Discussion group on harvesting subsidies

Don Cayo
The Next City
December 21, 1996

Discussion

Poor Countries like to maintain cheap food policies by scandalously underpaying their dirt-poor farmers. Canada, with a curious logic found only in the most sophisticated economies, maintains a cheap food policy by overpaying for farm products grown here. And not just by handing out subsidies or by rewarding some farmers too richly for their work. We also overpay by fostering and supporting counterproductivity — everything from grossly inefficient grain transportation, to overspending on farm capital, to growing the wrong things in the wrong places.

Our cash-strapped governments are scrambling to pull the plug on direct subsidies, nearly $4 billion a year by the time international trading agreements started forcing them down. Indirect subsidies are also tumbling. Internationally, there’s pressure for freer trade in agricultural commodities, and domestically, there’s agitation for lower prices and greater freedom to produce. These chip away at the power of marketing monopolies to extract premium prices, which cost consumers almost as much as subsidies ever did. But well after these subsidies disappear — for years, if not decades, to come — we will be bearing the untallied cost of the inefficiencies, which may be the highest cost of all.

Still, you can argue — and many supporters of interventionist farm policies do — that food is cheap in Canada. The best evidence supporting the case is found in fields and barns. Modern Canadian farmers routinely work wonders, extracting more from less. Better fertilizers, better pest control, better genetics and better management — crop yields per acre have more than doubled in the last four or five decades, and they continue to increase. Livestock grows to market weight on a fraction of the feed once required. With a combination of better grain yields and better animals, it takes only a fifth as much land to support a barnful of chickens as in 1951. And the land base to sustain the Ontario hog industry has shrunk to half the acreage of 45 years ago, even though 50 per cent more pigs are yielding twice as much lean meat.

Defenders of the agricultural status quo like to boast that Canadians spend less than others to feed themselves. In China, they note, 1.2 billion people spend well over half their income on food, and Mexicans nearly a third. In developed countries, the Japanese spend about 20 per cent, and the French almost as much. And Canadians? Just 15.5 per cent — down from well over 20 per cent when baby boomers were young. Farmers, processors and politicians who argue that our food is cheap also point to grocery store shelves. With a few exceptions — notably milk, chicken, turkey and eggs — our domestic food prices rival those in the United States.

The productivity gains are real. But they’ve been undermined and devalued by politics — decades of ill-conceived policies that skew who grows what where. And even without the exceptions, the comparisons don’t mean much. China’s average household income is less than one-fiftieth ours, Mexico’s less than one-thirtieth. Most people in these countries are poor. Of course they spend a higher percentage of their incomes on food — many have zero per cent left for luxuries, which most Canadians consume with abandon.

On the surface, the Japanese and French analogies are more to the point. Both these countries have family incomes 10 or 20 per cent higher than ours, which implies that their food should require a lower, not higher, percentage of income. But Japan is heavily dependent on food imports; it’s no surprise that groceries there cost more. And France, though chock full of farmers, is a member of the European Union. Its food policies are so screwed up by the EU’s Byzantine, internecine politics as to make intelligent comparisons impossible. Besides, everybody knows the French eat better than we do.

The comparison with U.S. grocery store prices doesn’t tell the whole story either. First, don’t imagine Americans pay the full cost of their food at the checkout, or that public policy doesn’t influence their prices. At the start of the free trade era, when Canadians were overpaying their farmers $6.8 billion a year in either direct subsidies or inflated prices, Americans were overpaying $78.5 billion. They’re still at it. One Washington trick is to pay farmers not to seed land, a direct handout that prevents the buildup of surpluses that would drive prices down. The U.S. government also buys a lot of surplus production — milk for school lunch programs, for example. Again, that’s both a transparent subsidy and a hidden price support.

Second, we Canadians don’t yet pay our whole food bill at the grocery store, and today’s farmers have yesterday’s tax dollars to thank for a rich legacy of land cleared and improved, of buildings built, and of crops and livestock enhanced through research. Farmers are beginning to pay for once free health inspections, but governments still cover half the cost of crop insurance or other risk-reducing programs. And in most rural areas, many services — roads, electricity, telephones, police and fire and ambulance networks, and more — aren’t fully supported by local fees or taxes. The total is impossible to tally. In some cases, like the research that hugely reduces the cost and improves the quality of Canadian farm produce, the spending may be easy to justify. But these costs are nevertheless real, part of the price Canadians pay for food.

Third, don’t forget those exceptions — milk, chicken, turkey and eggs. Dairy and feather farmers are the coddled kings of Canadian agriculture, their industries responsive only marginally to the law of supply and demand. They are supply managed — a euphemism for what is in effect a closed shop that bars all competitors, nationally and internationally, and manipulates prices to its members’ advantage. The consequence is uncompetitiveness and supermarket prices that are consistently higher — at least 10 per cent and often 30 per cent or more — than in the United States.

The tax burden to support direct and indirect subsidies may be reasonably well shared by Canadians, but artificially high prices are another story. Overcharging inflicts an onerous tax on the poor to boost prices for poultry, eggs and milk — all dietary staples. There’s no denying that the relative cost of food is modest for middle-class Canadians, and it’s minuscule for the rich. But grocery shopping strains the pocketbooks of people sustained by welfare or marginal jobs. A struggling single mom in Toronto or Montreal has two choices: She can overpay to further enrich the poultry and dairy farmers with those fine brick houses and sprawling barns that dot the rural landscape in Ontario and Quebec; or she can see her children go without foods vital to a nutritious diet.

The same policies that ill serve consumers provide, at best, only short-term support for farmers, and they foster long-term problems now coming to the fore. Many farmers were encouraged into activities without a sufficient land base to sustain production. As governments’ support for agriculture wanes, many who responded to irrational policies of the day now find themselves mired in debt, realizing that they’re growing the wrong things in the wrong way in the wrong places. Those in coddled industries that grew up inefficient find their high prices bar them from markets, domestic and foreign.

And rural communities are paying a bigger price still.

I saw that price firsthand last summer as I toured my home province of New Brunswick, my natal Saskatchewan and the rich farm belt of Southern Ontario. I came home convinced that interventionist policies fail both consumers and farmers, not to mention governments’ own regional development aspirations. The case is irrefutable: The best cheap food policy would leave the business of farming to farmers.

THE PATCHWORK QUILT OF THE PRAIRIE GRAIN BELT HAS CHANGED color since the days of my youth. There’s a lot more yellow — we used to call it rape when a few leading-edge farmers began planting it in the 1960s, but now it’s canola. There’s more pale blue flax — another lucrative oilseed. There are more shades of green, reflecting a wider range of feed grains and rotation crops. And there’s virtually no black — the tilled-clean summer fallow that farmers of my father’s generation were convinced was essential to good husbandry.

This is a picture of bounteous farming developments this decade — a growing diversity that’s good for the land and good for the farmer’s bottom line. But something is missing from this picture. People. Houses. Even small towns. They aren’t there in the numbers I remember. This isn’t faulty memory; these are real blank spots, and they represent the failure of farm policy.

What a contrast with New Brunswick where small towns abound, and homes are strung in ribbons along countless kilometres of country roads. The Maritimes economy is booming nowhere, but rural New Brunswick sustains a modestly increasing population. Some work in forestry; some commute to town, as rural dwellers do in every part of Canada. But a surprising number work in farm-related jobs: Manufacturers process 86 per cent of the province’s agricultural products to substantially higher value. Each job in the field generates nearly seven jobs off the farm.

A success story? Not entirely. Too much of my little province’s agricultural potential lies fallow. We plant just 55,000 acres of potatoes each year, a little more than that in the rotation crops required to give potato soil a break, and quite a lot less in blueberries, our second-biggest agricultural export. We produce just enough milk and poultry to feed all 760,000 of us. And we produce a small fraction of our other meat and vegetables.

Saskatchewan, on the other hand, has all kinds of agriculture. Grain or oilseeds or forage grows on about 50 million acres — nearly a thousand times more land than New Brunswick has seeded to potatoes. For most of Saskatchewan’s history, tending that much cropland took well over 100,000 farmers — the peak was 142,000 in 1936. Today, farms employ a mere 60,000, many with day jobs and many more with spouses who work off the farm. Worse from a rural development perspective, Saskatchewan ships its produce unprocessed; Prairie agriculture provides a comparative handful of off-farm jobs. So, as farms get bigger, neighbors become more distant. With nothing to do until Dad retires, working-age sons and daughters drift to the cities, most never to return. Small towns with schools and rinks and little business districts that once thrived thanks to local farmers’ custom now fade from the map — and from the landscape.

These two very different problems — underdevelopment of agriculture in the Maritimes and underpopulation of agriculture-rich areas of the Prairies — were exacerbated, if not caused, by a single set of federal farm policies: grain transportation subsidies that have, over time, diverted billions and billions of tax dollars from the city to the country without doing anyone any good.

FEED FREIGHT ASSISTANCE, A SUBSIDY PROGRAM that provided farmers with $14 to $18 million a year, ended last year. It was supposed to help Western and Central Canadians sell their grain while benefiting Maritime livestock operators who didn’t grow enough of their own. It did. But, along with the $700 million Crow rate subsidy that helped Prairie farmers ship grain abroad, it also did some other things.

In the Maritimes, Feed Freight Assistance created huge dependency on imported feed. Cheap imports fuelled the creation of fairly large chicken, turkey and hog operations on farms with nowhere near enough land to sustain them. The farmers can’t grow the food their animals require — most don’t grow any — and they can’t productively dispose of the manure. They’ve prospered, till now, thanks to subsidized grain and, in the case of poultry, the supply-management system that limits production within the province, bars competitors from outside, and bolsters the selling price. With feed costs currently at a record high worldwide and the simultaneous loss of the subsidy, turkey growers are faltering in New Brunswick. Their industry is likely to fail. Dozens of big barns that grow 3.2 million kilograms of turkey a year are fated to be boarded up; they have no other use.

