Chapter Three: Tests of the No-Fault Hypothesis

David S. Loughran                                                                                                                Rand Institute                                                                                                                        January 1/2001

The effect of no-fault automobile insurance on driver behavior and automobile accidents in the United States.

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2) Not in a free market world

Lawrence Solomon
National Post
December 28, 2000

In my last column which dealt with nuclear power’s inability to respond to another OPEC oil crisis, I made one central point: Nuclear power plants take too many years to plan and build, and are, in any event, too prone to system- wide failure to be part of any sensible defence against a third OPEC oil crisis. As I noted, all the nuclear reactors that have been built in North America were planned or under construction prior to the first OPEC oil crisis. Although North American utilities and North American governments proposed hundreds of new nuclear plants after both the 1974 and 1979 OPEC oil crises to free us from dependence on Arab energy supplies, all were cancelled before they could be built.

Morgan Brown, an employee of Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd., does not dispute the historical fact of nuclear power’s failure to rise to the challenge of either OPEC oil crisis. In fact, he does not directly dispute almost anything in my column — most of his “corrections” correct points I did not make. When he does directly dispute my evidence, he is entirely mistaken.

Japan is the only developed nation in the world with significant ambitions for new nuclear power plants, but even this highly oil-dependent nation has dramatically scaled back its plans. According to International Energy Outlook, an official source, after the nuclear plants already under construction are completed, Japan’s nuclear industry will go into decline, with more plants being retired after 2010 than constructed. As for the rest of the world, less than 8% of the nuclear capacity the International Atomic Energy Agency predicted for us in 1974 materialized. Yes, Mr. Brown is able to point to a reactor here and there that may get built: I did not write otherwise. And yes, in South Korea and other countries where citizens have few rights, corners can be cut to shorten the construction time. But these scattered instances do not make for a vibrant, growing industry. The number of nuclear reactors in the world has peaked. In 20 years, according to the U.S. Department of Energy, that number will be cut in half.

Mr. Brown not only misrepresents the big picture, he gets the small details wrong as well. He claims only eight out of 20 reactors in Ontario — not nine of 21 as I stated — have been shut down for an extended period of time. The reactor he disowns is the Douglas Point reactor on Lake Huron, started by his company in the 1950s, completed in 1968 and trumpeted as “Canada’s first full-scale nuclear-electric generating station.” AECL planned to make money by selling Douglas Point power to Ontario Hydro; then, after proving the economic viability of the Candu reactor, it planned to sell the station itself to Hydro.

Instead, the Douglas Point station lost money almost every year, and Hydro refused to buy it for $1. AECL finally decided to shut it down in the early 1980s, after recognizing that even two OPEC oil crises in five years could not justify running this loser any longer.

Mr. Brown also misleads in portraying the number of failed reactors in the United Kingdom. The International Nuclear Safety Center, operated by the Argonne National Laboratory for the U.S. Department of Energy, lists nine nuclear power reactors in the U.K. that have been permanently shut down. Mr. Brown obtains his smaller number of five by neglecting to count reactors shut down more than nine years ago, and he further minimizes the loss of nuclear capacity by adding a reactor whose construction was too far along to cancel by the time a free market in power arrived in the U.K.

When competition came to the U.K.’s power sector, the efficiency of the already-built nuclear reactors improved impressively — this was one of the many benefits of deregulation. But the chief benefit of the U.K.’s deregulation was in exposing the colossal cost of building new nuclear power plants, thus ending the nuclear industry’s dreams of never-ending expansion. As the London Observer wrote in an editorial titled “Nuclear fantasy” that appeared Nov. 12, 1989, on the eve of deregulation:

“It has taken the cold stare of the City [London’s financial district] to penetrate the veils of secrecy and deceit that have long enveloped the nuclear industry.

“Privatization has proved that nuclear power is hopelessly uneconomic and saddled with decommissioning costs that no private company could accept without huge guarantees from the Government. Yet, from the 1950s to a few months ago, anyone who breathed the slightest doubt about its viability was met with a blizzard of faulty figures and downright lies.”

In Ontario, because we do not yet have privatization and deregulation, money-losing Crown-owned companies such as Mr. Brown’s AECL — which has never sold a reactor to any Western democracy — remain free to maintain the fiction, against all evidence, that nuclear power retains a bright future. The London Observer’s advice for Britain in 1989 applies equally well to Canada today, where Ontario’s unreliable reactors threaten the province with blackouts: “Had the truth been known long ago, Britain’s energy policy would not now lie in ruins. For decades, the promotion of energy conservation and research into clean sources of energy has been neglected, while money was poured in its hundreds of millions down the nuclear drain … The country should construct an energy policy based on the real world, rather than a nuclear fantasy.”

