Commentary

Lawrence Solomon
CBC commentary
March 10, 1993

The man has performed miracles since taking the helm of the continent’s most inefficient utility barely three months ago. Think of the challenge before him last December: an organization that needed 24% more staff than Canada’s other utilities to produce a kilowatt hour of power . Wages and benefits that averaged $69,000 per person. Tottering nuclear plants that needed billions in repairs. The Darlington nuclear plant, $10 billion over budget. A $6 billion commitment to throw money away on conservation programs so flawed that consumers would often have gotten more environmental benefits using the dollar bills as insulation and stuffing them in their attics. The result of these Hydro excesses: rate increases of 30% over the past three years, and status as Canada’s #1 polluter.

Maurice Strong has stopped the Hydro monster, often with the grudging support of those most affected. 6,000 jobs are being eliminated, most of them voluntarily; the bulk of the conservation boondoggle has been short-circuited; a massive capital expansion has been slashed, as has billions which were scheduled to be spent on misguided attempts to salvage the company’s ruinous nuclear program. Rates are to be capped at inflation over the rest of the decade.

But the monster is far from slain. With its monopoly in place, Hydro remains over $30 billion in debt, its rates twice as high as necessary. It’s still the country’s #1 polluter, still an entirely unaccountable organization not subject to the discipline of either regulators or the marketplace.

Maurice Strong – the only strong man the utility has had to answer to in decades – made it plain that a logical next step is breaking up the Hydro monopoly, privatizing some of the pieces, and letting competition work its magic. In the last few years, that’s been the prescription for monopolies around the world, from Sweden to Singapore to the former countries of the Soviet Union. In the U.K., which Mr. Strong has presented as a model, rates plummeted and environmental well-being soared as the private sector rapidly phased out polluting coal and nuclear technologies in favour of cleaner and cheaper natural gas and renewable energy technologies.

But some of the best examples of the merits of competition can be found right here at home. BC Hydro several years ago abandoned its penchant for building more and more large dams in favour of an open market system that promoted private generation as an alternative. And Alberta’s largest utility, TransAlta, as well as Newfoundland Power & Light, have followed suit by volunteering to lose their monopoly and let competition reign. Even Hydro-Quebec .

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Presentation to the Municipal Electric Association Summer Conference 1992

Lawrence Solomon
Energy Probe
March 18, 1992

Plenary Session #1 V.V.! Public Power in the 1990s

Thank you. You can’t know how heartening it is for me to see the MEA holding this conference, with privatization issues. so prominent. Just one year ago, most people considered many of the issues at this conference to be all-but-irrelevant to Ontario In fact, when the Environ mental Assessment Board examining Ontario Hydro’s 25-Year-Plan decided to hear evidence from Energy Probe about privatizations occurring around the world, the MEA objected, and even went to Court to try to stop the Board from hearing our views.

The Court decided that the Boardcould. hear about privatizations, and we will be presenting our case for a competitive restructuring of Hydro this fall or next spring. And today, I can give you a sense of where we’ll be coming from.

Those of you who know of my books on Ontario Hydro know the respect that I hold for the municipal utilities. The municipalities, as you know, gave birth to Ontario Hydro, in a system that brilliantly combined public and private power.

Somehow you foresaw, back at the turn of the century, the great wisdom in a public grid to carry power from Niagara Falls. That power, lest we forget, was private power. Ontario Hydro was set up not to generate power, but to bring the benefits of private power from Niagara Falls to the dozen or so municipalities which founded it.

The grid was a natural monopoly – your forefathers knew that – and put it into public hands which were then best suited to running a monopoly. But generation was naturally competitive, and so your forefathers’ generation left in private hands, where competition could be employed to keep costs down. Later, of course, Ontario Hydro changed.

It began to acquire generating sites, then used its political muscle to rob municipalities of autonomy. Some of you will remember the great struggles between Ontario and the municipal utilities. The municipalities better than others foresaw that turning Ontario Hydro into a crown corporation would make the utility even less accountable. You resisted that in 1973, but lost, to the province’s grief.

