can organize or purchase the vast amount of donkey work needed to meet the signature requirement.

Juries, not signature requirements and referendums, are the way to go for citizen lawmaking.

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André Carrel, Rossland, British Colombia, responds: July 21, 1998

Did you know that Rossland, British Columbia, established its own constitution in 1990, and has lived with it ever since? Did you know that the citizens of Rossland have voted on 13 binding referendum questions since 1990?

I am the municipal administrator for the City of Rossland, and I can assure you from eight years of experience with our municipal constitution that trusting citizens works, at least as good as assuming that they need to be protected from their own stupidity.

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Filip Palda replies

Mr. Threlkeld believes he has discovered a new form of representation in which citizens propose laws to randomly chosen juries of their peers. These juries have a few months to learn the ropes of government and to apply their knowledge in deciding which laws should be passed.

I do not mean to discourage Mr. Threlkeld, but this is partly how democracy works today. Laws do not pop out of our politicians’ heads like Greek goddesses. Groups of citizens put pressure on our leaders, and whoever pushes hardest and most ably gets his way. Think of our present telecommunications laws. Mr. Threlkeld or any other citizen can apply to the CRTC for a hearing. At these hearings, CRTC commissioners listen to citizens’ views on what policies will best serve the public interest. The commissioners then make up their minds. Mr. Threlkeld may also submit bills to the House of Commons. These bills will be studied at the committee stage (a mini-jury) and may either be submitted to the floor for reading or not pursued, as would potential laws in Mr. Threlkeld’s system.

Mr. Threlkeld believes juries would give citizens an equal chance to present laws and that money and the ability to push ideas forward would not be important. Why he believes this is not clear. How would his jury decide? Citizens with political savvy and the bucks to back it up would hire top lobbyists to make their case before the political jury. That also happens to be how things work today.

The main difference between Mr. Threlkeld’s scheme and representative democracy as we know it is a lack of expertise and accountability. Citizens yanked from their lives of designing web pages, patrolling national parks, or washing car windows at street corners would not be apt to juggle and filter the competing demands on government. If they had politics in their blood, they would have become politicians.

Politicians face the awesome task of passing laws that do not push or upset any one group too much. The public’s wrath awaits them at the polls if they fall off this tiger. Mr. Threlkeld’s juries would suffer no such wrath. Representatives are plucked at random and then returned to society after a fixed term. Without the spur of re-election digging in their sides, why would citizens in power pay attention through the endless committee meetings and the learned arguments of lobbyists? Why would they fear unjustly favoring one group over the other? This lack of attention to detail and fairness would be reflected in policies that upset the citizenry.

Direct democracy is not a substitute for representative democracy. It is a complement. We do not need politicians to interpret all our wishes. While politicians should decide questions that require a great deal of specialized knowledge — such as delicate diplomatic questions concerning Bosnia and the intricacies of pollution emission regulation — questions about the treatment of young criminal offenders and the degree to which local communities should finance their own affairs are best left to the public. Even where politicians can interpret our wishes, we need direct democracy to keep them in line. Direct democracy reminds our leaders that should they stray from the public’s will, the public has a way to bypass any special deals politicians and narrow interest groups have whipped up. Far from allowing big money to dominate politics, direct democracy lowers the cost of political participation for the ordinary citizen. He does not need to hire expert lobbyists to represent his views to recalcitrant leaders. Direct democracy strips away layers of middlemen who get between the public will and the governments’ actions.

Nevertheless, Mr. Threlkeld’s idea should not be rejected based on one expert’s opinion. Democracy in Canada lacks innovation, and what Mr. Threlkeld is proposing is an innovation. Why not give it a try? The answer is that we probably won’t try it because we do not have the direct democratic instruments that would allow Mr. Threlkeld to bypass his leaders and take his case to a direct vote of citizens. The one place where Mr. Threlkeld might have some success is in Rossland. This small western community is the bud of direct democracy in Canada. Rossland’s citizens have learned to be open to new ideas about democratic reform, and might give Mr. Threlkeld the welcome that mainstream Canadian politicians will not.

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Miha Ahronovitz, Thornhill, Ontario, responds: December 27, 1998

What an extraordinary article!

Perhaps direct democracy is the essential democracy. But isn’t the majority of citizens functionally illiterate? A hypothetical direct vote with the question, “Do you agree to have direct voting and democracy?” would be rejected immediately by a crashing majority of 75 per cent!

This in Canada, one of the most developed countries in the world. What would happen with a would-be direct democracy in Quebec, if they (the elected politicians) decide to be independent?

And what about direct democracy in Zimbabwe?

If indirect democracy is nothing but a orchard for demagogy, where do we have a true democracy today?

I would propose a compulsory course at school on how a citizen can vote directly. Filip Palda’s article should be made a compulsory reference.

We can devise a system on merit points for the right of direct voting. A PhD will have 5 points. An illiterate will have 1 point. An exceptional citizen, like Mother Theresa, can have 10 points. If one grants someone else the right to vote for him, he can not give away more than 1 point. Starting from, say, 3 points, the voter can have a PIN. If a person has under 3 points, he can vote in person since he would not feel comfortable using a PIN.

Is this complicated? But who says that life is simple and one man, one vote is the epitome of justice?

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Simon Threlkeld, Toronto, responds: January 19, 1999

In my reply to Filip Palda’s article, I argue that jury assembly hearings provide a much better basis for informed citizen lawmaking than citizen initiated referendums. In his reply Filip Palda argues that citizen initiated referendums are better.

Filip Palda’s objections to jury assemblies are without merit and are bizarre in that they all apply as much or more to the citizen initiated referendums he supports.

In his second paragraph Filip Palda seems to suggest that there is no need for jury assemblies to play a role in legislation because citizens can already make proposals to the government as well as to government appointed bodies like the CRTC. This same argument can just as well be made about citizen initiated referendums.

Unfortunately, government and government appointed bodies are not very good at carrying out the people’s wishes. This is why citizen lawmaking is necessary, whether in the form of the referendums favored by Filip Palda or in the form of the jury assembly hearings I favor.

In his fourth paragraph, Filip Palda claims that the ordinary citizens who make up jury assemblies lack “expertise.” He seems oblivious to the public’s lack of expertise being far more of a problem in the referendums he supports. Jurors become far better informed about the proposed laws they vote on than referendum voters do. Referendum voters, unlike jurors, only learn about proposed laws willy nilly in their spare time amidst the distractions of daily living.

Another objection Filip Palda makes in his fourth paragraph is that jurors lack “accountability” for how they vote. It apparently escapes his attention that referendum voters also lack accountability.

Politicians should be accountable to the people so that they will carry out the people’s wishes. But a jury assembly can be relied on to carry out the people’s wishes by virtue of being an accurate cross section of the people. This is much better than mere accountability.

In addition, the real world accountability of politicians is largely undemocratic. Politicians are disproportionately accountable to the rich and powerful interests that are best able to finance election campaigns and generate effective publicity.

In his third paragraph, Filip Palda objects that those with “the bucks” would have an advantage in making presentations to a jury assembly. Earth to Palda: running a referendum campaign and meeting the signature requirement is many times more expensive than presenting to a jury assembly. The far lower financial threshold involved in appearing before a jury assembly opens up the legislative process to capable public interest groups with little in the bank and no big business backers. The far higher financial threshold of the referendum and the signature requirement excludes the vast majority of public interest groups. This makes referendums and the signature requirement largely undemocratic and plutocratic.

In his fifth paragraph, continuing on the themes of jurors being unaccountable and lacking expertise, Filip Palda claims that jurors will be inattentive to details and fairness. However, this is not the experience with trial and coroner’s juries who do tend to be concerned with details, fairness, and getting it right. Instead, it is the far more poorly informed referendum voting favored by Filip Palda that is apt to be characterized by an ignorance of details and of what the unfair consequences might be.