Chickens and hogs — perhaps even dairy and beef cattle, which get some of their feed from local forage — could be next if farmers can’t get a nearby supply of grain. Whether New Brunswick would have as many farm animals without the subsidies is unknowable, but it’s a safe bet that those we had would have been fed our own grain.

Today, New Brunswickers grow only 30 per cent of the grain that feeds our livestock, and we have only half enough livestock to feed ourselves. With more grain fields, we’d have a stronger meat industry. As a byproduct, we’d also strengthen our potato farms, which take a terrible toll on the soil. Year after year of the same crop creates a haven for pests that only chemicals can kill and sops up nutrients that acidic fertilizers only partially replace. Big tractors and harvesters beat the soil up and smash it down, pack it solid and plough it loose. Then, the final indignity, rain and melting snow wash away granules that, over time, add up to cubic metres of lost rich silt.

New Brunswick potato farmers have seen their counterparts in neighboring Maine abandon 40,000 acres of once productive land, now essentially mined of its life-giving properties. They’re fighting to save their own soil with a host of techniques: new chisel ploughs that just scratch the surface; erosion-foiling terraces; cover crops left over the winter, tilled under in the spring; strip crops of alternating potatoes and grain. Crop rotation, which fights erosion and the buildup of pests, is used too. But not enough. The ideal rotation is three years according to some experts, five according to others. In New Brunswick, farmers average slightly better than two.

This skimping has more to do with dollars than sense. Potato farmers know they must rotate, especially with grain, the ideal alternative. But with cheap Western and Ontario imports flooding in, planting grain hasn’t paid. Now it might. Since Feed Freight Assistance ended last year, Maritime farmers are eyeing land to clear. There’s lots available. Not only could they grow more high-value potatoes, they could also ease the strain on their overworked land. New grain crops grown during the off years could feed their neighbours’ chickens and pigs. In a few years, who knows? Maybe New Brunswick could start feeding New England, a rich market at our doorstep whose high land and labor costs should make Canadian meat competitive.

Grain transportation subsidies affected farming out West differently. Massive cash infusions certainly propped up grain growers in Saskatchewan, Manitoba and Alberta. But their communities suffered. With so much grain shipped raw, neither processing nor other secondary industries ever gained much hold. How could they? Grain was so cheap to ship, it made sense to wait till it was in a big population centre before milling it, baking it or turning it into pasta and pies. So, along with millions and millions of tonnes of grain, Saskatchewan and its Prairie sisters also shipped out thousands and thousands of jobs.

With transportation subsidies now gone, it makes sense to do something with Prairie grain close to home — even just feeding it to livestock. A pig barn, for example, yields a higher-value, lower-bulk product, which can be shipped economically to consumers in a distant city. Farmers can make more raising pigs than just growing grain, and their neighbors can find jobs milling feed or processing meat. The loss of Feed Freight Assistance and the Crow rate subsidy also puts an end to a false economy that paid farmers to grow grain in places they otherwise wouldn’t. Cattle — even bison, which are marvelously adapted to the Prairie terrain and climate — are once again appearing on marginal land that never should have grown grain and never would have if farm decisions had been driven by economic realities rather than political ones.

I EMBARKED HEAVILY LADEN ON MY 11,000-KILOMETRE ODYSSEY to research this piece and a related series for the newspaper where I work. My little Volkswagen carried more than just me, clean clothes, my laptop and briefcase abulge with background reading. I also took, as usual on assignment, a little store of previous knowledge to chew on while travelling and a mixed bag of preconceptions and predilections.

It’s a stretch to call me a farm boy, though my roots extend to Saskatchewan’s grey bush soil northwest of Prince Albert. I was only three when Dad sold our tiny house, rented out the land and steered the family urban-bound via a series of short stays in small towns. So I grew up only somewhat citified and with an affection for farm life based on spotty early memories and a lingering fondness for country kith and kin. Balance that with the skepticism and penchant for analysis that come with my career. Not to mention the self-interest of the private me, a price-weary taxpayer and consumer. I’ve written volumes about public policy in Atlantic Canada, and I know how government intervention has skewed agriculture and screwed consumers here.

I often rail about the stunting effect of western grain subsidies on New Brunswick agriculture — it’s a mini-crusade on the editorial pages I edit. But my rants were always softened, in my head at least, by the supposition that all this public money must be helping somebody, somewhere — perhaps an old friend or extended family member back on a Prairie farm.

It would be nice to affect an authoritative air that implies I’ve always understood all the drawbacks of farm policies. But I haven’t. Until I chanced by a meeting of groups representing all manner of Manitoba producers, I had no idea that grain transportation subsidies had hurt the Western economy as badly as the Maritimes, probably worse. I expected the meeting to be peppered with long-faced mooning about salad days gone by; I found clear-eyed analyses of future opportunities. Days later, when I reached Saskatchewan, I found the same thing.

I set out knowing that easy money — handouts — foster inefficiency. But until I sat down at the kitchen table with Hubert Esquirol, an anti-interventionist farmer in Northern Saskatchewan, I didn’t know the whole sorry story of the railways. Twenty-six thousand rail cars, Esquirol tells me, worth $70,000 each — a $1.8-billion fleet — sit idle 87 per cent of the time. Prairie grain en route to Vancouver averages nine kilometres an hour. That’s the speed of a farm tractor tilling a field, just a little faster than most people’s brisk walk. And some spur lines cost more to operate than the value of the grain they carry.

I knew about the mixed legacy of the trend to fewer, bigger farms in every part of Canada. I knew some retirement-bound farmers had sold out joyously for good prices, while others, swamped by debt, walked away with nothing. But until I lunched with Linda Haverstock in Saskatoon, I didn’t realize the damage caused by easy-money policies that kept many doomed farmers hanging on a little longer. Things were made worse, not better, for the very people they were supposed to help. Haverstock, the former Saskatchewan Liberal leader who quit after caucus disagreements, is returning to practise as a psychologist counselling troubled farm families. She’s horrified at how frequently bad policies and bad advice drag people further and further into debt that can’t avert — that merely postpones — the crunch. When they finally go broke, they’re too old for new careers. “We can’t go back,” she says. “But you have to ask yourself, would it have been better for these people to have faced the music much earlier and not end up with this horrific debt?”

I knew about supply management — select clubs for regulation- and tariff-protected farmers who’ve been granted not only an exclusive right to produce but also the power to keep prices high. But until George Leroux took me on a tour of Coldsprings Farm’s turkey barns, a mini-empire scattered from Thamesford to Tillsonburg in Southern Ontario, I never dreamed that one of these anointed few would chafe at the very things that irk me so. I sought out Leroux because he’s president of Coldsprings, grower of nearly a tenth of Canada’s turkeys. I wanted counterbalance for some of the preconceptions and predilections I left home with; I found reinforcement.

Coldsprings not only grows turkeys, it breeds and hatches them, slaughters and processes them, grows and mills their feed, composts and sells their manure. Supply management is under attack both from would-be competitors outside the country and critics at home. Even if domestic opponents fail, Leroux knows that sooner or later NAFTA or the GATT will tear down those tariff walls. He’s girding for the day Coldsprings goes head-to-head with American growers — not only in Canada, but also in the U.S., if he gets his way. High prices already constrain Canadian poultry producers. Canadians don’t eat as much turkey and chicken as Americans do because it costs too much. Yet, Coldsprings matches all the American production costs, except two. The first is a 2.4-cent-a-kilogram levy it must pay to support collective marketing; the second is the 12.2 cents a kilogram it costs to finance millions of dollars the company has invested in quota — a piece of paper that gives supply-managed farms the right to produce. Leroux is blunt: Coldsprings would do better, and its customers would do better, in an unfettered market.

I knew horticultural growers in Southern Ontario live by their wits as much as by the sweat of their brow. True, they have wonderful soil, a salubrious summer climate and Canada’s richest market on their doorstep. But they must pay the highest farm wages in Canada for labor-intensive harvesting, and their land costs are astronomical, driven by suburban values rather than agricultural worth. Until I chatted with Jay Reesor outside his roadside market in Markham, I assumed he’d envy and itch to emulate supply-managed farmers with their secure incomes and built-in margins to cover every cost of production, no matter how high. Instead, he wants farm monopolies out of his way. Reesor sells all his own produce directly to consumers, including a few dozen eggs a day from his 500 hens. Those eggs are worth more than the few dollars they bring in. They also attract customers who know a Reesor egg is fresh, gathered just the day before it’s sold. Often as not, they also buy something else — his locally famous sweet corn, or beans, or they stay and pick a few strawberries. He can’t, however, add a single hen to his flock; he can’t encourage a neighbor to produce a few dozen extra eggs for his market. He has 500 hens thanks only to a loophole in regulations designed to keep people like him out of the poultry business. He had 14 chickens when he was 10 — or perhaps 10 when he was 14, he can never quite remember without checking the receipt he keeps tucked away to show supply-management snoops who come yearly to count his flock. That history of previous ownership lets him keep 500 birds without any quota. He’d like more layers, and perhaps a few range-fed broilers to attract new customers. And he resents those regulatory walls that have created such a comfortable cloister for insiders, but an impenetrable barrier for everyone else.

The list goes on. From hog farmer Warren Stein I learned just how competitive Canadians can be in a relatively free international market. From ministers and their deputies across the land I learned that, although they’re always careful to voice support for the principle of supply management, they also speak of “changes” their provinces seek — changes so sweeping they sound like a death-knell for the system. Several farmers told me they often don’t invest wisely — they buy or build not because of pressing need, but because government money’s available. Even Nettie Wiebe, president of the National Farmers Union and a pro-interventionist if ever there was one, dislikes the way things were, as well as the way they’re evolving now.