We’re here this weekend to discuss the directions for public power in the 1990s. I’m here to tell you that there is a worldwide trend underway. It’s occurring in capitalist countries and in socialist countries. It’s occurring in western countries, in third world countries, in the countries of the former eastern bloc. And I’m proud to say that this trend is taking the world toward the very system that your forefathers established at the turn of the century. We are going back to a competitive electrricity system. Different countries are pursuing competition in different ways, but almost all employ the princi.ples established by your forefathers – a decentralized system in which a monopoly grid conveys private power. (display map now)

The great experiment with monopoly generation is coming to a close. Some still cling to it, but it is becoming harder and harder to justify monopoly utilities in the modern world. Most governments are realizing that we live in a highly interde.pendent world, and that the electricity sector is too important to leave behind. The restructurings we’re seeing around the world are occurring for many, many reasons. In some cases, these competitive restructurings are occur.

ring because of ideology. That certainly was a dominant factor in the case of Great Britain, under Maggie Thatcher. But in other cases, socialist parties, such as the Spanish Workers Party, or the Australian or New Zealand Labour parties, were the agents of change. In the U.S., President Jimmy Carter, a Democrat, was the progressive. Electricity sector restructurings have one thing in common – they make sense, regardless of your political orientation.

They’re happening around the world for the same reason that Ontario Hydro will need to be restructured. Governments need money for social programs; governments need money to reduce deficits or pay down their debt; governments want to restore their credit rating; governments want to promote liquidity in equity markets; governments want to greatly expand and democratize the ownership of equity, to broader segments of the public.

There are two other reasons a competitive restructuring will be happening here: it will help protect the Ontario environment, and it will lower the cost of power, which will promote jobs. To give you an idea of what has been happening with Ontario electricity rates, I’d like you to look at the overhead slide, which comes from a study entitledCross Border Electricity Rates: Ontario’s Loss of Competitiveness The graph you see compares Toronto electricity rates to the U.S. average.

Until 1978, the U.S. and Ontario had very similar electricity structures, both being monopolized sectors. Some parts of the U.S. – those with abundant hydroelectricity – had lower cost electricity than Ontario, but most U.S. utilities charged more for their power than did Ontario Hydro, because most did not have significant water resources. Overall, the U.S. charged much more for power than did Ontario Hydro.

In 1978, the U.S. federal government, under the Carter administration, passed anti-monopoly legislation that affected all 50 U.S. states. The monopoly utilities challenged this legislation in the courts, and eventually lost when in the mid-1980s the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the federal anti-monopoly legislation was constitutional. As a result, the utilities were forced to allow competition. The graph we’re looking at shows the result. In1985, U.S. rates were almost twice as high. With

competition now allowed, vast amounts of cheap and clean power began to flood the U.S. market. Coal and nuclear power expansion from the utilities were stopped dead in their tracks. Replacing these expensive and environmentally damaging technologies were safer and more economic technologies: renewable technologies such as windmills, but most of all, high efficiency gas technologies. The economy was ahead and the environment was ahead.

Now let’s look at the graph to see what happened in Ontario over that same period, during which Ontario Hydro’s monopoly powers remained intact. As you can see, Hydro’s rates increased dramatically. In 1993 they will need to continue their dramatic increase if the utility is to avoid taxpayer bailouts. If Hydro rates are capped, as the energy minister said he might do, the result can only be more debt or a rapid decline of the electricity system’s reliability, or both. Capping rates is not a responsible alternative, but doing what governments everywhere are doing – restructuring the electricity sector – would be highly responsible, and simultaneously solve numerous problems.

I propose that Ontario Hydro, at least for the foreseeable future, maintain ownership of its very valuable transmission system, which is a natural monopoly, and maintain the debt incurred to build the transmission system. I’d like Hydro to continue to manage the grid. No change there.

I also propose that the nuclear division of Ontario Hydro be segregated into a subsidiary called Ontario Nuclear, which would continue to be owned by Ontario Hydro. The debt incurred to build the nuclear plants would remain associated with the nuclear plants. The nuclear plants would be operated by the very same personnel that run them today. Again, no real change here.