In his sixth paragraph, Filip Palda may be suggesting that I want to substitute jury assembly legislation for government legislation. I am not so ambitious. Instead I only want jury assemblies to supplement and influence government legislation.

In his first paragraph, Filip Palda seems to suggest that I want jury assemblies to “learn the ropes of government.” But all I expect of them is the more modest accomplishment of becoming well informed about the proposed laws they vote on.

Perhaps there are really two Filip Paldas: The one who wrote the article who believes in citizen rule and that democracy’s best aspect is ultimately “the common sense of the common people.” The other the one who wrote the reply using some of the stock arguments against referendums and democracy in general to criticize the idea of jury assembly hearings for citizen proposed laws.

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Bum rap: Antispanking activists need to take a time-out and let parents use their instincts

Okey Chigbo
The Next City
June 21, 1998

 

WHENEVER I READ SOMETHING ON THE SPANKING CONTROVERSY, I remember an incident a few years ago in a downtown day care. It happened at about 6:05 p.m., five minutes past the deadline for parents to depart with their offspring. The staff was itching to leave, and an occasional dirty look aimed at a tardy parent darted through the mask of cordiality stretched across their faces. I was hurriedly helping my son put on his socks, shoes, and coat, when I heard a commotion behind me. I turned; it was another late parent walking toward us carrying a boy of about four, her arms locked firmly around his middle. He was kicking and yelling at the top of his lungs, “No! No! Put me down!” She was talking to him in the very best contemporary parenting book manner: very calmly, very firmly, not raising her voice. “It’s time to go now,” she said. “I’ve given you 20 minutes to play with the day-care toys. That’s enough. Daddy’s got dinner ready, and he’s waiting for us at home.”

She put him down by the kiddie coat rack, and knelt beside him. He seized this brief moment of freedom to unleash a barrage of blows to her head and chest. “Let me go!” he yelled as he connected with her chin. She looked around in embarrassment. I averted my eyes. “That hurt,” she said evenly, taking down his coat, “That really hurt. I don’t like that.” She grappled with him in a fruitless effort to force him into his coat; he wriggled out easily, shoving her face as far away from him as possible. The struggle continued for minutes, then reached a stalemate. The day-care staff, looking on with increasing disgust and fatigue, offered such helpful comments as, “Come on Tyler. It’s time to go home now.”

As I left with my son, I reflected upon the spirit of the age that has blessed us with such incidents. Perhaps some non-aversive method of discipline would have made that terrible child comply with his mother’s request quickly, but I cannot think of it. I am convinced that the most effective solution in that particular instance would have been a sharp, compliance-inducing swat on the bottom.

But what parent does that today when people are watching? The antispanking movement of the last 15 years has done a brilliant job propagating the view that spanking is just another form of child abuse. Today, normal parents are not just frightened of appearing abusive; they also fear that an occasional swat to the behind can turn their little darling into a dangerously aggressive adolescent and an incorrigibly criminal adult, as the “scientific evidence” says. In fact, the antispanking movement, and its agents in the mainstream media, has used this weak, and in some cases simply non-existent, evidence to beat parents into submission. Antispanking advocates have given us nothing more than a smattering of half-truths along with heavy smacks of propaganda.

Before I continue, let me state categorically that I reject spanking as a primary method of discipline. Let no one see this article as encouragement to parents to spank their children for every little thing. It goes without saying that I support all efforts to end the physical abuse of children, but I do not think that spanking, used rarely and judiciously, is abuse. Rather, it can be useful in some situations, with many kids.

But what is spanking? Antispankers define it as broadly as possible, not just to show that spanking causes harm, but to more easily place it on a continuum with child abuse. One antispanking article, for example, defined spanking as “any disciplinary hitting of kids that’s not injurious or currently considered abusive.” Note the emotive and misleading word hitting which can include punching, cuffing, boxing the ears, and slapping the face. But the meaning of the word spanking, which has remained relatively stable over the centuries, is quite different from these abusive behaviors. The English language’s most authoritative source, the Oxford English Dictionary, defines the verb to spank as “To slap or smack (a person, esp. a child) with the open hand.” Its earliest etymological entry, dated 1727, reads, “To spank, to slap with the open Hand.” Another citation from 1889 shows how it was done then (and continues to be done now): “My mother . . . lifted me cleverly [and] planted two spanks behind.” In 1996, the Canadian Paediatric Society (CPS) gave a similar definition of “disciplinary spanking”: “[It] is physically non-injurious, administered with an opened hand to the buttocks, and intended to modify behavior.” This is the definition agreed upon by the American Academy of Pediatrics and the one I use. I reject any broader definition as an insidious effort to demonize this age-old and harmless practice.

IN CANADA, THE ANTISPANKING MOVEMENT HAS EMBARKED ON what it hopes is a final offensive against spanking. Last year, an advocacy group called the Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law received $45,000 from the Federal Court Challenges Program to help it mount a Charter of Rights and Freedoms challenge to Section 43 of the Criminal Code, which allows parents to use “reasonable force” in correcting their children. The foundation spearheads the Canadian branch of a North America-wide movement of liberal child-care professionals, assorted experts, and sundry kind-hearted folk that seeks to abolish every form of physical punishment aimed at children. These people are not just concerned with clear child abuse; Canadian law, they say, should not permit parents even the open-handed, non-injurious smack to a defiant child’s bottom. They therefore want to repeal Section 43, not amend it. If the foundation wins, police could lay assault charges against parents who swat their four-year-old. Because the legal challenge is underway in the lower courts, the foundation’s lawyers are not talking to journalists. No one knows when the process will be completed.

Many people fear that a repeal of Section 43 could criminalize a vast number of otherwise law-abiding citizens. In a 1995 letter to the Canadian Medical Association Journal, Dr. Bruce Williams highlights the irony: “Those who oppose the use of punishment in raising children favor the use of punishment, in the form of criminal sanctions, to deal with those who use corporal punishment on their children.”

Of course, propagandists for the cause deny that parents who only spank will face any criminal charges after the repeal. “Minor breaches of the law are not prosecuted,” stated antispanking lawyer Corinne Robertshaw in 1997. Toronto Star columnist Michele Landsberg assumes, “No cop or children’s aid worker is ever going to report the parent who merely spanks a toddler’s bottom for darting into the road.” Really? Perhaps Robertshaw and Landsberg can explain why U.S. tourist David Peterson was charged with assault in 1994 and locked up in a London, Ontario, jail when some local do-gooder saw him spank his five-year-old daughter and reported him to the cops. Peterson was no abusive, ignorant, and drunken bully, viciously whacking his daughter indiscriminately: Described as “mild mannered” in newspaper and magazine accounts, Peterson has an MBA and is a specialist in production management. His wife, Paula, has an MA in early childhood education and was working on her doctorate at the time. Peterson had followed an established family procedure, spanking his child only after she had been given sufficient warning and had persisted in her behavior. The judge threw out the case, but if someone can be prosecuted while spanking is still legal, what will happen when it is actually illegal?

Writing in the Canadian Paediatric Society News Bulletin, Dr. Mervyn Fox, former chair of the CPS’s Psychosocial Paediatrics Committee, gives another reason to question Robertshaw and Landsberg’s assumptions: “I consult on behavioral paediatrics at a children’s mental health centre in a county whose Children’s Aid Society has a strong bias against any physical punishment. The society is widely regarded as punitive rather than rehabilitative, absolutist rather than allowing for individual variations. In consequence, parents are afraid to use any discipline for fear of prosecution.”