There’s a pattern here. Plenty of people still plead the merits of their own special interests, but nobody looking at the big picture makes a case that it ought not change. The status quo has no defenders.

My list of people ill served by farm policies was getting long. At the top, consumers and taxpayers. We pick up the tab for privilege, inefficiency and bad decisions on the farm. Then add the uncountable, unknowable thousands who don’t have farm jobs in the Maritimes or off-farm jobs in the Prairies because their communities’ growth has been stunted. Add urban Canadians, the millions living in the handful of metropolises whose prosperity is tied far more to the health of their hinterlands than to exploitation of their own nearby resources. Add all the farmers lured into bad investments, whether the ones who built unsustainable and now doomed turkey barns in the Maritimes, or those who merely drove their overhead up a bit with an unneeded building or a piece of equipment replaced before its day was done. Add huge costs to the environment — and ultimately to farmers and all society — from land overstressed and made chemically overdependent by underrotation or growing the wrong things. Add poultry and dairy farmers, most nowhere nearly as prepared for a competitive future as Leroux. Their supply-managed sinecures may have provided some good years, but now they face killer competition from abroad. Add the farmers denied diversification — small ones like Reesor or big ones out West who’d like to feed their grain to chickens or turkeys or dairy cows. Add specialty chicken restaurants unable to match the bargains offered by burger joints that sell unregulated beef. Add millers who must buy through the Canadian Wheat Board and can’t get grain from specific growers they favor. Add every Canadian who feels the effect of lost export opportunities on our balance of trade; every Canadian who works or wants to work in the food industry. Or to eat.

This was really something to chew on during the long drive home. If the complex and costly policies guiding agriculture in Canada serve no one’s long-term interest, how did they come to be? How do we make future policies work better?

SO MANY FAILURES, SO MANY UNINTENDED SIDE EFFECTS — what an indictment of Canadian farm policy. But that’s farm policy, not food policy — an important distinction. Where are consumers’ interests in this? Until recently, at the bottom of the list — if included at all. Even now, only a handful of consumer lobbies — big guys like the Canadian Restaurant and Foodservices Association — are beginning to catch the ear of policy makers and balance the voices of special interests who’ve dominated farm policy discussions in the past. Perhaps we non-farming Canadians were too busy to join the fray, too preoccupied with other priorities. Maybe we were too ill informed. Or too nice.

Grain transportation subsidies in Canada go back to 1897. They were probably needed then. They fuelled settlement of the West, a national priority of the day. That job done, did anyone think about the wisdom of continuing to pay out all that money? Perhaps. But in the following century, no one thought enough about it to halt what became an indefensibly expensive and counterproductive practice. So, too, with other farm supports. They accumulated, one by one, in response to the clamor of special interests espousing special needs — some real, some imagined. Those of us who pay the bills never provided much counterbalance. So inertia ensured that, once a measure was in place, policy makers rarely worried their heads about it again.

And fear of the farm vote ensured that if people in power ever did think about cutting farm subsidies, they’d think twice. Conventional political wisdom has it that farmers control most ridings in the Prairies and nearly half of the ones in Quebec — an odd assumption in a country where a mere two per cent of the people farm. Odd or not, it prevailed. Farm subsidies came to be regarded as untouchable; entitlements became a divine right.

Early this decade, however, the cost cutters swept to power and finally began to butcher these sacred cows. Former transport minister Doug Young pulled the big plug on grain transportation subsidies. Others pulled a lot of smaller ones — a seven-dollar-a-hog subsidy for pigs in New Brunswick, a six-cent-a-litre subsidy on milk across Canada, a plethora of one-shot grants, free inspection services, deficiency payments when prices dip, bail-outs when crops fail.

Squawking about the cuts has been subdued, perhaps because farmers who fear the loss of their traditional perks are too busy defending other fronts. Opponents of both the supply-management system and other monopolies that sell most of our “free market” farm commodities are launching a vigorous wave of assaults. These are producers — still the minority — tackling their own colleagues. They’re Fraser Valley dairy farmers demanding the right to produce butter and cheese and other milk products now supplied to British Columbia by Quebec quota holders; they’re 5,000 moderate Prairie grain farmers and 800 or 900 militant ones who want to break the Canadian Wheat Board’s stranglehold on mainstream grain crops. And, more quietly but perhaps more significantly, they’re Manitoba hog farmers who chafe at being forced to sell their pigs through the province’s hog-marketing agency. This summer, Manitoba became the first government to listen. It allowed its province’s hog farmers to sell outside the board. Most aren’t doing so — at least not yet. But they’re demanding some overdue efficiencies, and they’ll vote with their feet if they don’t get results.

In 1989, the Canadian Wheat Board lost its monopoly on oats, a secondary Prairie crop. What happened was a boon to farmers; the Canadian price has increased relative to the U.S., and marketing costs have dropped by a third. Last summer, a federal review panel recommended that the wheat board lose a little more power. It said farmers should be free to sell up to a quarter of their wheat independently of the board, and the board should lose its monopoly on feed barley, though not on malt. Whether these specific recommendations are adopted is moot. The trend is clear — and so is the pressure for it to continue.

Entrepreneurship is already finding some creative ways around stifling monopolies. When New Brunswick decided to grow its little dairy industry, for example, it faced a tough challenge. How could it expand when the law limits the province’s producers to feeding its 760,000 citizens, who, with the exception of poor people, already get as much milk as they want? The answer was a deal to raise and sell 50,000 dairy cows to Pakistan. New Brunswick couldn’t keep some or all those cows and export the milk; the national milk marketing system demands that any extra production be spread evenly among dairy farms across Canada. Besides, quota for that many cows would have cost $600 million — half again as much as the whole deal, which includes huge amounts of production and processing paraphernalia.

Yet farmers producing supply-managed foods for Canadians still must tie up that kind of money in quota — investment that produces not a morsel of meat, not an egg, not even the mustache on a milk drinker’s upper lip. And incentive-skewing regulations — the kinds of things that penalize excellence to reward mediocrity — remain alive and well.

At times through the years when the world price was low, Maritime livestock growers could have bought offshore feed cheaper than subsidized Canadian grain. They never did. Under rules that remained in place until Feed Freight Assistance ended, a would-be grain importer needed permission from the Canadian Wheat Board, the world’s biggest grain seller — sort of like getting General Motors’s permission to buy a Dodge. Even if the permission had been granted (and it never was) there were other impediments. Transportation regulations required the use of specific kinds of ships and unloading procedures — costly ones, sure to eat up any savings. Then there were obstructionist inspection requirements, more rigid than mere health and safety concerns would demand. The Maritimes were, in everything but name, a captive market of the West.

TODAY’S GOVERNMENTS MAY BE OUT OF MONEY, BUT THEY CAN STILL pretend that such regulatory interventions don’t cost anything. And between the lines of my summer conversations and background reading, were hints that convinced me that this is where big battles remain to be fought.

It would have been funny if it weren’t distressing how every minister and senior bureaucrat I met in four provinces so scrupulously avoided the S-word when discussing lingering farm subsidies. They’re pleased to explain how their governments pay 25 per cent of the premiums for crop failure protection plans, but they recoil from calling this spade a subsidy. Enticing farmers into such programs may well be wiser than the alternatives — either coming up with ad hoc bail-outs when crops inevitably fail, or risking a spate of bankruptcies. But such widespread coyness in the way policy makers speak suggests greater commitment to politically correct language in public discourse than to the principle of efficient markets.

Then there’s the ubiquitous bureaucratic lip service to supply management, even when it’s clearly against the speaker’s best interests. Why would Ontario, with its richly profitable and sustainable poultry and dairy farms, want to perpetuate a market-skewing, development-deadening, consumer-unfriendly system? Why would Saskatchewan or Manitoba, where farmers are sitting on millions of bushels of feed grain they can’t afford to ship? Why would New Brunswick, stuck with unsustainable farms and denied the opportunity to grow an export industry? The answer hasn’t changed. Governments are still spooked by farm lobbies. Special interests — those accustomed to a place at a bountiful trough — are speaking loud and clear. But nothing much is being said by the rest of us — those merely denied a potential opportunity that we may not even know should be there, or those who pay the bills without giving them much thought. This is worrisome. History tells us that, when it comes to Canadian farm policies, squeaky wheels get greased. And greased. And greased.

WHAT IF CANADA DIDN’T HAVE FARM POLICIES ANY MORE? What if we had, instead, federal and provincial food policies that balanced everyone’s interests? Farmers, processors, consumers, taxpayers and politicians — we could find a good deal of common ground if we looked for it.

Nettie Wiebe of the National Farmers Union speaks for a constituency that dreads the day non-farm voices dominate the policy debate. She foresees a trashing of the farm-gate price, with no resulting savings for consumers, who pay far more for processing, packaging, transportation, wholesaling and retailing than the producer ever sees.

But trashing the farm-gate price serves no one’s interest. It’s as short-sighted as the policies we’ve pursued. Smart agriculture is profitable in Canada. Studies show that young farmers make a decent return on investment, whereas older ones — many not so well equipped with sharp pencils or new technology and some coasting to retirement — would tend to do better by selling out and putting the money into GICs. Even so, a farmer’s average net worth is $400,000, compared to $80,000 for the rest of us. The smart strategy would encourage more, not fewer, young savvy operators to enter the field.