The change comes with Hydro’s non-nuclear plants, which I propose be sold off to companies in the private sector. The plants could be organized into several electricity generating companies and sold through a public offering, as the Nova Scotia government is doing with its privatization of Nova Scotia Power, and as many other governments around the world have done. These plants would be sold with their associated debt, and would fetch for Ontario taxpayers something in the area of $15 billion. The $15 billion need not come in all at once – many governments are selling off their utilities in several tranches, and even then on the installment plan. For example, in the UK only 60% of the government’s stake was sold, and then it was payable in two installments, over the course of two years. Spreading out the revenues is desirable because it doesn’t overload the equity markets, and so keeps the value of the government’s asset high, while producing a continuing revenue stream for the government.

The revenue stream doesn’t end, even after all the installments are paid, because the new, private sector companies have become taxpaying members of society. If just the non-nuclear stations were in the private sector, annual provincial income tax could come to several hundred million per year, quite apart from the economic growth, and increased tax revenues, that would flow from lower electricity rates. If all electricity was subject to the same taxes as any other business or another commodity, billions in additional revenues would come in to the provincial purse.

Those revenues could be used to lower taxes for the rest of society, creating a more level playing field. They could be used to lower the deficit or the debt, reducing future interest payments. They could be used to finance our social safety net. Or they could be used for all three.

Because privatization means a win for the economy, a win for consumers, a win for the environment, because it solves so many problems, it has been steadily winning over more and more members of society.The Financial Post was the first major newspaper to endorse our privatization proposal, in 1989. This year The Globe and Mail, in a brilliant series of editorials, as emerged as a major proponent of privatizing Hydro.

The Provincial Progressive Conservative Party – in power at the turn of the century when Hydro was created – has always defended it. Now it wants see privatization. They’re not alone. Many in the Liveral Party, and even in the NDP are of like mind.

The major power consuming industries used to be staunch Hydro supporters. Now they’re openly starting to question public power. Many in the financial industry are absolutely convinced of the merits of privatizing Hydro – some more convinced than I am that it will happen soon. In fact, one senior member of the investment community who also advises this government, told me just last week that he expects that in the next provincial election campaign all three parties will be campaigning on a platform of privatizing Hydro.Far-fetched? Perhaps.

But in the context of the worldwide trend to electricity sector privatizations, and in the context of what’s been happening in Ontario – with electricity rates and with the provincial debt – perhaps keeping Hydro as a public power monopoly is what’s truly far-fetched.

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Presentation to the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs

Lawrence Solomon

February 11, 1992

Pre-Budget Consultation Hearings

I am grateful for the opportunity to take part in the Committee’s pre-budget consultation hearings, because this next budget is sure to be one of the most widely watched events in Ontario history.  This province, as all parties will acknowledge, is in economic difficulty, and no easy answers appear to be in the offing. I am coming here with some easy answers.  I do not claim to have all the answers, but in one dominant area I do claim to have some easy answers. My answers will help protect social programs while furthering economic needs. My answers will raise government tax revenues while lowering the deficit. They are sure to instill business confidence and promote domestic and foreign investment. They are so compelling that they have become commonplace around the world, in developed countries and underdeveloped ones, by socialist governments and by capitalist ones, by progressive-minded, pragmatic governments of all political stripes.

I have brought several Energy Probe studies with me, which you should have before you. I ask you to turn to the thickest one, the one entitled. The Worldwide Trend to Electricity Sector Privatizations As you’ll see, these privatizations are occurring, in varying degrees, almost everywhere. I have brought a map to show you the change over time: (display map now)  In some cases, privatizations occurred because of ideology. That certainly was a dominant factor in the case of Great Britain, under Maggie Thatcher. But in other cases, socialist parties, such as the Spanish Workers Party, or the Australian or New Zealand Labour parties, were the agents of change.

In the U.S., President Jimmy Carter, a Democrat, was the progressive. Electricity sector privatizations have one thing in common – they make sense, regardless of your political orientation.  They’re happening around the world for the same reason it should happen here. Governments need money for social programs; governments need money to reduce deficits or pay down their debt; governments want to restore their credit rating; governments want to promote liquidity in equity markets; governments want to greatly expand and democratize the ownership of equity, to broader segments of the public.

There are two other reasons electricity sector privatization should be happening here: it would help protect the Ontario environment, and it would lower the cost of power, which would promote jobs.