No deregulated energy system anywhere in the world has chosen to build nuclear reactors, and for good reason. The last 20 U.S. reactors took many years to build — typically more than a decade — and cost US$3-billion to US$4- billion each, or about US$3,000 to US$4,000 per kilowatt of capacity. In comparison, new high-efficient gas plants using jet-engine technologies — the choice of today’s free markets — are built in 12 to 18 months and come in at US$400 to US$600 per kilowatt. Wind turbines now come in at about US$1,000. In a free market economy, or one that strives for energy security, there is simply no room for nuclear power.

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1) Nuclear power has a future

Morgan Brown
National Post
December 28, 2000

Anti-nuclear activist Larry Solomon needs to update, correct and clarify his statements (Nuclear Power No Defence Against a New Oil Crisis, Dec. 19).

Contrary to Mr. Solomon’s claim that only the Third World and Eastern Bloc countries are pursuing nuclear power, Japan and South Korea have ambitious reactor programs. South Africa is designing and preparing to build a new, higher-efficiency reactor. In France, where 75% of the electricity is nuclear-generated, the market is saturated so no more reactors are being built. But France is exporting a lot of electricity to the rest of Europe. Finland, the top- ranked nuclear operating nation, is seriously considering building a fifth reactor, having significantly upgraded its present ones. It is often stated that Sweden and Germany are abandoning nuclear power, but Sweden has halted the process, and Germany has developed a program that will allow the current reactors to operate to the end of their planned lives (more than 20 years from now).

Nuclear-generated electricity now supplies about 12% of Canada’s electrical generation requirements. Electricity production supplies only about 17% of our total annual primary energy needs, the rest being used for transportation, heating and industrial applications. Canadian nuclear plants have delivered enough electricity to our grids to supply Canadian electrical needs for three years at present consumption rates. That amount of electricity would have a value, at present wholesale rates, of approximately $47-billion.

Mr. Solomon claims Ontario’s electricity supply is vulnerable because of its use of nuclear-generated electricity; more than 40% comes from reactors. He said nine of Ontario’s 21 power reactors have produced no power for at least 21 months. There are only 20 power reactors in Ontario, and eight have been shut for periods of 32 to 64 months. The four shut reactors at Pickering are slated for restart over the next few years, after substantial upgrades are complete. Two of the shut Bruce reactors are being assessed with a view to refurbishment and restart. It is because of nuclear reactors that Ontario has a diverse, and hence strong, electrical supply. Mr. Solomon’s empty statement that “some or all of the remaining 12 [reactors] could be permanently shut down should a common design problem surface” is worth as much as saying “natural gas prices may be higher or lower tomorrow.”

Ontario consumed 22% more primary energy in 1997 than in 1987, although its electricity consumption has increased only slightly. While conservation and efficiency initiatives have reduced demand somewhat, it was a change in economy and a switch to natural gas heating that had the biggest impacts on electricity consumption.

Mr. Solomon should update his figures on the time it takes for reactors to be built. Darlington’s four reactors were ordered in 1973, but construction was only started in the years 1981 through 1985, and the reactors were completed in 1990 through 1993. The construction time included years lost to government reviews and strikes. Certainly, Darlington’s construction time was long, but not the “10 to 14 years typical of nuclear plants” that Mr. Solomon claims. Recently, reactor construction times have been decreased significantly. Three CANDU reactors built in South Korea in the 1990s took 6.5, 5.75 and 7 years to complete from signing the contract. One of those reactors took only 4.9 years from ground-breaking to commercial operation.

In the U.K., the deregulated electrical system did close some coal plants. The U.K. did not “shut down many existing nuclear plants” as Mr. Solomon said. Nine years ago, there were 31 power reactors in operation. Since then, one reactor has been completed and five small ones were shut down, giving a net system capacity decrease of 0.3%. Despite this decrease, the U.K. reactors generated 22% more electricity in 1999 than they did in 1992 — hardly the phase-out Mr. Solomon claims. The U.K. has come close to meeting its Kyoto greenhouse gas emission targets only thanks to improved reactor performance.

The oldest U.K. reactor is 44, and received a licence extension to 50 years. Some American reactors have already had their operating licences extended to 60 years, from the planned 40-year lives — hardly the premature shutdowns Mr. Solomon claims. There is also a great deal of effort being spent here and abroad in plant life extension.

Mr. Solomon is concerned with our reliance on foreign energy sources, particularly oil. Yet he refuses to acknowledge that nuclear technology should — nay, must — be part of the solution to energy supply, energy security and environmental concerns. He claims, incredibly, that reactors take a long time to build and are “the most vulnerable of technologies,” and that somehow using nuclear technology will “only make us more dependent on Arab oil.” When will Mr. Solomon and his business — Energy Probe — get their collective head out of the sand and move into the new century?