How? By letting them do what they do well. Let Jay Reesor have all the chickens he wants; let Toronto-area consumers decide how far they’ll drive and how much they’ll pay for an extra-fresh egg; let the guys who go around counting chickens find real work to do. Give George Leroux the freedom to meet the Yankee invaders head on at the border. Let British Columbians eat B.C. butter — if their producers are efficient, it would save cross-Canada transportation costs. Free up the hundreds of millions of dollars tied up in quota, letting it be invested productively to create something people can eat. Let Hubert Esquirol truck his grain to Minneapolis if Canadian railways won’t land it at the Lakehead or in Thunder Bay for reasonable cost. Give New Brunswick potato farmers a level field to develop grain as a new cash crop and give respite to their tired soil. Let farmers and processors everywhere profit from new export markets. Reward the innovators who find ways to increase production or to use less energy, less fertilizer, less spray. Make it, at long last, less profitable for farmers to spend their energy milking the government than milking the cows. Free farmers to pursue only the goals that make sense for their level of skills, their amount of capital, their land. Leave the business of farming to farmers.

When farmers succeed in putting the best-suited land, the best genetics, the best technology and the best management to work in the best places, processors will have more raw product at a more reasonable cost. If the guiding principle becomes economic and ecological sustainability, no longer just political whim, consumers will have cheaper food — not just today and tomorrow, but long into the future. As wasteful subsidies end, taxpayers will have, if not lower taxes, then at least the prospect of a little something left over in the treasury to shrink the federal deficit or the provincial debt. As production reorganizes in the locations with natural advantages, governments will see some genuine regional development — perhaps not every commodity being produced in every region, but strong sustainable industries wherever the mix is right. As capital is put to better use, Canada will export more, creating jobs, improving the balance of trade and — not incidentally — helping to feed a burgeoning and hungry world.

There may still be agricultural costs that non-farm Canadians ought to share. Are health inspections — once the responsibility of government but now paid for by farmers — a boon to the grower, the consumer, or both? Is research a proper societal expenditure, one that ought to be borne by industry, or should it, too, be a bit of both? The cost of environmental protection is soaring for farmers, and society at large has a huge role in determining how high it need go and how it can be met. None of these questions are solely for farmers to answer. They’re for all Canadians — the rightful purview of a genuine food policy.

There will be no getting around the need for Canadians to continue paying for what we get. But isn’t it time we start getting what we pay for, too?


Letters

, Wawota, Saskatchewan, responds: February 3, 1997, Claremont, Ontario, responds: February 23, 1997, Burlington, Ontario, responds: August 31, 1997

  1. John Husband
  2. Lorne Almack
  3. Frank Gue
  4. Don Cayo replies

John Husband, Wawota, Saskatchewan, responds: February 3, 1997

As an organic grain farmer from Saskatchewan, I read “Harvesting Subsidies” by Don Cayo with great interest. Ten years ago I felt isolated when questioning a world run by Big Brother. It was accepted that if government did not lead the way, we would be on the slippery slope toward Third World status. It now becomes more evident every day that most of society’s problems can be analyzed right back to government meddling. Agriculture is not an exception, in fact, it provides an obvious example.

For over half a century Canadian agriculture has been subjected to studies, regulations, bailouts, incentives, controls, royal commissions, this-time-we’ll-get-it-right schemes and reports piled upon reports. Agriculture is reeling, but fortunately the patient has not died!

Argentina provides an interesting comparison. Canada and Argentina share many agrarian similarities in both background and establishment. However agricultural policy took a very different course in Argentina. Agriculture there has been unremittingly taxed for the last 75 years in order to provide government money to develop other industries. The result? Agriculture remains the one healthy industry in a Third World country filled with inefficient and unprofitable industries and provides the only reliable source of foreign earnings. In the long run, do all economic endeavors of governments actually work backwards?

Organic agriculture has become a growing force both in Canada and the world. That growth is due to dedication complemented by consumer acceptance and support. A foundation principle of organic agriculture is producer control and accountability to our customers utilizing an audit control to ensure the integrity of our products. All monopoly marketing boards are incompatible with organic methods, and at best they are only an expensive impediment in marketing.

It might be observed that government controlled monopolies, although impacting dramatically on the farmer, yet seemingly innocuous to the consumer, are not strictly a farmers problem. It is important to recognize that selling is also buying, and denial of one is denial of both. Few consumers in Canada will be aware that in the years 1993 to 1994 the Canadian Wheat Board restricted all Canadian flour mills to lower grades of wheat in order to save the best wheat to pursue export markets. This violates organic principles which place domestic markets first.

Ensuring food safety may be a legitimate role for government, but consumers and producers certainly don’t need government bureaucrats as expensive middlemen in the food industry.


Lorne Almack, Claremont, Ontario, responds: February 23, 1997

Oh dear, more simplistic, misleading, neo-conservative hype, spreading nonsense about supply management.

Don Cayo wrongfully assumes a free market where none exists. U.S. farmers slurp at the public trough beyond the wildest dreams of their poor Canadian farm cousins. European food producers are even better treated. The price they get for wheat is three times higher than our farmers receive. Negotiate an international level playing field, and we Canadians will compete anywhere. Free us of the burden of subsidizing urban sprawl through tax assessment on farm land to pay for education, urban sewers, and roads for commuters.

Mr. Cayo should know that they grow potatoes in New Brunswick because that is the only short-season, marketable crop that will grow in the nutrient-poor soils of NB. There is no Class 1 food land in Canada east of the public lands of Pickering.

I can agree with the elimination of the Crow rate and Western Grain Stabilization, which provides cheap feed grain to Quebec and the Maritimes. But be careful; U.S. chicken, beef, and hog farmers also thrive on subsidized feed grains. Also, beware of the possible abuse of monopoly power by railroads and food cartels capable of manipulating markets.

But most alarming is Mr. Cayo’s confusion on supply management. He reveals a typical urban, neo-conservative bias favoring big business. Every industry, manufacturer, or service supplier practices supply management. General Motors practices supply management. It continually monitors sales, production, and inventory for each car model. When sales are slow, production is cut back. Production is planned to meet demand at a price set by GM. Auto manufacturers do not produce to capacity and supply any dealer or customer with cars at a fluctuating bid price. GM would not appreciate price fluctuations or direct competition from other auto makers. Did Mr. Cayo ever try to buy a Ford from a GM dealer? GM also gets a massive subsidy from the public supply of roads and hospital insurance for highway victims. GM workers also benefit from the controlled market. Auto workers’ wages are passed on to the public. Have you noticed that car prices rise much faster than food prices? What is good for GM is also good for our farmers. Ideally, in a more perfect world, both should operate in a free market.

Mr. Cayo should know that in many states of the U.S. marketing follows the Canadian practice. Quotas are set and production planned to meet local demand. In other states dairy factories produce the milk at less cost. Efficiency is achieved by economies of scale – replacement of owner operated farms by paying minimum wages to immigrant workers. Efficient? Yes! Made so, by low wages, massive feeding of hormones and antibiotics, and spraying of carcinogenic pesticides. Huge, efficient dairy farms suffer from a lack of animal husbandry. Mastitis is controlled by penicillin, not by common hygiene, animal care, and early diagnosis. I will not drink Florida milk. Pasteurized puss is not appealing. I will not eat U.S. chicken because I abhor a product washed in its own fecal matter, that cannot safely be prepared on a cutting board for fear of salmonella poisoning. Low price and greater efficiency does not overcome my repugnance toward U.S. industrial agriculture.

When I visit the U.S., I bring my own eggs, bacon and chicken. I buy its cheap gin made from subsidized U.S. grain and practically free of tax. Canadians should continue to support orderly marketing, and quality supply at a reasonable price.

P. S. I enjoy reading The NEXT CITY despite being baited by nonsense authors like Coyne and Cayo.


Frank Gue, Burlington, Ontario, responds: August 31, 1997

In reply to Mr. John Husband’s question, “Do all economic endeavors of governments actually work backwards?”

The short answer is: Yes they do.

Economic endeavors of government conform to an empirical law which I believe I was the first to formulate, viz: The most probable result of government intervention in an economic matter is that it will make the matter worse.

This is because of the inevitable unintended consequences which politicians and bureaucrats are famously unable to foresee. These unintended consequences, of course, require more government intervention, which gives rise to further unintended consequences, ad infinitum until the economic and social overload imposed by regulated intervention causes total collapse of the economy and society.

This has happened unnumbered times in history and doubtless prehistory, the most recent and spectacular examples being the U.S.S.R., Albania, and their contemporaries.

Lest the above be thought merely a cynical smart-alec one-liner, let us go no further than Editor Lawrence Solomon’s lucid explanation of how the minimum wage has operated to eliminate thousands of job openings (“The ends of unemployment,” Summer 1997). Very similar articles have appeared often showing how, let us say, rent controls act to deny housing to people who need it.


Don Cayo replies

I am heartened by John Husband’s letter, discouraged by Lorne Almack’s. I wish I’d known of the Husband farm when I was researching my piece for The NEXT CITY. I like to write about farmers with the initiative to carve out niches to meet real demand rather than pander to the policy of the month.

I don’t mind Mr. Almack’s name-calling. I’ve been judged worse — by critics across the political spectrum, some who analyze my work more astutely than this letter writer does. But I’m saddened that so often we Canadians don’t debate the merits of policy; we slide too easily into this so’s-your-mother tone of discourse.

Mr. Almack and I seem to agree on the inherent ability of Canadian farmers to compete and on the wisdom of scuttling grain transportation subsidies. So where do we disagree?

Well, he says, “Don Cayo wrongfully assumes a free market where none exists.” Huh? If I were unaware of European and U.S. agriculture subsidies, how could I write about them? My fifth paragraph noted that the European Union’s “food policies are so screwed up . . . as to make intelligent comparisons impossible.” And in the sixth paragraph I said, “At the start of the free trade era, when Canadians were overpaying their farmers $6.8 billion a year in either direct subsidies or inflated prices, Americans were overpaying $78.5 billion. They’re still at it.” So apparently I’m guilty of “simplistic, misleading, neoconservative hype” because I believe waste in Canada shouldn’t continue unabated forever just because other people are wasteful too.