To give you an idea of what has been happening with Ontario electricity rates, I’d like you torefer to another study before you, entitled .Cross Border Electricity Rates: Ontario’s Loss of Competitiveness I would like to ask you to turn to the first graph, which compares Toronto electricity rates to the U.S. average.

Until 1978, the U.S. and Ontario had very similar electricity structures, both being monopolized sectors. Some parts of the U.S. – those with abundant hydroelectricity – had lower cost electricity than Ontario, but most U.S. utilities charged more for their power than did Ontario Hydro, because most did not have significant water resources. Overall the U.S. charged much more for power than did Ontario Hydro.

In 1978, the U.S. federal government, under the Carter administration, passed anti-monopoly legislation that affected all 50 U.S. states. The monopoly utilities challenged this legislation in the courts, and eventually lost when in the mid-1980s the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the federal anti-monopoly legislation was constitutional. As a result, the utilities were forced to allow competition.

The graph we’re looking at shows the result. With competition now allowed, vast amounts of cheap and clean power began to flood the U.S. market. Coal and nuclear power expansion from the utilities were stopped dead in their tracks. Replacing these expensive and environmentally damaging technologies were safer and more economic technologies: renewable technologies such as windmills, but most of all, high efficiency gas technologies.The economy was ahead and the environment was ahead.  Now let’s look at the graph to see what happened in Ontario over that same period, during which Ontario Hydro’s monopoly powers remained in tact. As you can see, Hydro’s rates increased dramatically. They will need to continue their dramatic increase if the utility is to avoid taxpayer bailouts. If Hydro rates are capped, as the energy minister said he might do, the result can only be more debt or a rapid decline of the electricity system’s reliability, or both.

Capping rates is not a responsible alternative, but doing what governments everywhere are doing – privatizing some of the electricity sector – would be highly responsible, and simultaneously solve numerous problems.

I propose that Ontario Hydro, at least for the foreseeable future, maintain ownership of its very valuable transmission system, which is a natural monopoly, and maintain the debt incurred to build the transmission system. I’d like Hydro to continue to manage the grid. No change there. I also propose that the nuclear division of Ontario Hydro be segregated into a subsidiary called Ontario Nuclear, which would continue to be owned by Ontario Hydro.

The debt incurred to build the nuclear plants would remain associated with the nuclear plants. The nuclear plants would be operated by the very same personnel that run them today. Again, no real change here.

The change comes with Hydro’s non-nuclear plants, which I propose be sold off to companies in the private sector. The plants could be organized into several electricity generating companies and sold through a public offering, as the Nova Scotia government is doing with its privatization of Nova Scotia Power, and as many other governments around the world have done. These plants would be sold with their associated debt, and would fetch for Ontario taxpayers something in the area of $15 to $20 billion. The $15 billion need not come in all at once either – many governments are selling off their utilities in several tranches, and even then on the installment plan.

For example, in the UK only 60% of the government’s stake was sold, and then it was payable in two installments, over the course of two years. Spreading out the revenues is desirable because it doesn’t overload the equity markets, and so keeps the value of the government’s asset high, while producing a continuing revenue stream for the government.

The revenue stream doesn’t end, even after all the installments are paid, because the new, private sector companies have become taxpaying members of society. If just the non-nuclear stations were in the private sector, annual provincial income tax could come to $500 million per year, quite apart from the economic growth, and increased tax revenues, that would flow from lower electricity rates. If all electricity was subject to the same taxes as any other business or another commodity, billions in additional revenues would come in to the provincial purse.  Those revenues could be used to lower taxes for the rest of society, creating a more level playing field. They could be used to lower the deficit or the debt, reducing future interest payments. They could be used to finance our social safety net. Or they could be used for all three.

How you choose to allocate those funds among those purposes is an area for legitimate disagreement, and I would be disappointed if the members around this room did not disagree strongly about what this province’s spending priorities should be. But whether you choose to privatize some of the Hydro system, to give yourself the freedom to choose among those options, should not be a matter of serious controversy for most fair-minded people in this room. Privatizing Hydro helps socialists be socialists and helps capitalists be capitalists. Be yourselves, honourable members, and privatize Ontario Hydro.