Morgan Brown, PEng, is a research engineer at Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd. in Pinawa, Man.

Read Mr.Solomon’s Response.

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Nuclear power no defence against a new oil crisis

Lawrence Solomon
National Post
December 19, 2000

After Egypt and Syria invaded Israel in October, 1973, to start the Yom Kippur War, the Arab oil-exporting nations punished the West for its support of Israel by slashing oil production and raising oil prices. Western governments, seeking energy independence, hastened their plans to adopt nuclear power, which they universally saw as the fuel of the future.

After Muslim fundamentalists toppled the Shah of Iran in 1979, they installed Ayatollah Khomeini in his place and punished the West with a second OPEC oil crisis. The West made even bigger plans to get off oil and on to nuclear-powered electricity.

Today, the Middle East is again in turmoil. A new Palestinian Intifada is in full force, and peace talks between the Israelis and the Palestinians are in disarray. The United States is more dependent on foreign oil than in 1973. A militarily strong Saddam Hussein is once again flexing his muscles, and oil prices are once again high.

Many in the West are again seeking salvation in nuclear power. They forget that it failed utterly to counteract the clout of the Arab oil-exporting countries in the previous two OPEC oil crises, and they don’t understand that a new attempt to turn to nuclear power could only make us more dependent, not less, on Arab oil.

Over the entire history of nuclear power, North American utilities built 150 nuclear reactors. All of them were planned or under construction before the first OPEC embargo. North American utilities subsequently placed hundreds more nuclear reactors on the drawing boards. None of these post-OPEC reactors were built — none — despite overwhelming public support, despite the utilities’ monopoly powers, despite the billions of dollars governments provided in subsidies. Canada’s last nuclear plant to be completed was Ontario Hydro’s Darlington station outside Toronto. Ontario Hydro first started spending money on Darlington in 1970; it formally ordered it built in 1976 after receiving government permission; and it finished the job in 1993, more than 20 years later. The last U.S. reactor to be completed was ordered in 1974.

Most electric utilities abandoned their nuclear plans by the late 1980s — some of them 90% or more complete. In the quarter-century since the first OPEC oil crisis, the frantic pro-nuclear efforts by North American governments to ramp up nuclear production were for naught: Apart from plants already in the pipeline, not one additional kilowatt-hour of power was produced.

Elsewhere in the world, nuclear power’s failure to replace oil is little different. Only Third World and Eastern Bloc countries still aggressively pursue nuclear power — largely because Western governments seeking to keep their nuclear manufacturers alive have plied them with nearly free reactors. In 1974, the International Atomic Energy Agency predicted 4,500,000 megawatts of nuclear capacity. In fact, the world now has less than 10% as much and, according to U.S. Department of Energy projections, the relatively small amount that does exist will be halved over the next two decades, as reactors reach the end of their useful lives.

In Canada, despite mammoth subsidies by governments, nuclear power meets less than 3% of our energy needs, about half as much as provided by wood. Yet because most of that 3% is concentrated in just one province — Ontario — and in just one type of energy production — electricity — it has made us extremely vulnerable to disruption. Of Ontario’s 21 nuclear reactors, nine have produced no power for at least 21 months, and some or all of the remaining 12 could be permanently shut down should a common design problem surface.

North America overcame the OPEC energy crises without the help of new nuclear plants. It did so partly by developing new oil and gas fields at home and mostly — overwhelmingly — by insulating our homes, improving our industrial processes and otherwise increasing our efficiency. Ontario, the most nuclearized jurisdiction in North America, consumes about as much power today as it did a decade ago, despite an economy 30% larger.

In the event of a new OPEC crisis, nuclear reactors couldn’t be built quickly enough to help, but we would nevertheless be secure. In part, our energy needs would be met from the great untapped potential for conservation and efficiency improvements and in part from small-scale technologies that can be brought on stream in 12 to 18 months, compared with the 10 to 14 years typical of nuclear plants.

When the U.K. fully deregulated its power system a decade ago, the free market rapidly shut down many existing nuclear and coal plants and embarked on the biggest building boom in the country’s history, much of it small-scale and almost all of it based on co-generation and other high-efficiency gas technologies. Unlike the highly politicized, partial deregulations we’re seeing in California, Alberta and other jurisdictions now facing power shortages, the U.K.’s approach — privatizing everything but a few nuclear plants (which no one then wanted) and deregulating the power sector to encourage investment — created a power glut while lowering rates and phasing out the most environmentally harmful forms of energy.