ANTISPANKERS ATTRIBUTE MUCH OF THE VIOLENCE IN NORTH AMERICAN SOCIETY — the urban violence among youth, the vandalism, the brutal rapes — directly to the physical punishment of children. According to the doyen of antispanking advocates, University of New Hampshire sociologist Professor Murray Straus, “Although physical punishment may produce conformity in the immediate situation, in the longer run, it tends to increase the probability of deviance, including delinquency in adolescence and violent crime inside and outside the family as an adult [sic].”

The North American media seems to agree with Straus’s conclusions and uncritically publishes every questionable claim. In August 1997, the journal Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine published yet another study led by Straus; the study “showed” that spanking children is “a significant predictor of ASB [antisocial behavior] two years later.” Every major newspaper reported it, with some running opinion pieces by self-appointed experts that said, basically, “children whose parents still swat them on the bottom will grow up to be violent monsters.”

Even without a PhD in sociology, the average person, using his common sense, should be suspicious of studies that claim spanking increases societal violence. The first question the skeptic asks: Was there more violence and crime in the ’50s and ’60s than there is now? The answer, of course, is no. “To be sure, there is at least three times as much violent crime today as there was 30 years ago,” writes Harvard’s James Q. Wilson, author of Crime and Human Nature and The Moral Sense. But if the theory that more spanking equals more societal violence is correct, the ’50s and ’60s should have been a hellish period of violent crime. Parents spanked more then. According to Straus himself, 99 per cent of American parents spanked or used some form of corporal punishment in 1950; today, everyone, including Straus, agrees that the use of corporal punishment and spanking has declined. Survey figures say that 70 to 90 per cent of parents now spank.

A careful look at U.S. crime statistics also refutes the idea that spanking equals more societal violence. Between 1985 and 1993, violent crime actually decreased by 20 per cent among males 25 or older, while it increased 65 per cent for males 18 to 24 and by 165 per cent for 14- to 17-year-old males. So those who grew up in a period of more spanking were, and are, less violent than younger people who have grown up in a period of declining approval and practice of spanking. This does not prove that a decrease in spanking makes societies more violent, but these statistics throw cold water on any notion that blames spanking for societal violence.

Some may say, “Well, that’s the U.S., they’re crazier down there; there may be other reasons — availability of guns for instance — that have skewed the statistics.” These doubters should consider Sweden, a historically nonviolent country and a favorite of antispanking advocates. The Swedish government outlawed spanking in 1979 and operated an extensive education program to wean parents away from corporal punishment. Since the ban, police reports of teen violence have soared sixfold, according to Statistics Sweden. “What is happening in Sweden is gang violence, mobbing as they call it over there,” says non-abusive spanking researcher Dr. Robert Larzelere, a director of research at the Youth Care Building in Boys Town, Nebraska, and a vocal critic of the blanket antispanking position. “Violence has dramatically increased over the last decade or more.”

Despite this evidence, antispanking advocates continue to link spanking and violence. At a 1996 corporal punishment conference, Straus cited anthropologist Ashley Montague who argued that “spanking the baby may be the psychological seed of war.” In 1978, Montague gathered eight anthropologists who had studied nonviolent primitive societies such as the Fore of New Guinea and the Aborigines of Australia. These anthropologists published their accounts of primitive child-rearing practices in the book Learning Non-Aggression, which showed that none of these nonviolent societies spanked their children.

But Laurie J. Bauman of the department of pediatrics, Albert Einstein College of Medicine, criticized Straus’s logic by pointing out that these “societal level studies cannot be used to show causality.” Other factors (rather than spanking) could have made these societies nonviolent, factors like overall social attitudes and values.

But let us ignore this academic position for a moment and see things again as a layperson. Modern Singapore provides an extreme example of a spanking society. In the home, Singaporean parents cane their children and strongly approve of physical discipline; in school, headmasters physically discipline unruly delinquents; and, of course, Singapore still whips adults in its criminal justice system. According to the logic of antispankers, Singapore should be the most violent society on earth, a Hobbesian world where life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Yet Singapore is one of the most nonviolent of industrialized societies and, in fact, surpasses Sweden in many measures of nonviolence. In Singapore, women walk the streets freely without fear of violent sexual assault. Children are well behaved and respectful; vandalism and juvenile delinquency are rare; and Singaporean schoolchildren perform remarkably well on international measures of academic achievement.

I am not saying Singapore’s authoritarian culture is good for Canada; we couldn’t adopt it anyway, given our different social structure, governance, attitudes, and history. But Singapore shows that the spanking-equals-societal-violence thesis does not even stand up to casual scrutiny. The issue is far more complex than the antispankers purport.

UP UNTIL 1980, MANY IF NOT MOST PEDIATRICIANS AND CHILD-CARE PROFESSIONALS endorsed spanking — including “progressive” child-rearing gurus like Dr. Benjamin Spock. But so tremendous an ideological change occurred in the intervening years that few Canadian child-care professionals today will publicly endorse moderate spanking. Part of this ideological change grew out of an increased public awareness of child abuse. But part of the change follows baby boomers’ rise to power. In The Lyric Generation, a masterful dissection of the boomer era, Quebec writer François Ricard writes that the boomer generation views the world as an immense open field to take apart and remake as they please “in their own image and for their own fulfilment, without hinderance and without compromise.” The boomers’ wish to create a perfect world, writes Ricard, is an “innocent desire, and therefore terrible. Before it, all the world can do is brace itself.”

In the pre-boomer era, the world had a different notion of childhood, continues Ricard. “Even though they were lovingly adored, children were still treated as imperfect beings, precious certainly, but incomplete, and by virtue of that fact, obliged to bend to the authority and strictures of adults. Thus it was that only 50 years ago, the strap and spanking were considered perfectly normal disciplinary measures both at home and at school.” But in the postwar years, society came to see childhood as more complete and perfect, a territory ruled by its own laws; adults now had to conform to the rules of childhood rather than the other way around.

Many child-care professionals from the baby boomer generation assumed they knew best how to raise other people’s children; their pronouncements on the very latest, enlightened child-rearing methods served only to undermine the confidence of parents, who then doubted that they knew how to raise decent, well-adjusted children. Instead of relying on intuition, tradition, and the accumulated wisdom of community and relatives, parents began flocking to parenting clinics and bookstores to buy mostly inane, idiotic, and impractical child-rearing books. (I know. I have read an unnecessarily large number of them.) These enlightened professionals brought us permissive parenting and its numerous blessings; the antispanking movement is their latest effort to make childhood yet more perfect, while removing the last vestiges of parental authority.

Within the child-development professions and among the researchers, however, a battle still rages over the meaning of corporal punishment and spanking research. On the one side are those who want all forms of corporal punishment, including spanking, banned because it is harmful and doesn’t work. Anthony M. Graziano, Jessica L. Hamblen, and Wendy A. Plante write in Pediatrics: “It is . . . reasonable to assume the position that corporal punishment in child rearing should be discouraged because it is morally objectionable and, in any event, is not even needed.” On the other side are those who do not necessarily support spanking, but they think that there is not enough evidence to demand a blanket ban, or to lecture parents on how to discipline their children. People like Boys Town’s Larzelere, or the venerable Diana Baumrind of Berkeley, who has researched child development for almost 50 years, argue that spanking is effective and not harmful to children between two and six if used sparingly to back up other non-aversive disciplinary measures.

THOSE ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERTS WHO HAVE ACCEPTED THE antispanking paradigm (a significant number) write as if it is the only rational decision based on the scientific evidence. Their writings, however, reveal little evidence, much opinion, and a good deal of exaggeration and moralizing. But who says the acceptance of a new ideological view has to be a rational decision? “Individual scientists embrace a new paradigm for all sorts of reasons,” wrote the late philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. “Some of these reasons . . . lie outside the apparent sphere of science entirely. Others must depend upon idiosyncrasies of autobiography and personality.”