Or perhaps, given Mr. Almack’s claim that New Brunswick can grow no crop other than potatoes, my sin is believing a wider range of crops is possible on land where farmers used to (and some still do) grow a variety of other things. Never mind government studies that show lots of good land available, some under cultivation and some not. Look at Ashley Long, a farmer a few kilometres up the Kennebecasis Valley from my home, who sold his dairy quota five years ago and went into grain — and makes at least as much money now. Look at history. New Brunswick may never have vast acreages to rival the West, but we fed ourselves and our livestock before, and we can do it again. Pre-Loyalist Acadians, for heaven’s sake, were self-sufficient for a period of time that lasted longer than Canada has been a country.

But where I really seem to get Mr. Almack’s goat is with my distaste for supply management — the cushy closed shop that frees dairy, chicken, and turkey producers from any inconvenience of competition at home or abroad. Somehow, he equates that with “a typical urban, neoconservative bias favoring big business.” I did write about Coldsprings Farm, a large turkey producer that would be happier without supply management. But I also wrote about how the system shafted a lot of littler guys: the New Brunswick turkey producers who were stuck with unsustainable farms that bad policy enticed them to build; the Western grain producers who can’t feed their crops to chickens or turkeys or dairy cows; and Jay Reesor, the fast-on-his-feet market gardener from Markham, Ontario, who was held back by a monopolistic system that shut him out.

My biggest beef with supply management is that it ties up millions of dollars — sometimes more than half the total value of a farm — in quota, an unproductive investment that yields not an ounce of food in return. Mr. Almack does not address that, and it does not seem to occur to him that the barrier such a huge investment creates is more burdensome to a small producer than to a very large one.

His comparison of General Motors’s inventory control to supply management is one I’ve heard often, and it’s as spurious now as it was 20 years ago. General Motors adjusts its own production to the demands of the market, but not anyone else’s production. It competes with Ford, Chrysler, and the imports. And if car companies got together to skew the market the way supply management boards routinely do, they’d be breaking the law.

To me, the most interesting line in Mr. Almack’s letter is, “Free us of the burden of subsidizing urban sprawl through tax assessments on farmland to pay for education, urban sewers, and roads for commuters.” That, of course, is a two-way street — in some areas, “rural urbanites” subsidize farmers by providing roads and services; in other areas, farmers are put under immense pressure by taxes to pay for services they neither want nor need.

That problem will get worse. And that problem — like the questions Mr. Almack raises about environmental responsibility, drug and hormone use, or fair treatment of laborers — is one that farmers ought not be left to wrestle with alone. Society has to decide what its standards are to be and how to pay to have those standards met. And that, as I argue in my essay, is the rightful purview not of farm policy, but of a genuine food policy that represents and balances the interests of all sectors of society.

I don’t believe American-produced meat and dairy products are as unwholesome as Mr. Almack claims, but American agriculture has run into some serious problems that I hope Canada avoids. The environmental cost of overconcentrating production, for example, can be huge. But it doesn’t require a bloated marketing board bureaucracy to see that. Big companies — Coldsprings Farm and Maple Leaf Foods, to name just two that I talked to — are starting to worry as well about what they see as “diseconomies of scale” — costs incurred by corporate producers that are avoided by the efficient owner-operator.

Mr. Almack says he enjoys reading The NEXT CITY. That being so, I invite him to revisit “Harvesting subsidies.” This time, consider the possibility that I’m not a huckster for a political agenda, but rather what I say I am — a guy who read and talked and thought a lot, then concluded that the system fails too many people. Maybe we’ll agree on some things. Can we concur that something’s wrong when scores of thousands of farmers are forced from the land? Do we see trade barriers falling in Canada and around the world, and do we fear for farmers who aren’t ready for vigorous international competition? Do we worry that many farmers overstress their land and squander their capital to produce the wrong things in the wrong places? Are we vexed when many struggling farmers are denied the chance to produce what makes sense for them? Do we think it unjust that consumers have no voice in policies that determine the price and quality of their food, just as farmers have no voice in urban-driven issues that drive up their costs?

Even if we agree on what the problems are, of course, Mr. Almack and I may still favor different solutions. But how much more productive it would be to discuss these issues in a spirit of fair and workable compromise.

Posted in Agriculture (Rural) | Leave a comment

Book reviews

The Next City
December 21, 1996

 

Peering through the smoke

Ashes to Ashes: America’s Hundred-Year Cigarette War, the Public Health, and the Unabashed Triumph of Philip Morris

by Richard Kluger
(Alfred A. Knopf, 1996. 807 pages) $45

IF RICHARD KLUGER’S BOOK WERE A PACK OF CIGARETTES, I would have trouble inhaling at first, but I would soon get hooked. The introductory chapter is a cannonade against tobacco. With all the balance and reason of a Ralph Nader on amphetamines, Kluger sets smoking on the same level as nuclear weaponry, hatred between nations and desecration of nature. Smoking may even have killed more people than the wars of this century. Readers who can make it past this brief outburst of rhetoric can settle down to a fascinating commercial history of the American cigarette, told by a professional reporter of high calibre.

The rise of the cigarette is the story of modern commerce. The cigarette industry led the way in developing the mix of research, management, retailing and marketing on which large corporations model themselves today. Such economic brio could not have been foretold 120 years ago. After the American Civil War, most tobacco was either chewed, smoked through pipes or rolled into cigars. Cigarettes were made from the dregs left by these more popular products and rolled with flavoring pastes that were rumored to include dung and urine. Either you paid a premium for luxury cigarettes or you took your chances with the common stuff. It is no surprise that most people stayed away.

What brought smokers in was Buck Duke, a teenager from North Carolina with a shrewder grasp of the human soul than Plato or Kant ever had. Duke grew up in a family that earned a modest living farming tobacco. He took his leap into history by seizing an opportunity that the nation’s small-thinking cigarette makers had rejected — a new machine that could reliably roll 70,000 cigarettes a day, the output of 45 manual workers. Duke bought the machine and swore its exasperated inventors, the Bonsack brothers, to be his semi-exclusive suppliers. The Bonsacks would charge all competing buyers a 25 per cent premium over the price paid by Duke. Duke then set about improving cigarette blends and tobacco breeds. He matched his technical grasp of manufacturing with a modern view of marketing. Almost all profits were plowed back into advertising. Duke was investing in something called goodwill, an asset he understood would take years to build before paying off mightily. As a young millionaire he did not scruple to pound the pavements of New York late at night to drop in on corner stores, ask what brands were selling, what consumers were looking for in a smoke, and whether the owner would put Duke’s brands on window display — for a premium of course. With such tactics he caught his competitors napping. By the turn of the century he had bought most of them out, expanded into cigars and chews and brought his company, American Tobacco, to the head of tobacco manufacture and marketing in the United States.

Anyone this talented and rich is bound to rouse jealousies. On the pretext of breaking up a price-fixing monopoly, the Justice Department forced Duke to disband his tobacco trust. Duke’s spirited defence against the accusation of manipulating the market was, “We happen to have more of the brands that please the people, and consequently we sell more tobacco.” This sounds similar to Michael Milken’s explanation on how he got rich selling high-risk-high-yield debt, and to Bill Gates’s defence of Microsoft. Both of these 1980s billionaires claim they made their fortunes fashioning products that consumers wanted at prices no one else could beat. On reading the rest of Richard Kluger’s book, it is hard not to believe that Duke was right.

From the 1920s to the present, the cigarette industry has molded itself to the most intimate contours of its clients’ desires. Far from being kings, tobacco executives emerge from these pages as slaves to the public whim. The industry followed the public’s wish for cigarettes with low tar and few noxious elements. The major cigarette concerns funded scientific research that dissected cigarette smoke in trying to discover tobacco’s harmful effects. Over the years, the industry poured hundreds of millions of dollars into making cigarettes safe. During the 1980s, RJR Nabisco sunk $300 million dollars into its smokeless cigarette project; a project that failed because smokers wanted to suck down smoke, not steamed tobacco fumes.

If the industry’s efforts have not made smokers safe from cancer and emphysema, it seems that smokers themselves are to blame. When the industry introduced filters, its clients increased their cigarette uptake. This sort of phenomenon was first identified by University of Chicago economist Samuel Peltzman in the 1970s as the “law of offsetting behavior.” After accounting for all factors that might possibly have led to the falling traffic mortalities of the 1970s (such as an ageing population), Peltzman found that forcing people to wear seat-belts did not lower traffic mortality rates. Drivers understand the protective value of seat-belts. They press harder on the pedal, to the point where the risk of death rises back to its old level. Air bags, and anti-lock brakes have done little to prevent road massacres for the same reason. Consumers of deadly products are eerily well informed on the risks and adjust their behavior to find the level of deadliness that suits them best.

The notion that consumers are rational beings who understand risks, choose to become addicted, and face the consequences like adults, is not prominent in Richard Kluger’s book. In his eyes, the cigarette industry lulled smokers into a sense of security by questioning the link between cigarettes and cancer. Cigarette makers may not be Satan’s little helpers, but they come close. Kluger believes they could have done a great deal more than they did to warn smokers of the dangers of their product, and that government should have clamped down on the industry much harder.

Hostility to smoking goes back far. As Kluger notes, in the 17th century, the Mogul emperor of Hindustan ordered smokers’ lips split on the grounds that their habit invited debauchery. Kluger’s more modern hostility is based on the notion that many people do not understand the addictive nature of smoking and its true costs. Smokers are backward looking. They only remember the joys that smoking brought them and do not think about what suffering the future holds. We need government to pluck the cigarettes from their uncomprehending mouths and drag these poor souls back to a sane way of living.