Because nuclear reactors take so long to build, and because they are so susceptible to premature closure — few are now expected to last their predicted service lives — they are the most vulnerable of technologies. Had the International Atomic Energy Agency’s prediction come true, our society truly would be dependent on nuclear power, and when serious problems arose, as they invariably have, we would truly have been vulnerable to OPEC blackmail.

Reprinted on the charity.ca web site.

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The crack in the microloan myth

Lawrence Solomon
National Post
December 5, 2000

Scheme to empower poor women doesn’t stand up to scrutiny

We’ve all read heartwarming stories like this one, set in Madi, Kyrgyzstan and reported in Sunday’s New York Times:

“A year ago, Minavar Salijanova and her family were close to starving. They lived in a three-room house of mud brick inherited from her parents and the seven children had few clothes. Mrs. Salijanova could not even dream of owning a new green dress, let alone putting on a feast like the one she had now spread for neighbours and the visiting United Nations officials who helped her toward previously unimagined prosperity.

“Sixty chickens roam the yard, vying for feed with five prized goats bought with money earned selling eggs for about six cents apiece in the nearby market. The children have new clothes, too, and Mrs. Salijanova hopes to buy a milk cow and a calf next month …

“Mrs. Salijanova and her family are among the beneficiaries of a United Nations program that, for the first time, is bringing microcredit — already widespread in parts of Asia and Africa — to the former Soviet lands of Central Asia.”

Countless articles have appeared in the Western media, extolling the many virtues of microcredit — loans as small as $100, $50 or even $10, typically to women in poor countries. Transformed through these loans — which miraculously are almost always repaid — women become entrepreneurial, financially secure and empowered, even liberated, in their tradition-bound, male-dominated societies. Not one media report in a thousand questions these claims.

Here’s a story you haven’t heard. It comes from Hamidul Huq, a doctoral candidate at the Wageningen University in the Netherlands, who has written a sobering report about the effects of microlending in his home country of Bangladesh. Bangladesh is also home to the Grameen Bank, which began the microlending revolution two decades ago.

In one of Mr. Huq’s case studies, he quotes Kalpana, a woman who returned to her family home after her husband abandoned her and her baby daughter, and feared being a burden on her father, a landless peasant too poor to support his household.

“An officer of the bank called a meeting for the village women, which I went to. The officer told us that if we became members of the Grameen Bank, they would give us a loan … I thought, I have here a chance of survival. That same evening I asked my father’s permission to become a member of the Grameen Bank, mentioning to him loan possibilities. My brothers supported me, maybe because of their interest in the loan money, and my father agreed to my becoming a member of the bank. After some days the officer came again and formed eight women’s groups.”

The money that Kalpana borrowed — Grameen lends only to women, whom it considers superior credit risks — she immediately turned over to her father, who used it to start a small rice-husking operation. It succeeded well enough to put some food on the table, make the weekly loan repayments to Grameen, and qualify her for a larger loan, which she turned over to her father and two brothers. The treadmill never ended. Kalpana worked day and night to stay ahead of the bank payments, and in the end, her father took all her assets to pay for her younger sister’s marriage, leaving her in debt with no savings, not even enough to pay the nominal registration fee to qualify for free medical treatment at a local clinic when she became ill.

“If I had had money of my own, then I would have gone to the clinic in the early stage of the illness. I am now very weak and cannot even work now.” Yet after 12 years of this bleak experience, Kalpana said she would “continue with Grameen Bank because they will always give me loans.” Indeed, from the bank’s perspective, Kalpana is a model client, always making her repayments, the model of an empowered woman.

Then there’s Rabeya, daughter of a rickshaw puller, who hanged herself when she couldn’t make the payments on her second loan, even with help from her father, who lent her part of the repayment. Her Grameen Bank officer, insisting she pay the full amount, had given her one hour, suggesting she sell the sari she was wearing. The bank then threatened to stop the funeral if the family didn’t pay, according to Banglabazar Patrika, a national Bangladeshi daily. Elsewhere in Bangladesh, the press, suspecting a systemic problem, has described thousands of desperate, placard- carrying Bangladeshis demonstrating to pressure Grameen Bank to grant them interest rate relief.

No one has ever broadly surveyed recipients of microlending to ask how often women become borrowing fronts for male family members and whether the borrowers’ miraculous repayment rates stem from their ever-greater indebtedness and the microlenders’ willingness to use shame — a powerful weapon on women in traditional societies — as a repayment technique. Mr. Huq argues the Grameen structure, rather than empowering rural women, amounts to no more than another instrument of oppression. An uncritical Western press — participating in feel-good photo ops arranged for their benefit by the UN and other foreign aid agencies that back microlenders — neglects to give these agencies due scrutiny.

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