Personal idiosyncracies may explain the strange comments and claims in antispanking literature, scientific and otherwise. For instance, in a 1992 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association, David Orentlicher pronounces, “Children are the only citizens who can be beaten with impunity, and this probably arises from the belief that children are the property of others rather than human beings who have rights.” I must have missed something; Orentlicher has to be writing about some Third World country instead of the United States. As far as I know, any teacher or parent who beats a child with impunity in any part of North America will face criminal charges if caught.

An electronic search of the medical and psychological literature for spanking or corporal punishment turns up several studies written or co-authored by Straus. When some antispanking advocates claim that the evidence against spanking is “overwhelming,” in many cases, they are referring to studies led by this tireless social researcher. Straus finds that (1) all the really violent societies in the world allow corporal punishment of children, (2) the greater the degree of approval of corporal punishment in a state, the higher the murder rate, (3) the more corporal punishment in schools, the higher the rate of violence among students, (4) the more corporal punishment in middle childhood or early adolescence, the greater the probability of crime and delinquent behavior, (5) corporal punishment is associated with poor interpersonal and managerial skills, depression, suicide, and alcohol abuse, (6) more corporal punishment means a lower likelihood of graduating from college, (7) corporal punishment increases the risk of becoming a generally angry person, and (8) the more corporal punishment a man experienced the more likely he is to beat his wife.

All this stuff must seem pretty compelling to true believers. But more thoughtful academics and laypeople will shake their heads and wonder. Straus’s studies, it seems, always confirm his hypotheses. However, it’s not the indefatigable researcher’s batting average of 1.000 that the skeptic finds amazing; it’s his ability to show connections between corporal punishment and virtually anything bad. At this rate, he may soon show that corporal punishment is associated with both world wars, and the Vietnam and the Persian Gulf wars.

Straus’s critics not only question his conclusions, they question his methodology. Donileen R. Loseke of Skidmore College in Saratoga Springs, New York, writes in the journal Social Problems: “Straus’s text represents one type of sociology, an ‘academic’ sociology that mimics the methods of the natural sciences, a sociology where the scientist claims expert status and tells others how they should think about their lives.” Demie Kurz of the University of Pennsylvania writes in the same journal: “Efforts by social scientists to predict adult functioning based on childhood experiences have been disappointing. Some children in adverse circumstances appear to be relatively invulnerable and thrive, while other children in privileged circumstances falter. . . . Straus does not adequately explain how physical punishment received in childhood becomes translated across the life cycle into adult acts of violence.”

In the August 1994 issue of the Journal of Marriage and the Family, Ronald L. Simons, Christine Johnson, and Rand D. Conger of Iowa State University present evidence that challenges some of Straus’s and other antispanking researchers’ findings. Before relating their findings — based on a sample of 332 families to find out how harsh corporal punishment and parental involvement affected adolescents — Simons and his colleagues summarized the criticisms of the antispanking studies done by Straus and others: “Critics have noted that most of these studies suffer from serious methodological limitations that preclude firm conclusions. The difficulties most often cited relate to sampling, measurement, and failure to utilize control groups.” Their own study showed that the level of parental support and involvement with children, not corporal punishment, predicted negative outcomes. “Once the effect of parental involvement was removed, corporal punishment showed no detrimental impact on adolescent aggressiveness, delinquency, or psychological well-being.” Doesn’t this fit better with what we know about the real world? A world in which nearly all our parents spanked, and we didn’t all grow up to be rapists and murderers?

But what has to be considered the most powerful criticism of antispanking research — because it comes from the master himself — can be found in Straus’s latest study published in Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine. Perhaps to show what a great step forward he has taken in this new study, he writes, “Most [previous] studies have relied on correlational data, which cannot establish CP [corporal punishment] as a cause of behavioral or emotional problems for children. Even the few longitudinal studies have failed to control for a child’s aggression at the time, or have confounded spanking with other disciplinary practices. Thus controversy continues to exist, and there are strong grounds for caution about whether existing research supports the theory that CP causes ASB [antisocial behavior] by children.”

So, many of the studies antispankers cite actually show that spanking is correlated with antisocial behaviors, rather than show it to be causally related. Why is this a problem? Because correlation doesn’t tell us much about cause, as British psychologist Robin Dunbar shows in The Trouble with Science: Researchers at Israel’s Tel Aviv University once reported that people with thin moustaches are more likely to get ulcers than anyone else, yet you’d be a fool to cut off your thin moustache based on this evidence. It merely means that many people who have ulcers have thin moustaches (perhaps due to an uptight personality), and not that thin moustaches cause ulcers. “The central problem in science,” writes Dunbar, “is how to differentiate between real causal effects and the spurious ones that are due to confounding variables.”

To be fair to Straus, in many of his studies, he does warn that the data is correlational and therefore the conclusions cannot be taken as definitive. But the more evangelical of his followers haven’t heeded these words of caution; in movements that want to change the world, impatient followers often ignore the caveats of their more subtle leaders, as do reporters hungry for a sensational story.

To improve the evidence for causality, Straus embarked on the study that would later appear in Archives of Pediatrics and garner so much media attention. This longitudinal study, co-authored by David B. Sugarman, and Jean Giles-Sims, looked at a sample of 807 mothers (aged 14 to 21 when first interviewed and aged 21 to 28 when assessed for Straus’s data) of children six to nine years. Straus statistically controlled for variables — demographic characteristics, the children’s prior aggressive behavior, the children’s gender, and the level of emotional support in the family — that could muddy the results. Straus and his colleagues, of course, found that after controlling for all these effects, “CP remains a statistically significant predictor of ASB two years later.”

The criticisms have already come pouring in. “Straus’s study doesn’t demonstrate a causal relationship between spanking and aggressive behavior,” says Dr. Den Trumbull, a Montgomery, Alabama, pediatrician. “At best it demonstrates an association between abusive corporal punishment and aggression in children.” For many years Trumbull, a fellow of the American Academy of Pediatrics and a member of the AAP’s Section on Developmental and Behavioral Pediatrics, has been an incisive critic of the views of Straus and other antispankers. Trumbull criticizes Straus’s new study for excluding children aged two to six, the age at which spanking is most effective. “He had the data, but he didn’t publish the results. Instead, he chose children between six to nine years of age, a group, I believe, where spanking should be infrequently needed and used.”

Trumbull also argues that the children with whom Straus found his strongest association had been spanked three or more times in the previous week. “If you are spanking children three times a week at ages six to nine years, it is a marker for dysfunctional parenting. You are obviously having difficulty with the child, and the child may actually have other problems going on.”

Boys Town’s Larzelere also criticized Straus’s study. Although he acknowledges that it is better designed than other studies that tried to show detrimental outcomes for physical punishment, “the only thing Straus et al. . . . have proven is that spanking six- to nine-year-olds at the rate of 156 times a year has a small but detrimental effect.” Larzelere calculates this effect as a meagre 1.3 per cent increase in antisocial behavior. And furthermore, says Larzelere, because of the wording of the study’s questions, most of the children who were actually spanked from 1 to 25 times a year fell into Straus’s non-spanking and most improved group. This obviously skews the results in the direction Straus wants. “The parents were asked how many times in the past week they spanked their six- to nine-year-old child. I point out to Straus that the parents who were spanking occasionally, say once a year or even up to as many times as 25 times a year, are more likely to be in his no-spanking group since they were only asked, ‘how many times did you spank in the past week.'”