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Presentation to the Standing Committee on Resource Development

Lawrence Solomon

January 22, 1992

I am grateful for the opportunity to comment on the proposed amendments to the Power Corporation Act, because this Act has had a profound effect on the Ontario economy.

Each of you should have a copy of a study entitled .Cross Border Electricity Rates: Ontario’s Loss of Competitiveness.. I would like to ask you to turn to the first graph, which compares Toronto electricity rates to the U.S. average.

Until 1978, the U.S. and Ontario had very similar electricity structures, both being monopolized sectors.

Some parts of the U.S. – those with abundant hydroelectricity – had lower cost electricity than Ontario, but most U.S. utilities charged more for their power than did Ontario Hydro, because most did not have significant water resources. Overall, the U.S. charged much more for power than did Ontario Hydro.

In 1978, the U.S. federal government, under the Carter administration, passed anti-monopoly legislation that affected the equivalents to the Power Corporation Act in the 50 U.S. states. The monopoly utilities challenged this legislation in the courts, and eventually lost when in the mid-1980s the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the federal anti-monopoly legislation was constitutional. As a result, the various state equivalents to the Power Corporation Act had to be amended to allow competition.

The graph we’re looking at shows the result. With competition now allowed, vast amounts of cheap and clean power began to flood the

U. S. market. Coal and nuclear power expansion from the utilities were stopped dead in their tracks. Replacing these expensive and environmentally damaging technologies were safer and more economic technologies: renewable technologies such as windmills, but most of all, high efficiency gas technologies.

The economy was ahead and the environment was ahead.

Now let’s look at the graph to see what happened in Ontario over that same period, during which Ontario’s Power Corporation Act retained all of Hydro’s monopoly powers.

As you can see, Hydro’s rates increased dramatically. They will need to continue their dramatic increase if the utility is to avoid taxpayer bailouts. Bill 118 – if passed as is – will only speed the utility’s decline.

Thank you.

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Save the forests – Sell the trees

Save the forests – Sell the trees
Wall Street Journal
August 25, 1989

Wherever trees grow on private land, forest owners seem to draw the ire of their governments. The government of Ontario has a problem with the way many of its small, private woodlot owners tend their forests: They won’t cut down their trees. The government’s surveys conclude that these smallholders–mostly farmers, professionals and retirees, who control more than 10 million acres of timberland–have what the government’s experts call “a rather indifferent attitude” toward their land.

The Ontario government, like governments in wooded areas everywhere, wants to stimulate the exploitation of its forests. But no matter what it tries–and that includes everything from free advice and harvesting services to tax holidays for those joining a government Woodlot Improvement Plan–most woodlot owners refuse to clear-cut their private forests for personal gain, or even to harvest their older timber at the accelerated rate the government favours.

Don’t Blame the Private Sector

Deforestation and the degradation of Ontario’s forest lands make the papers every day in Ontario, but it isn’t the private sector, which owns less than 10%. of Ontario’s timber, that is to blame. The de-forestation is occurring in the government’s land.

While governments act like capitalists, seeing trees as piles of lumber and talking of economic growth, woodlot owners often attend to more spiritual needs: cross country skiing, hunting, birdwatching or simply the pleasure of owning a piece of wooded land. When they do sell their trees, they tend to avoid clear-cutting and they hold out for prices that are typically two or three times those set by the government for timber.

Sweden has more standing forest today than at any time in its past; bogs have been reclaimed and reforestation is mandatory. Unlike Canada, most of the forest land is privately owned, but the government of Sweden, too, has a problem with its small woodlot owners: Sweden’s forest industry has become a major importer of wood because the smallholders don’t want to cut down their trees fast enough.

Each year, Sweden grows 100 million cubic metres of wood while harvesting only 70 million cubic metres, leaving a large and growing surplus on private ground. This surplus has also stimulated a national debate over whether to “use the carrot or the whip” to get the woodlot owners to see things the state’s way, says Anders Luden, agricultural attache at the Swedish Embassy in Washington.

Sweden’s forest industry–the country’s second-largest industry and largest net foreign-exchange earner–is strictly, and from the government’s point of view successfully, managed as an economic resource. Woodlot owners are required to re-forest, but they are also required to harvest at least half of their trees within a decade after they mature. Wild, unmanaged stands are forbidden, lest the nation’s economy be hurt.