Kluger might have shown greater respect for the reader’s intelligence by mentioning recent research that suggests smokers are not complete dunces. Economist Gary Becker won the Nobel Prize in 1992, in part, for showing that addiction is a matter of rational choice by consumers. “Rationality” means that consumers look forward and think about the benefits and costs that smoking will bring them in years to come. Becker and other economists have looked at patterns of smoking over time and have found that the numbers accord with the theory. Rationality may explain why the proportion of smokers in the population has halved over the last forty years. Since the 1950s, life expectancies have risen by more than 10 per cent in the U.S. and Canada. Incomes have more than doubled. To a rational smoker, this means his habit will rob him of more years of life lived at a higher income than before. In other words, progress gives us more to lose by smoking. No wonder people are quitting. With such a process of reason at work, who is Kluger, or anyone else, to appoint himself as his smoker’s keeper?

If the case for regulating smoking is questionable, the case for giving government this duty must rest on the faith that government will not bungle the task nor abuse its power. The great tobacco advertising ban that swept over a quarter of industrialized countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s is a prime example of bungling. A study of smoking trends in 22 OECD countries since the 1960s shows that cigarette sales rose slightly in the six countries that imposed a complete ban on advertising. This is not surprising. Cigarette companies have long known that advertising does not produce the demand for tobacco. It simply draws smokers away from other forms of tobacco such as cigars and chews, or away from the allegiance to competing cigarette companies. At most, a ban on advertising will freeze incumbent producers into their market shares. But with advertising gone, the costs of companies will fall, and so will their prices. The ironic result is a rise in cigarette smoking. If Kluger is aware of this study, he does not mention it. Instead he proposes an eight-pronged attack on the tobacco industry that includes higher taxes, a stricter ban on advertising and government oversight of manufacturing and marketing.

The problem with government regulation of social habits is that bureaucrats and politicians do not have the resources or information to tailor their policies to individuals. They can only send down sweeping solutions from on high. This may explain why governments have not been able to solve problems such as poverty and unemployment. The best regulation for a complicated behavior such as smoking may be that which comes from the advice of friends and family, and from the disapproval of colleagues. The process may be slower than a government crackdown, but the payoffs are greater. Moral progress can only come if people are allowed to choose between good and bad. Perhaps this is why a prominent thinker of the last century wrote, “Prohibition would work great injury to the cause of temperance. It is a species of intemperance within itself, for it goes beyond the bounds of reason in that it attempts to control a man’s appetite by legislation and makes a crime out of things that are not crimes. A prohibition law strikes at the very principle upon which our government was founded.” If Abraham Lincoln’s advice is kept in mind, readers can filter away the more intemperate parts of Richard Kluger’s book, to enjoy the story it tells of the rise of a great industry.


Reply to Filip Palda’s review of Ashes to Ashes by Richard Kluger

Why governments must regulate the tobacco industry

IN HIS REVIEW OF ASHES TO ASHES (Winter 1996/97), Filip Palda attempts to force a market theory on the data — basically, he believes that government should adopt a laissez-faire attitude to smoking and other activities where people put their lives at risk — and he conveniently ignores facts that do not jive with the market-model explanation. His theory does not explain smoking behavior very well.

Mr. Palda complains that the author, Richard Kluger, doesn’t treat consumers as “rational beings who understand risks, choose to become addicted, and face the consequences like adults.” Your reviewer assumes consumers are informed, yet for years the tobacco industry has lied about the health risks associated with smoking. People are aware of the risks largely due to the efforts of various non-smoking lobby groups and government regulations that require various warnings on cigarette packages.

Mr. Palda is also wrong to think consumers choose to be addicted. Most Canadians who become addicted to tobacco do so as children. According to Health Canada’s 1994 Youth Smoking Survey, 7 per cent of youths aged 10 to 14, and 24 per cent of 15- to 19-year-olds, smoked regularly. An even higher percentage were recent smokers who were not regular yet.

Studies of smoking behavior among children show them to be very well informed about the health risks without understanding how addictive nicotine is. Most believe that they will be able to quit. Two-thirds of female smokers aged 10 to 19 have tried to quit at least once. Over 30 per cent in each age group have tried to quit three times or more. Among boys, 60 per cent have tried to quit at least once, and 27 per cent have tried to quit three times or more. Forty-three per cent of male smokers aged 10 to 14 have tried to quit smoking.

Mr. Palda says consumers should face the consequences like adults, ignoring the fact that most smokers are not adults when they become addicted. Ninety per cent started under the age of 20; on average, they begin at 14. Even if smokers became addicted as adults, it is callous to just say, “take the consequences,” when public health policies can help people quit. An individual who does not start smoking by age 19 is very unlikely to ever start. In North America, the overwhelming majority of non-addicted adults choose not to start.

To reduce the health problems associated with smoking, public health policy should encourage children not to start smoking. Ashes to Ashes discusses at length the tobacco industry’s attempts to target children, including free cigarettes samples at rock concerts and advertising aimed at adolescents. Kluger would forbid free sampling of cigarettes and their sale in vending machines, and severely fine those selling to buyers under the age of 18.

Citing a study of 22 OECD countries that shows cigarette sales rose slightly in the six countries that completely banned advertising, Mr. Palda claims that “The great tobacco advertising ban that swept over a quarter of industrialized counties in the late 1960s and early 1970s is a prime example of bungling.” Banning advertising only reduces companies’ advertising costs, Mr. Palda believes, leading to lower prices and more cigarettes smoked. The logic sounds reasonable, but the study does not support it.

The evidence regarding cigarette advertising bans is anything but clear cut. While the OECD study does show a very slight rise, its authors (not Mr. Palda) are quick to state that the relationship between banning advertising and increased cigarette sales was not statistically significant. The study controlled for price and attributed the slight increase more to the disappearance of government regulated health warnings that accompanied the advertising. People became less aware of the risks involved with smoking and, so, were more likely to smoke.

Since banning cigarette advertising did not lower cigarette consumption, other policies should be pursued instead. Perhaps an antismoking ad which mocks the Marlboro Man could follow each cigarette commercial.

Mr. Palda believes the “best regulation for a complicated behavior such as smoking may be that which comes from the advice of friends and family, and from the disapproval of colleagues. The process may be slower than a government crackdown, but the payoffs are greater.”

In this I agree wholeheartedly. People are more likely to change their behavior if they believe in the change, rather than if they are forced. Since drunk driving became socially unacceptable, fewer people drink and drive, leading to a considerable decrease in drunk driving accidents in Canada during the last 20 years. However, we still need drunk driving regulations and police enforcement of drunk driving laws.

TO SURVIVE, THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY MUST RECRUIT new smokers. Because advertising aimed at adults primarily shifts brand loyalty, it must addict children and adolescents to replenish the declining number of adult smokers.

Government regulation can reduce the number of young smokers. According to the OECD study, increasing the price of cigarettes sharply reduces cigarette consumption, especially for young people, who on average have less disposable income. We also need government regulation to combat unequal power relationships. The market model assumes that many buyers and sellers of goods and services are informed, and that the marketplace determines prices and consumption.

In practice, corporations can use their great economic resources to thwart the relatively poor individual citizens who dispute the claims of cigarette manufacturers. With their wealth, companies can bribe politicians by making large contributions to their election campaigns and can hire lobbyists to turn government regulations to their economic interests. With their wealth, corporations can hire a legion of public relations types to lie and to misinform people by providing speakers to service clubs and school kits to teachers, by writing letters to newspapers, by putting out press releases, and so on.

The inequality in power is obvious. An individual has few hours and economic resources to devote to challenging the practices of the tobacco industry. In a democratic society, each citizen should have equal power in determining policies that affect such issues as public health. One way to do this is through elections, referenda, and government regulation. The alternative championed by Mr. Palda leads to domination by the wealthy and unscrupulous.

References:

Health Canada (1994). 1994 Youth Smoking Survey. Cat. H49-98/1994E.

Spoke, Susan & Associates (1996). A Literature Review on Smoking: The Social, Psychological and Physiological Influencers Affecting Decisions and Behaviour.

Stewart, M.J. (1993). “The effect of advertising on tobacco consumption in OECD countries.” International Journal of Advertising, 12:155-180.

by Evan Morris, Regina

AFTER READING MR. MORRIS’S letter I got confused. Did I really write a book review in which I am “callous” toward addicts, in which I try to force market theory on data, and where I call for government to take a “laissez-faire” attitude when people put their lives at risk? In rereading my review, I could find no trace of the beast Mr. Morris sighted running loose in those pages. Perhaps what bothered him was that someone questions the antismoking position. On this count I plead guilty. Here are some of the antismoking claims about which I have doubts:

Claim no. 1: Smokers don’t know the risks. An expert in this field is Kip Viscusi. Viscusi engaged the New York survey research firm, Audits and Surveys, to ask 3,119 Americans about their knowledge of the dangers of tobacco use. Respondents — including smokers — heavily overestimated the risk that a smoker will develop lung cancer, and slightly overestimated the risk of death from smoking and the years by which smoking shortens a life. It is not clear why people overestimate the true risks of smoking. Perhaps inflated estimates are a way of protecting yourself against dangerous behavior, the way some people advance their wristwatches by five minutes to make sure they arrive on time.

Claim no. 2: People do not avoid smoking based on their evaluation of important information. The crucial question here is whether perceptions of risk influence behavior. If people can sense risk, and adjust their behavior to that sense, this suggests they are thinking, autonomous beings who do not need a bureaucrat in a nanny’s uniform to spank them for lighting up. Using a technique known as logistic regression, Viscusi isolated the effect of risk perceptions from other variables that might influence an individual’s decision to smoke. He found that the more risk a person perceives from smoking, the less likely he is to smoke. This means that people are using their heads and making choices. Including making the choice to become addicted and making the choice to end addiction. According to a 1990 report of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, even though 50 million Americans smoked, half of all American adults who once smoked had quit, and overall there were 38 million former smokers in the U.S. population. With rising perceptions of the risk of smoking came rising quit ratios so that today approximately 60 per cent of smokers will choose to quit their habit.