Archives of Pediatrics and Adolescent Medicine published Larzelere’s critique in the March 1998 issue, which included two other critical letters; in one of them, Dr. Balamurali K. Ambati of the Beth Israel Medical Center in New York, Dr. Jayakrishna Ambati, and Dr. Ambati

M. Rao write: “This highly publicized article is riddled with methodological and statistical flaws that cast light more on the long-established biases of Dr. Straus and colleagues than on CP’s use in discipline. . . . Corporal punishment is a time-tested tool employed in the disciplinary armamentarium of many cultures. The erosion of traditional family values in the United States has paralleled efforts to impugn this practice, and [the U.S.] rises in social decay, while Eastern societies (where CP is common) continue to best the United States in both academic and social indicators of youth welfare. . . . The sweeping conclusion of Straus et al. that elimination of CP will reduce the level of violence in U.S. society is based on little more than statistical quicksand and methodological thin ice.”

The most powerful critique of Straus’s work comes from the study — by Dr. Marjorie Lindner Gunnoe of the Department of Psychology, Calvin College, Grand Rapids, Michigan, and Carrie Lea Mariner of Child Trends Inc., Washington — that directly follows his in the journal. Although every media outlet, with the notable exception of the New York Times, ignored it, both Trumbull and Larzelere think Gunnoe’s study is stronger and better designed, and Larzelere describes it as a top 10 “gold standard” study. Like Straus, Gunnoe sets out to test whether spanking causes aggression in children; like Straus, she controlled for confounding variables. But her sample size of 1,112 children is larger than Straus’s, the 4 to 11 age range is wider, and she examined the effects of spanking after a longer period than Straus — five years, as opposed to two.

Unlike Straus, Gunnoe does not assume the simplistic theoretical link between spanking and aggression, violence, and murder. She focuses, more realistically, on the family context. Like most child-development experts, she believes that harsh and abusive discipline can create violent and antisocial individuals, normal spanking may or may not, depending on the cultural context, child’s age, and the meaning the child ascribes to that spanking.

So if, for instance, a culture treats the strap and the cane as normal disciplinary measures that loving parents use to correct children, the child will accept them as such. If children understand and accept the authority of their parents, then spanking is unlikely to have negative outcomes. Children see spanking either as an expression of legitimate parental authority, or as a personal attack, and different outcomes result in either case. In my view, this theoretical formulation better explains the real world.

Gunnoe found that spanking deters fighting for all children aged four to seven years; she found no evidence that spanking boys younger than six or girls younger than eight fostered aggression. She also found a link between spanking outcome and race. She discovered that African-American children whose parents spank generally fight less. She theorizes that this may be because African-Americans regard spanking as necessary and good for the kind of environment they live in. African-Americans tend to regard “time-outs” — the nouveau method of discipline that puts a child in a corner or chair for a few minutes — with mild contempt as a “white thing.”

Gunnoe did find that spanking creates aggression in one subgroup — 8- to 11-year-old white boys in single mother families. Boys in such families, she argues, may tend to see themselves as more similar to adults, taking the place of the absent father. Consequently, some may see spanking as a personal attack. Furthermore, other research shows that single mothers tend to have difficulties maintaining normal parental authority over their sons, putting these boys at risk for antisocial behavior and delinquency.

Gunnoe’s finding about single mothers forms the core of her criticism of Straus’s study. She wonders why two similar studies should come up with such different results and attributes the difference to Straus’s choice of data. Straus did not account for “interactions between family structure,” she writes. “This is potentially consequential, given that the older children in [Straus’s study] are, owing to the sample design, a group of children born to young and disproportionately single mothers.”

So, the scientific evidence is weak for the claim that spanking leads to all kinds of very bad things for children and society. Anyone really interested in an overall view of what the best known U.S. experts actually say on the subject should read the August 1996 supplement to the journal Pediatrics. (Most of the primary North American research has been done in the U.S. In Canada, research tends to involve reviewing the empirical work of researchers in the U.S. and elsewhere.) It published papers presented at a conference on the consequences of corporal punishment called by the American Academy of Pediatrics and held at Elk Grove Village, Illinois, in February that year. The conference was held ostensibly to help the AAP reach a position on spanking, which it had been unable to do for six years. All the heavyweights in child-development research were there — 24 of them, including Straus himself — but they could not reach an agreement on the consequences of spanking, many of them rejecting the idea that normal disciplinary spanking is harmful. One of the 13 consensus statements they made states, “Data relative to the long-term consequences of spanking of preschool children are inconclusive.”

Dr. Larzelere’s thoroughly rigorous review of what he considers quality studies on spanking is particularly worth reading. Of the 35 studies that met his stringent inclusion standards, 9 (26 per cent) found beneficial outcomes, 14 (40 per cent) neutral outcomes, and 12 (34 per cent) found predominantly detrimental outcomes. After finding that 66 per cent of the reliable studies see no harm in spanking, Larzelere declared in his personal conference statement that “antispanking rhetoric far exceeds its empirical support.”

Yet antispanking advocates continue to sign up supporters for their cause. In April this year, the AAP’s Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health, claiming to be guided by information from the conference, came out with a document that took a strong antispanking stance. This despite the lack of consensus among the 24 experts invited, and despite the fact that the experts agreed that conclusions couldn’t be drawn without more research. Why would they now take such a strong stance when nothing new and definitive has been published to clear up the controversy? One of the 24 experts at the conference attributes it to politics, not science — he suggests they succumbed to pressure from outside child-advocate organizations.

In any case, in 1996, the Canadian Paediatric Society’s Psychosocial Paediatrics Committee also carried out a review of virtually the same evidence, and came to the more evidence-based conclusion that “Controversy persists regarding the consequences of spanking. Additional research is needed to clarify issues.” In an article written last year in the CPS journal Paediatrics and Child Health, the chair of the committee, Dr. William J. Mahoney, wrote: “What is missing from the available literature is evidence that disciplinary spanking administered in a non-angry situation has negative outcomes. There is some evidence that it can be effective.” I recently spoke to Calgary pediatrician Dr. Peter Nieman, a member of the Psychosocial Paediatrics Committee of the CPS, and the principal author of its statement on discipline. “We thoroughly examined the evidence from both Canada and the U.S,” he said. “The truth is, there is really not enough scientific data to say that appropriate disciplinary spanking is bad, period, and it should be banned, period. Appropriate spanking is not harmful physically or mentally to a child.”

SO WHERE DOES THIS REJECTION OF THEIR SCIENTIFIC CLAIMS LEAVE THE antispanking lobby? With a lot of sermonizing, loads of half-baked opinions, and very poor moral arguments. In the spring 1994 issue of Empathic Parenting, the journal of the Canadian Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, British child psychologist Penelope Leach writes, “Spanking is wrong because we all agree that hitting people is wrong and children are people.” This sort of argument may sound good on first reading, but we can’t make such blanket statements because in many situations most of us agree hitting people is “necessary.” If you go to a bar and start a brawl, the bouncers may use reasonable force to eject you; if you go outside and continue, the police will show up, and ask you to cease and desist. If you do not and “show verbal non-compliance,” you might receive a disabling whack, delivered to the outside of the thigh with a nightstick. Comfortable middle-class antispankers forget that our society gives authority figures the right to use “reasonable force” to control public disturbances; similarly, in that microcosm of society, the family, the authority figures of the home — parents — should have the right to do the same to control the behavior of their children.

Leach’s arguments get worse: “When a mugger hits an old lady for money,” she writes, “or a child hits another for candy, is it any different from when a parent hits a child to get him to obey?” It’s difficult to take this seriously. Unlike normal parental spanking, mugging for money and snatching candy are purely egotistical acts; when responsible parents spank their children, they seek neither personal satisfaction nor gain: they seek to correct inappropriate behavior, for the child’s ultimate benefit. In many cases, the parent is reluctant to spank, and feels terrible after doing it. Does this describe the average mugger or candy-snatching kid?