But these smallholders still exercise too much control, asserts Mr. Lunden, explaining that the country’s forest management plans are being thwarted by the smallholders’ growing affluence, which allow them to forgo the income that harvesting would bring.

Neighbouring Finland also has a huge forest industry and, like Sweden, has more forest than ever before. Five years ago when the industry was importing 30% of its wood, the Central Association of Forest Industries, a trade association, blamed it woes on the ignorance of many of the country’s 300,000 small woodlot owners, who were refusing to cut their wood out of “their gut reaction . . . to leave the trees alone, even though the forest environment actually deteriorates without judicious felling.” The industry lamented being “reduced to importing wood, while all the time we were surrounded by trees ready to be felled.”

The Finnish government agreed that the small woodlot owners posed a problem: New government and industry measures–augmenting a pre-existing policy that taxed the recalcitrant woodlot owners on the amount they would have earned if they had harvested their trees–have since reduced imports to about 10% of the total wood used. But because increasing numbers of Finnish forest owners live in urban areas and derive a yield from their woodlots that can’t be measured solely in board feet, industry and government fear a resurgence of smallholder intransigence.

In Third World countries, too, the state encourages the plunder of the forest while the traditional owners of the forest–whether individual property owners or more often, small village or tribal communities–vainly attempt to stave off remote governments. In Brazil’s Amazon basin, the government has subsidized the tearing down and burning of a forested area bigger than all of France over this past decade, according to the World Bank. Subsidies of various kinds have deforested other regions of Latin America, several Asian countries, and much of Africa, often after decentralized forest holdings fell under central government control.

Federal ownership of almost 200 million acres of forest land has served U.S. forests poorly since World War II, when large-scale commercial harvesting began in the forests taken into the national trust by President Theodore Roosevelt earlier in this century.

Much of this silviculture is unprofitable: The logging on more than half the Forest Service’s lands loses about $100 million a year. Much of this loss is incurred in the Rocky Mountains, where logging on unstable soils and difficult slopes boosts both harvesting costs and wilderness damage. Overall, however, the Forest Service turns a profit, primarily due to its highly lucrative but irreplaceable coastal rainforests which are being logged at record rates to keep Northwest sawmills in business. The Wilderness Society fears that America’s remaining rainforests, most of which are controlled by the Forest Service, could disappear within 15 years. Because governments around the world have such an abysmal record, environmentalists like the World Resources Institute, a U.N–funded Washington think tank, have come to favour returning state lands to private landowners and local communities, which, on the whole, have maintained their lands far better. Private owners don’t cut at a loss, they don’t cut for employment reasons, and they manage their forests not as an undifferentiated commodity but as multi-purpose properties with timber being but one asset.

Governments have differing reasons for exploiting their forests: In Ontario, where the government sells its trees to logging companies for an average of 85 cents apiece, the purpose is the maintenance of forestry jobs; in Brazil the Amazon was seized from local inhabitants under land redistribution, then harvested or burned for agricultural production; in Scandinavia the forest is little more than a feedstock for the forest products industry.

But whatever the government’s motive, the result is generally the same. Forests meet a premature end, the plant and animal species nurtured by overmature trees suffer, timber gluts the marketplace and the price of wood is artificially depressed.

No Incentives

These low prices further discourage proper management of forest lands. Because Ontario loggers don’t own their land, and the government loses money on every tree it harvests, neither has an economic incentive to replant. The government has scant political incentive either. Other than token planting programs to demonstrate a concern for reforestation, the government presides over the deterioration of its holdings, since the chief political benefit of new stands to harvest–credit for forest products jobs–would go to the complete strangers who would be in power 80 years later when the trees mature.

Were governments to maintain only true wilderness areas (or to turn these over to conservation organizations), and then return the balance of their forests to private hands, and to the indigenous communities that have successfully managed them since time immemorial, the value of forest lands would climb to recognize their true market value: not only their worth as logpiles but also their recreational value, their development value, their ecological value, and their spiritual value to individuals from so many societies–including our own–around the world.

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