“Choosing” to become addicted sounds strange. Isn’t addiction an accident? As when Ulysses’s men got lost in Lotus land and could not stop themselves from munching magic flowers? If this is how you think about addiction then you have to believe that smokers get hooked without understanding the risks. As Viscusi’s research suggests, this view does not jive with the facts. Viscusi has the audacity to suggest that smokers are not ignorant of, or insensitive to, risk but simply have less fear of risk than others. He supports this view with wage data that show that smokers demand half the compensation for work in dangerous situations that non-smokers demand. Maybe smokers just have a different take on life. Forcing them to change might be like forcing Diogenes out of his barrel. Is anyone wise enough to perform the eviction without doubts?

What about children? Is smoking a rational choice for them? A 1974 study by psychologists F.

W. Schneider and L. A. Vanmastrig measured children’s perceptions of smoking risk. Over 99 per cent of children between 7 and 8 years of age believe that smoking causes cancer and shortens a person’s life. The majority of children also believe that it is hard to stop smoking. Viscusi’s own survey of teenagers between 16 and 21 bore out these results. He found that this age group had an even higher assessment of the risks of smoking than adults and that they had the same negative response to risk as adults. Namely “there is no evidence of younger consumers being lured into smoking in any disproportionate manner.”

Some young consumers of course do end up getting lured. Could not some government muscle protect them from the evils of tobacco? In a recent survey of U.S. research, social psychologist Steve Sussman and his colleagues found that the youngsters who are likeliest to become serious smokers have low self-esteem, are likely to abuse alcohol and drugs, and come from troubled families where parents did not care about their activities. Smoking may give youngsters good feelings that happier people can generate without the help of a drug. What this suggests is that efforts to stomp out smoking may simply push these people to look for another feel-good drug such as alcohol or Valium. Economists Rajeev Goel and Mathew Morey found evidence of this type of substitution. In a study covering 50 U.S. states between 1959 and 1982, they estimated that a 15 per cent rise in cigarette prices would lower cigarette demand by 15 per cent and raise liquor demand by 20 per cent. What these data hint at is that no advertising ban or cigarette prohibition is going to solve a problem created by years of family neglect. Perversely, an antismoking crusade might entice some youngsters to start smoking. H. L. Mencken noted this effect during the years of alcohol prohibition in the United States. “The benefits that were to come from the abolition of the open saloon, long damned as a constant temptation to the young, are not visible. On the contrary, the young are now tempted as the saloon, even in its most romantic and voluptuous forms, never tempted them.”

Claim no. 3: Tobacco companies are powerful concerns who control the market. Power is hard to measure, but consider this. In the late 1980s, tobacco companies tried to campaign against a California initiative that was hostile to their interests. In spite of an $8-million advertising campaign, the tobacco interests could not overcome the antitobacco interests who fought back with only $1 million in advertising.

Consider also that these supposedly powerful tobacco companies have seen a per capita consumption of cigarettes fall, almost to late 1940s levels. Advertising campaigns may have helped tobacco companies slow the decline (though the statistical debate on this point is unresolved in the economics profession), but growing public concern over health has outweighed industry propaganda. Advertising has mainly been about luring consumers from competing brands. Where advertising has been banned, some cigarette companies seem to have benefited. Economists Anthony Gyapong and Kwabena Brempong found that the 1970 U.S. tobacco advertising ban helped raise the profits of the established tobacco firms. Woodrow Eckard found a similar result and added that the advertising ban stabilized the market shares of established firms. It appears that the advertising ban was like a peace treaty that helped certain companies by putting an end to costly advertising wars.

If tobacco companies have the power to dictate terms to consumers, they have a strange way of showing that power. Richard Kluger’s book is in part the story of how the tobacco industry has scrambled to provide consumers with what they want: a safe smoke. In their survey of tobacco advertising between 1926 and 1986, D. J. Ringold and J. E. Calfee show that in the 1920s, cigarette companies were responding to consumer concerns about health. By the 1950s, an advertising war had broken out in which these companies were citing scientific data to lure smokers toward brands with low tar. Their main impediment to satisfying consumer health concerns was the Surgeon General. In the belief that all smoking is bad, he decided to frustrate tobacco companies in their competition to bring consumers a safer smoke (a view to which the American Cancer Society took exception). The Surgeon General continued his attempts to squash the search for a safer cigarette in 1989 when RJR Nabisco came out with the smokeless Premiere cigarette. In its attempts to stamp out smoking, the antismoking lobby appears willing to give smokers only one choice: Quit smoking or die. These are much harsher terms than the tobacco companies are offering.

In making these comments, please note I am not belittling the concerns of the antismoking lobby nor saying that this lobby is a monolithic group with no diversity of opinion. I do not smoke. For five years my sister and I pestered my father to stop smoking (we won). The purpose of my answer to Mr. Morris’s letter is to suggest that there are enough facts to make reasonable people pause before giving government the power to impose a standard of behavior on their fellows.

References:

Eckard, Woodrow E. Jr. (1991). “Competition and the Cigarette TV Advertising Ban.” Economic Inquiry. 29:119-133.

Goel, Rajeev K. and Mathew J. Morey (1995). “The Interdependence of Cigarette and Liquor Demand.” Southern Economic Journal, 62: 451-59.

Mencken, H.L. Editorial in the American Mercury, December 1924. Reprinted in Politics of Moral Behavior: Prohibition and Drug Abuse. Edited by K.A. Kerr. Reading: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1972.

Sussman, Steve, and Clyde W. Dent, Dee Burton, Alan Stacy, Brian R. Flay. Developing School-Based Tobacco Use Prevention and Cessation Programs. London: Sage Publications, 1995.

Mitchell, Mark L. and J. Harold Mulherin (1988). “Finessing the Political System: The Cigarette Advertising Ban.” Southern Economic Journal, 54:855-62.

Viscusi, Kip W. Smoking: Making the Risky Decision. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. (This book also has the references to the work of Schneider and Vanmastrig and Ringold and Calfee).


Full House: The Spread of Excellence from Plato to Darwin

by Stephen Jay Gould
(Harmony Books, 1996. 244 pages) $32.95

IF DIVERSITY AND INCLUSIVENESS are the leitmotifs of our day, Stephen Jay Gould’s Full House is truly a book for our times. Gould, a Harvard professor of zoology and anthropology, rejects the conventional understanding of evolution, which sees a trend to complexity in the history of life. In Full House we learn that diversity, not complexity, is the true measure of excellence. Gould’s elaborate defence of this conclusion begins with a call to statistical conversion: We must kick our Platonic habit of representing full systems by a single exemplar, or essence, and get used to reading trends not as complete entities on the move, upward or downward, but as variations within whole systems — within “full houses.”

While Gould’s discussion of true trends may daunt the statistically challenged, it is guaranteed to delight the baseball fan and poker player alike. Many assume that .400 hitting has disappeared because batters just aren’t as good as they used to be. But Gould explains that the absence of a latter-day Ted Williams in our own house actually marks an overall improvement in play.

Baseball may well be a metaphor for life. As do the disillusioned fans, those who think that progress characterizes life’s history have focused exclusively on extreme values. They have followed only the most complex organism through time — not the full house — and are guilty of substituting its increasing complexity for progress of the whole. (Gould describes this phenomenon as a fine example of a very small tail wagging a large dog.) Careful observation of the whole reveals some striking facts — particularly the enduring presence of bacteria, which Gould claims has dominated life despite 3.5 billion years of evolutionary “progress.”

Reader be warned. This mental workout has merely been a warm-up for what Gould thinks all this really means: We humans may be pretty sophisticated, but our sense of place in the cosmos needs a little readjusting. With no “progress” characterizing life’s history, we must learn to see ourselves not as the pinnacle and centre of it all, but simply as one conscious and contingent member of a very full house.

Patricia Murphy


The Irony of Free Speech

by Owen M. Fiss
(Harvard University Press, 1996. 98 pages) $27.45

IN THIS SLIM BOOK, Owen M. Fiss, Yale University’s Sterling Professor of Law, postulates that freedom of speech must be limited to protect it. He examines this counterintuitive argument in relation to the U.S. Constitution’s First Amendment, but analogy to Canada is not difficult.

Fiss’s arguments on pornography, hate speech and artistic grant allocation are perplexingly rife with straw men, missing premises and question begging. What, for example, can be made of his position that giving grant money to one artist restricts the freedom of others? Contradictorily, even as he makes this argument, Fiss supports regulation to “turn down” the volume of pornography and hate speech. He apparently ignores that such control makes the state an arbiter of good-speak and bad-speak, no less than grants make it an arbiter of art. Moreover, Fiss fails to support his premise that pornography or hate speech actually somehow “silences” people.

Nils R. Connor


Crisis in the Academy: Rethinking Higher Education in America

by Christopher J. Lucas
(St. Martin’s Press, 1996. 288 pages) $29.95

EDUCATIONAL HISTORIAN, CHRISTOPHER LUCAS chalks the current crisis in the universities up to finances. However, after he’s surveyed the origin and evolution of post-secondary education in the United States, his more important though unstated message is that there has always been a crisis in the academy. The perpetual crisis has revolved around the same set of issues. Should these institutions provide general education at the undergraduate level? Specialized professional training? Scholarly research at the graduate level? Should these be separated or combined in one institution? Who should be admitted? What curriculum should be taught and how should faculty be recruited and retained?

Among other reforms, Lucas proposes redefining the mandate of each set of institutions that make up post-secondary education. Some will need to become more vocationally oriented while others should reflect the philosophy of a liberal education. Lucas feels that universities offering undergraduate education should resist the pressure to measure results purely in terms of job placements, and they should question rigid course requirements of majoring in a particular discipline. In no sense would he allow students to select their courses and let the market decide the value of their choice. More worrying, however, he downplays to two pages the probable effect of information technology and the expansion of distance learning. Without considering these forces, future crises will be assured.