Other antispankers argue that if we consider ourselves moral beings, we should not strike children to correct them. But parents who spank generally do so as part of a larger effort to teach children moral behavior. Antispankers argue that this is illogical, because you can’t teach people not to hit others by hitting them, yet many useful, and even necessary, human behaviors appear illogical on paper. We fight large conflagrations by setting small controlled fires; in medicine, we end major pain and suffering by inflicting the relatively minor pain of surgery, injection, or dental operation. Causing children minor pain to correct a larger ill is neither inherently immoral nor illogical.

Antispankers suggest, in place of spanking, time-outs, reasoning, and removal of privileges. These are fine measures, which should be among every parent’s disciplinary tools. But are they workable at all times and for all ages? Antispanking dogmatists stoutly insist that they are; if you point out that these measures are not working for your kid, you’re simply not doing it right, you incompetent parent. But columnist John Rosemond, the bête noire of the U.S. psychological community, explains that time-outs sometimes don’t work. “The letter writer advises that time-out will work if it is used consistently,” he writes in one of his newspaper columns. “The problem is, one cannot use time-out consistently. It is difficult, if not impossible, to use if a behavior problem occurs away from home or when the parents are rushing out of the house to make an appointment. And children who are inclined toward misbehavior figure these things out quickly.” As a parent, I wholeheartedly agree. As for reasoning, a review of studies on verbal explanation and reasoning led by Nathan J. Blum of the University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, and published in Pediatrics, found that “verbal explanations and instructions are not effective in changing young children’s problem behaviors.”

RATHER THAN A REPEAL, CHILD-WELFARE ADVOCATES SHOULD CALL FOR AN amendment to the Criminal Code’s Section 43, to close loopholes that allow abusive parents to escape punishment. Instead of allowing parents the right to use “reasonable force” — which can be interpreted in various ways — the law could clearly specify what is acceptable and what is not. But it should not ban spanking outright.

I personally believe that a large number of do-gooders out there are just itching to get their hands on a legal stick with which to beat that Neanderthal pro-spanking majority among parents. A general survey of Americans shows that antispanking is the moral view of a minority of the population: The greatest supporters of antispanking are educated, white, middle-class women. I have absolutely nothing against educated, white, middle-class women; I just don’t think that the morality of this minority should be imposed on the rest of us. A blanket ban will especially affect immigrants whom, I suspect, more often spank their children. Why criminalize a growing segment of our population, the majority of whom are otherwise law abiding, simply because they have a different view on how to raise decent children?

Where is all this leading? Retired Vancouver child psychiatrist Thomas P. Millar thinks that the antispanking movement is part of a wider agenda to ban all forms of punishment. It is easy to dismiss this claim until you discover that eminent antispanker Dr. Joan McCord of Temple University argues that we should question the value of all forms of punishment because they all lead to the same evil things Straus claims for spanking. The battle lines over this particular conflict have already been drawn: At a conference on Research in Discipline, held in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, in 1996, McCord declared that the research showed that all punishment is unnecessary and undesirable, while another heavyweight in the field, Berkeley’s Baumrind, argued that the research showed the opposite.

If we are headed for McCord’s world, we should heed the warning of that great historian of Roman affairs, Jérôme Carcopino, writing in his masterpiece Daily Life in Ancient Rome. He was describing the Roman Empire at the height of its prosperity and decadence, just before it embarked on its 350-year decline: “The laws had once more adapted themselves to public feeling which, condemning the atrocious severities of the past, asked . . . nothing more of paternal authority than . . . natural affection. . . . But, unhappily, the Romans failed to strike the happy mean. They were not content to lessen the old severity; they yielded to the impulse to become far too complaisant. . . . The result was that they were succeeded by a generation of idlers and wastrels.”

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Book reviews – War on jihad

Preston Jones
The Next City
June 21, 1998

 

The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam: From Jihad to Dhimmitude

by Bat Ye’or (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1996. 522 pages) US$19.95

NEWSWEEK MAGAZINE’S MARCH 16, 1998, issue portrays America’s second generation, modern young Muslims as the future of the Islamic faith. “In El Cerrito, California, Shahed Amanullah knows it’s time to pray, not by a muezzin’s call from a mosque minaret,” writes Carla Power, “but because his PowerMac has chimed. A verse from the Koran hangs by his futon. Near the bookcases — lined with copies of Wired magazine and Jack Kerouac novels — lies a red Arabian prayer rug. There’s a plastic compass sewn into the carpet, its needle pointing toward Mecca.”

Further on, Power tells us that America’s Muslims — who number between two and six million (no firm statistics exist) — are “taking on stereotypes” and the “status quo.” That is, they are bothered that Islam in its entirety is associated in the popular mind with the terrorist likes of Hamas and Algerian and Egyptian extremists. “By going back to the basic texts,” Power writes, these young Americanized Muslims are “rediscovering an Islam founded on tolerance, social justice, and human rights.”

It would be interesting, indeed, to see how one could go back to 7th century Arabia and find a faith rooted in philosophical goods — “tolerance, social justice, and human rights” — that were not propounded until the early modern period, and then only in Western Europe. But putting that aside, these American Muslims’ desire to put a human, and humane, face on Islam is admirable, for it does get an unfortunate, if understandable, amount of bad press. Yet it should also be said that unless their enterprise is based in reality, unless it is rooted in facts, it will not stand. Which brings us to Bat Ye’or’s The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam, whose project is getting at the facts of Islam’s historical relationship with the Christians, and to a lesser extent, the Jews of the Middle-east, Eastern Europe, and Northern Africa from the 7th to the 20th centuries.

A Jew born in Egypt, Bat Ye’or has been a British citizen since 1959 and currently resides in France. All of her books, including this one, were written and first published in French. And while she apparently does not relish controversy — she notes more than once that she bears no animus toward Islam — neither does she sacrifice what she thinks is historical truth for the sake of niceness.

In his foreword to this book, Jacques Ellul, who until his recent death was a prominent French legal theorist, theologian, and culture critic, notes that due to political sensibilities (and, one would think, a fear of being thought sympathetic to France’s far-right, anti-immigrant National Front), scholars have been reluctant to speak and write seriously about jihad. Scholars who grappled with jihad usually emphasized its explicitly spiritual components.

In the spiritual sense, jihad is a struggle that each Muslim believer “has to wage against his own evil inclinations and his tendency to disbelief,” and this, writes Ellul, is something with which believers in most religions can identify. But jihad means more, too: From the 7th century to the present one, jihad has often meant literal warfare. “The world, as Bat Ye’or brilliantly shows, is divided into two regions: the dar al-Islam and the dar al-harb; in other words, the ‘domain of Islam’ and ‘the domain of war,'” Ellul continues. “[In Islam the] world is no longer divided into nations, peoples, and tribes. Rather, they are located en bloc in the world of war, where war is the only possible relationship with the outside world. The earth belongs to Allah, and all its inhabitants must acknowledge this reality; to achieve this goal there is but one method: war.” Ellul notes that the Koran does provide for peace with the dar al-harb; in many circumstances, of course, it is best not to wage war. “But this changes nothing,” Ellul writes: “war remains an institution, which means that it must resume as soon as circumstances permit.”

That war is near the heart of Islam should, at least from a historical perspective, not come as a surprise. Muhammad, Islam’s divine prophet, was himself a military commander; and as Bat Ye’or makes clear, Islam was born in a culture wracked by violence. So while Islam took much of its ethical teaching from the two biblical religions (Judaism and Christianity), the customs of the nomadic tribes of Arabia’s Hijaz, Islam’s birthplace, conditioned Islam’s interactions with non-Muslims. Thus Bat Ye’or writes that when Islamized Bedouins raided the towns of Babylonia (in present-day Iraq) and Syria in the early 7th century, Christians who lived in those places perceived these destructions as “no more than the usual predatory activities. But they were mistaken — this was jihad.” This was also the beginning of the astonishing spread of Islam from Arabia to the borders of China in the East and, in the West, to the gates of Vienna, where Islam was checked by Western forces in 1683.

The bulk of this book is dedicated to explaining what happened to Christians and Jews or, in Islamic parlance, to the “Peoples of the Book,” that is, the dhimmis who were subjugated by Muslim rulers. Originally the dhimma was a “protection pact” granted by Muhammad to the Peoples of the Book he had conquered. But before long, this protection became outright oppression. “The dhimma required the humiliation of the dhimmis, who were accused of falsifying the Bible by deletions, distortions, and omissions of the prophecies heralding Muhammad’s mission,” Bat Ye’or writes. “Their persistence in error, regarded as the mark of a diabolical nature, condemned them to degradation.”

Thus does Bat Ye’or seek to modify the conventional wisdom of most general world history textbooks, namely, that Christians and Jews who lived in lands conquered by Muslims from the 7th century have for the most part enjoyed relative peace and freedom. “During 13 centuries and on three continents the dhimmi peoples are presented [in most textbooks and by most scholars] as having uniformly and indefinitely enjoyed a status of benevolent tolerance,” Bat Ye’or writes. “Bursts of fanaticism and waves of persecution, when they are not obfuscated, are interpreted as exceptional situations, often attributable to the victims themselves or to foreign [i.e., European] provocation.”

Bat Ye’or does not accept this view, of course, in part because it flies in the face of human experience. “This puerile interpretation of dhimmi life — resembling idealized illustrations — endows Islam with an exceptional aura,” she notes. “This collective paradisiacal condition, which, allegedly, would have encompassed 13 centuries for millions of individuals, has never in fact been experienced by any people, at any period, anywhere in the world — because it is unfortunately incompatible with the human condition.”

In The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam, Bat Ye’or also dispenses with the widely accepted claim that Islamic civilization produced great intellectual and political achievements. While that civilization saw many such achievements, she writes, few originated in Islam; and most derived from the learning of the dhimmi. “Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians . . . taught their oppressors, with the patience of centuries,” she writes. Indeed, from these dhimmi, Muslims learned “the subtle skills of governing empires, the need for law and order, the management of finances, the administration of town and countryside, the rules of taxation rather than those of pillage, the sciences, philosophy, literature and the arts, the organization and transmission of knowledge — in short, the rudiments and foundations of civilization.”

Bat Ye’or does not minimize Islamic civilization — she calls it “vast, rich, [and] complex” — or hide the discoveries of her considerable study. And readers who take the time to peruse the 175 pages of documentation appended to her narrative might find it difficult to argue with her.

Bat Ye’or is equally forthright in assessing the present world — a world in which jihad, in theory and practice, is alive and well. “The Islamist movement makes no secret of its intentions to convert the West,” she observes.

“Its propaganda, published in booklets sold in all European Islamic centres for the last 30 years, sets out its aims and the methods to achieve them. They include proselytism, conversion, marriage with local women, and, above all, immigration. Remembering that Muslims always began as a minority in the conquered countries . . . before becoming a majority, the ideologists of this movement regard Islamic settlement in Europe, the United States, and elsewhere as a chance for Islam.”

Which brings us to this question: Will critically minded North Americans engage Bat Ye’or’s assertions with the seriousness they deserve? I have put this project to my university students, two of whom are Muslims, as follows: There are some brutal passages in the Hebrew Scriptures (in, for example, the Book of Judges), but there are also parts of the same Scriptures (e.g., the Book of Jonah) that counteract the brutal ones. Given this, and combined with what we know of the practice of Judaism throughout the world, one would be hard pressed to prove that violence is near the heart of Judaism. The same can be said of Buddhism and Christianity. Of course, evils have been, are being, and will doubtless be perpetrated by Buddhists and Christians; but only the ignorant or the shallow would say that violence is near the heart of either of these two faiths. Can the same thing be said of Islam?

Bat Ye’or does not seem to think so. Neither is Harvard’s Samuel P. Huntington (The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, 1996) optimistic that Islam can live in relative peace with the dar al-harb (the “domain of war” where Islamic law does not rule). “Even more than Christianity, Islam is an absolutist faith,” he writes. “It merges religion and politics and draws a sharp line between those in the dar al-Islam and the dar al-harb. As a result, Confucians, Buddhists, Hindus, Western Christians, and Orthodox Christians have less difficulty adapting to, and living with, each other than any of them has in adapting to and living with Muslims.” And the rather vitriolic response Richard John Neuhaus, editor-in-chief of First Things, a journal of religion and public life, received from American Islamic organizations after he favorably reviewed Bat Ye’or in October 1997 does not lend itself to thinking her or Huntington wrong (for a report on the response to Neuhaus see the February 1998 issue of First Things or http://www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9802/public.html#Islamic).

But it is still too early to come to firm conclusions about the ability of the dar al-Islam to live at peace with the dar al-harb. My students have not yet reported back to me. In the meantime, we should not avoid tough questions simply because asking them is unpleasant.

To comment, write to PrestonJones@nextcity.com

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Response to Preston Jones’s review

Ibrahim Hooper, national communications director, Council on American-Islamic Relations, Washington, D.C., responds: September 28, 1998

Peace

Of course, no one ever saw this letter because First Things refused to print it.

First Things editor owes an apology to Muslims
by Ibrahim Hooper

In his October “Public Square” editorial (“The Approaching Century of Religion”), Richard John Neuhaus left little doubt as to his negative opinion of Islam. While it is common for Islamophobic writers to cast Islam as the “other,” it is quite rare that such views are stated so explicitly. Mr. Neuhaus says clearly: “The chief other is Islam.”

To drive that point home, Mr. Neuhaus uses the convenient journalistic cover of a book review; in this case an examination of The Decline of Eastern Christianity under Islam: From Jihad to Dhimmitude by Bat Ye’or.

It is Bat Ye’or’s, and clearly Mr. Neuhaus’s contention that Islam was, is, and always will be a threat to “Judeo-Christian” civilization. In this worldview, Islam is a “challenge” that the West is “afraid to understand.” Periods of relative inter-civilizational peace and stability are a “momentary pause” in the permanent jihad against the “infidels.”

Mr. Neuhaus uses the term jihad quite liberally yet fails to offer a definition. Jihad does not mean “holy war.” It means to strive, struggle, and exert effort. It is a central and broad Islamic concept that includes struggle against evil inclinations within oneself, struggle to improve the quality of life in society, struggle in the battlefield for self-defense (e.g., having a standing army for national defense), or fighting against tyranny or oppression. There is no such thing as holy war in Islam, as some careless translators may imply. It is rather a loaded medieval concept that did not arise from within the Muslim community.

What is a Muslim to make of claims such as: “Islam’s origins in the customs and values of the Arab Bedouins and of nomadic tribes have left it with the jihad as the only way of relating to the non-Islamic world.” Or what about his description of Middle East as “a world still steeped in the Arab and Bedouin mindset of the Prophet.” Or even worse: “Islam’s spectacular spread was brought about by brutal military conquest, rapine, spoliation, and slavery . . .”

Is this mere ignorance, or does it rise, as I believe, to the level of ethnic and religious hate mongering? How does Mr. Neuhaus explain the following verse from the Quran, Islam’s revealed text: “Those who believe (in the Quran), and those who follow the Jewish (scriptures), and the Christians and the Sabians — Any who believe in God and the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord; on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve.” (Chapter 2, verse 62)

Now perhaps being a Christian who accepted Islam, I was not given the proper Islamic playbook. I may have somehow remained unaware that I am supposed to be in a perpetual state of warfare with my “infidel” relatives. (It is interesting that since accepting Islam many years ago, I have never heard a Muslim utter the Hollywood B-movie word infidel. (Perhaps Mr. Neuhaus is misusing the Arabic word kafir, or “one who rejects faith.”) Given his obvious biases, Mr. Neuhaus will not be impressed with the Quranic verse, “Let there be no compulsion in religion.” (Chapter 2, verse 256)

As with other Islamophobes, many of whom are mentioned or quoted in the article, Mr. Neuhaus tosses off the usual disclaimer of not being anti-Muslim. Yet one wonders how anyone who puts Islamic civilization in quotation marks and agrees that “how little that is admired in Islamic civilization is original,” or that “the classical heritage that was presumably preserved by Islam was in fact rescued from Islam by those who fled its oppression,” can avoid such a label.

At this point it would normally be appropriate to mention a long list of contributions Muslims and Islamic culture have made to human civilization throughout the past 14 centuries. I might mention the astrolabe, the poetry of Rumi, the astronomical discoveries of Al-Biruni, al-Kindi’s and al-Farabi’s attempts to establish harmony between faith and science, the Bayt al-Hikma (House of Wisdom) in Baghdad, the founding of Al-Azhar University, the observatory at Jiapur, Ali bin Isa’s treatise on ophthalmology, and the mathematic concepts of Al-Khwarizmi (the word “algebra” is derived from his book Kitab al-Jabr al-Muqabala). This list does not even touch on Islamic art, architecture, medical discoveries, geographical studies, and a host of other contributions to world history and civilization. But of course, since Mr. Neuhaus believes all of these things were really “rescued” from Islam, there is no point in even mentioning them.

Mr. Neuhaus’ religious blinders apparently allow such convolutions of logic and reason as, “Bat Ye’or is at pains not to appear anti-Islamic . . . But the story she tells speaks for itself.” Or this: “However tortured the historical relationships between Christians and Jews, each community is identified by the same biblical narrative . . . Not so with Islam.”

Has Mr. Neuhaus ever picked up a Quran? Apparently not, judging from these bizarre statements. Does he really not know that Muslims believe in and revere Abraham, Moses, Mary, Isaac, Ismail, Solomon, Jesus, David, Aaron, Noah, and many other figures from what he arrogantly and exclusively labels the “Judeo-Christian” tradition?

Perhaps all this quoting of chapter and verse is ultimately pointless to Mr. Neuhaus. He states: “I believe Bat Ye’or and others are right to caution us against delusions; for instance, the delusion that a Muslim-Christian dialogue can be constructed on a basis more or less equivalent to the Jewish-Christian dialogue.”

Here we go again. Islam is somehow uniquely unqualified for inclusion in “our” discussions. This is the Islam of medieval polemics and the Crusades, all boiling oil and scimitars. How sad that a prestigious journal would publish such one-dimensional drivel.

As Professor Malcolm Barber wrote on the subject of the Crusader mentality, “The point is that Islam had to be presented as the enemy. Consequently, Muslim belief had to be disapproved or mocked, and Muslim social behavior distorted and denigrated.” (“How the West Saw Medieval Islam,” History Today, May 1, 1997)

And what does the Catholic Church (Mr. Neuhaus is after all also “Father Neuhaus”) have to say about Islam and the “delusions” of dialogue? In “Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documents” (1992 Edition), we find: “The Church has also a high regard for the Muslims. They worship God . . . They strive to submit themselves . . . just as Abraham submitted himself to God’s plan, to whose faith Muslims eagerly link their own . . . Over the centuries many quarrels and dissensions have arisen between Christians and Muslims. The sacred Council now pleads with all to forget the past, and urges that a sincere effort be made to achieve mutual understanding . . .” Apparently Father Neuhaus is out of touch with church teachings.

Mr. Neuhaus’ views on immigration and the American Muslim community are truly gut churning. He states: “The biggest problem in sight is Islam. People like Ellul and Bat Ye’or (and obviously Mr. Neuhaus) worry about the low-level jihad of Islamic immigration in Europe . . . and about the establishment of Islam in Bosnia.” One wonders if Mr. Neuhaus would have agreed with those who saw Catholic immigration to the U.S. as a low-level invasion or would he defend the “Christian” Serbs who sought to rid Bosnia of its “Muslim problem.” A chill goes up the spine reading such words.

According to Mr. Neuhaus, the problem of Islam in America is not yet at a critical stage. He states: “The situation in the U.S. is very different. There are probably no more than two million Muslims in this country [the real figure is more than double that], and half of them are native-born blacks . . . at present Muslims here pose no threat to the Judeo-Christian identity of the culture . . .”

Now what are we to make of this statement? Are “native-born blacks” more Islamically docile and therefore no threat to “Judeo-Christian” American civilization? Or are African-Americans so low in Mr. Neuhaus’ political hierarchy that they are hardly worth mentioning? Does Mr. Neuhaus advocate restrictions on immigration from Muslim areas of the world?

Mr. Neuhaus’ casual dismissal of African-Americans and American Muslims is both insulting and inaccurate. American Muslims have seen tremendous growth and development in the past 30 years. The number of mosques and Islamic centers now approaches 2,000 nationwide. Muslims have initiated drug eradication campaigns in the inner cities, participated in disaster relief efforts in the Midwest (including sending donations and volunteers to Oklahoma City after the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building) and are currently engaged in voter registration drives and grass-roots political organizing around the country.

Muslims are also starting to stand up to the discrimination and bias they face daily in the workplace, in schools and in the media. The Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), the organization I represent, began documenting anti-Muslim incidents in the wake of the Oklahoma City attack, when Muslims were unfairly linked to that crime. In the first few days after the bombing, CAIR recorded more than 200 incidents of harassment, threats and actual assault. One woman even lost her near-term baby when terrorized by unknown assailants who attacked her house.

CAIR’s 1997 report on the status of American Muslim civil rights detailed a three-fold increase in such incidents. Hysterical and inaccurate commentary has been shown to be a major causal factor in this trend toward stereotyping and scapegoating Muslims.

Mr. Neuhaus concludes by saying that he has tried unsuccessfully (what a surprise) to reach out to Muslims in the past. “As an institute and a journal, we have over the years tried to engage Muslims in the conversations of which we are part . . . It is an embarrassment that . . . the Muslim participation is almost nonexistent.” Then he explains why no suitable Muslim articles have been accepted: “Muslim authors . . . are typically so defensive, or so belligerent, or so self-serving — or all three at once — that they would only compound misunderstandings.”

The stark racism, xenophobia, and bigotry this statement, and the other statements outlined above expose, should have leapt off the page at any reasonable editor.

In the beginning of this article, I called Mr. Neuhaus an Islamophobe. Let us now review, based on the evidence of his own words, whether or not he deserves that title.

According to a report published by the Runnymede Trust in England, there are seven features of Islamophobic discourse. Does Mr. Neuhaus exhibit these traits?

1) Muslim culture seen as monolithic and unchanging. — Check.
2) Claims that Muslim cultures are wholly different from other cultures. — Check.
3) Islam perceived as implacably threatening. — Double check.
4) Claims that Islam’s adherents use their faith mainly for political or military advantage. — Check.
5) Muslim criticism of Western cultures and societies rejected out of hand. — Check.
6) Fear of Islam mixed with racist hostility to immigration. — Triple check.
7) Islamophobia assumed to be natural and unproblematic. — Naturally.

Mr. Neuhaus owes an apology to the Muslim community, to his superiors in the Catholic Church, and to his readers.

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