Christopher Maule


Dossier: The Secret History of Armand Hammer

by Edward Jay Epstein
(Random House, 1996. 418 pages) $39.95

EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN’S TALE of the close relationship between Armand Hammer and the Soviet state will cause a shudder in many capitalists who find parallels to their own heroes uncomfortably close for comfort.

For Hammer’s life provides an extreme lesson in how to use state levers for private gain. The first westerner to obtain Soviet monopolies, this concessionaire extraordinary had his hand in asbestos mines and oil fields; he received a cut from every immigrant in America who wanted to send money to relatives in Russia, and for every Ford vehicle sold in the Soviet Union.

Epstein paints Hammer’s success as diametrically different from the accepted mode of business taught in the West. Not due to the free market, it “was based on the Leninist concept that economic rewards proceed from the state. Rather than exposing businessmen to withering only-the-fittest-shall-survive competition, the state protects its concessionaires. The chief skill, therefore, is getting a concession from the government — and holding on to it.”

Yet many, if not most, successful western capitalists more resemble Hammer in their business philosophy than Adam Smith and his ideal world of free markets. The chief skill demonstrated by Canadian industrialists, from Sir Henry Pellatt at the turn of the century to Ted Rogers today, was precisely getting — and holding onto — the state concessions and other favors that led to their fabulous wealth.

Lawrence Solomon

Filip Palda responds
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High density is the highroad to prosperity

Lawrence Solomon
The Next City
December 1, 1996

It’s always been hard to keep them down on the farm, and soon we won’t need to. Using GPS – global satellite positioning technology – American farmers have begun to map and analyze their land for characteristics such as acidity and soil types, which can vary widely throughout their fields. Instead of applying a uniform amount of seeds, fertilizer and herbicide across an entire field, GPS-equipped combines pick up signals from more than 20 satellites orbiting 11,000 miles above Earth and dole out the precise amount needed for each square metre as they travel the fields. Farmers are finding they’re increasing their yields while spending less on chemicals. Many areas, to their surprise, require no fertilizer at all.

With precision-farming packages starting at US$6,500 and manufactured by Rockwell International, Case Corp. and Deere & Co., farmers no longer need to walk their fields to estimate their needs. Automated equipment, such as the robotic harvesters soon coming onto the market, may one day free them from the need to drive their farm equipment, too. Like their city counterparts, farmers may become telecommuters, running most aspects of their operations from their city homes or their corporate offices, if they choose.

Most will. Whenever people have had economic options, they have tended to prefer high-density life in the city to low-density living elsewhere. The city offers excitement and economic opportunities. It offers education and social mobility. City jobs tend to be safer than those in the country. And with access to health clinics and other social services, people live healthier and longer in cities, especially in the case of the Third World, whose cities rescue many of the world’s poorest from miserable rural existences. Poverty “tends to be at its worst in rural areas,” explained the World Bank in a 1990 study, something “not always understood because the urban poor are more visible and vocal.”

Third World women especially benefit when they are liberated by city life: Away from hidebound country customs, it becomes respectable for girls to be educated and for women to work. According to the World Fertility Survey, 500 million women said they did not want their last child, they wanted more spacing between their children, or they did not want another child, yet lacked access to family planning. In cities, where women have better access to education and birth control, they tend to have smaller families and generally fare better than their country cousins in finding wage-paying jobs.

In the West, we long ago migrated to cities, where most of us now live in relative affluence. Japan took this route to prosperity, too, with Tokyo outdoing all Western cities. With a population of 27 million, almost as much as Canada’s, it has become the largest city on Earth. Now, the people of the Third World are following in the footsteps of affluent people elsewhere, improving their lot in the mega-cities of Bombay, Shanghai, São Paulo and Mexico City. Within a decade, most of the people on the planet will be urban dwellers.

Contrary to conventional wisdom, rural areas – and not cities – are inherently unsustainable. Without urban markets for their surplus, rural folk would be doomed to subsistence agricultural production, leaving them vulnerable to blights and local weather conditions that could devastate their harvests. For this reason, famines are features of rural societies – people in cities have too many options to starve.

Farms are such risky business, and so prone to bankruptcies, that a farmer would be foolhardy to till his fields without obtaining sophisticated financial implements from the city or, as is more common, a host of financial supports from city taxpayers. Farms have also not been exemplars of environmental sustainability, having been run as polluting industries – among society’s worst. More wilderness has been torn down to accommodate farmland than the most sprawling of cities.

Cities, on the other hand, epitomize sustainability. Urban residents live lightly on the land, consuming less energy and other resources than country folk, while also generating enough wealth to support rural areas financially through tax policies that send city earnings their way. City-states, which do not need to share wealth with rural areas, grow economically at two or three times the rate of Western nations.

Tiny Hong Kong was economically backwards until the 1940s, when it was transformed by an enormous influx of refugees from Shanghai, China’s industrial powerhouse, fleeing communism. Now, less than 50 years later, Hong Kong and its six million residents have become the powerhouse. So, too, with Singapore, which has become the world’s sixth wealthiest nation. If São Paulo’s 10 million citizens were a city-state of their own, freed from the burden of supporting Brazil’s rural population, it, too, would rank among the world’s wealthy nations.

The sustainability of cities comes from their inventiveness and adaptability. As Jane Jacobs demonstrated, agriculture began in cities, allowing cities to both feed themselves and to leave something for export. As city land became more valuable, agricultural enterprises were moved beyond the city limits, in the same way cities this century are moving their smokestack industries out of town to make room for enterprises of the information age.

Thanks to urban marketing skills, urban inventions and urban innovations, agriculture thrives in Canada, the United States and other highly urbanized societies and stagnates in agrarian societies. But cities still produce a surprising amount of agricultural product. Singapore is self-reliant in meat and produces 25 per cent of its vegetable needs. The 1980 U.S. census found that urban areas produced 30 per cent of the value of the country’s agricultural output. In 1990, this figure was up to 40 per cent. In 1970, 20 per cent of Muscovites were involved in agricultural production; now it’s 65 per cent. Java, with 50,000 square miles and a population of 100 million, feeds itself largely with locally grown food. Densely populated areas are so resilient that, if necessary, they could convert their industry to agriculture and feed themselves several times over. But unlike farms, cities don’t lend themselves to monoculture. Their diversity is their strength, and their diversity depends on their density.

Government policies, in most places on Earth, have encouraged the destruction of wilderness and the expansion of agriculture and suburban sprawl. Put another way, governments have discouraged cities from becoming ever denser. Remove government preferences that interfere with people’s choice of residence, and our wrong-headed use of the land on the planet would be righted. Cities would become much, much denser.

With more people living in cities, more wealth would be generated, and less wealth would be dissipated subsidizing rural lifestyles and industries. With increased wealth, population growth would slow in the Third World, reducing the demand for foodstuffs and farmland. São Paulo’s very high fertility rate in the early 1960s – on average, each woman gave birth to five children – has been halved during the city’s explosive population growth and may soon average 2.1 children, the point at which populations stabilize. Singapore and Hong Kong have stable populations, as do Taiwan, Thailand, South Korea and other urbanizing Third World countries. Even without reduced population growth, the demand for farmland is abating due to innovations that have improved agricultural production. We now need about half as much acreage per person for grain production as we did in 1950. As a result, farmland sprawl has begun to subside: Some of the farmland taken out of agriculture has become city land, and some has been returned to wilderness.

The ability to feed ourselves has never depended on a high ratio of farmland to urban population. With the world’s population at an all-time high and still growing, we are now producing and consuming more food per capita than ever before and are more resilient than ever before. India and China, the two most populous nations on Earth, are self-sufficient in rice. The Western world’s granaries are overflowing, leading to grain wars among Canada, the United States and Europe. Even Saudi Arabia exports wheat. People still starve for many reasons – the poverty of backward nations, massive dislocations caused by tribal fighting, as in Somalia, or the forcible large-scale relocations of populations as occurred in the U.S.S.R.

But finding the land to feed a large urban population is never a problem, and even in the extreme it is inconceivable that it could become so. At the density of Manhattan, which many consider a desirable place to live, the world’s entire population would occupy less space than the area taken up by the tiny country of Laos.

Dense urban life is not for everyone – large numbers of us prefer suburbs and small towns, farms and faraway places. Yet despite the city’s enormous problems, it draws increasing numbers to it.

Early this century, cities solved the problem of sanitation, which was plaguing their productivity, limiting their growth and threatening them with stagnation. Early in the next, cities are likely to solve traffic congestion – in most cases their chief remaining problem – by tolling urban roads, as London, Singapore and others are doing. With free-flowing urban roads, cities will become more efficient, cleaner, less frustrating and much more liveable. Cities will become more welcoming still to the half of humanity that has not yet moved there.

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Sizing up the city

Lawrence Solomon
The Next City
December 1, 1996

What’s the right size for a city? Toronto’s elites have been feverishly debating the merits of amalgamation for a full year now, and to hear either side, calamity may come if a befuddled Mike Harris government — which seemingly changes its mind fortnightly on the subject — ultimately settles on the wrong decision.

Amalgamationists believe that residents who live within the boundaries of Metropolitan Toronto are overgoverned, with seven sets of squabbling politicians and bureaucracies building fiefdoms at seven city halls. Amalgamationists also claim the moral high ground. Some municipalities within Metro provide better services than others. With one unified city, all Metro citizens would achieve universality and equity in the delivery of services.

Non-amalgamationists, pointing to experiences in Halifax, where costs rose after a recent amalgamation, claim the metropolitan bureaucracy would burgeon. These defenders of the status quo make moral claims, too, saying that local government is close to the people and better able to understand the stuff of community life: what hours to open the local hockey rink, how to allocate parking on neighborhood streets.

Like all complex questions in life, the arguments for and against amalgamation can’t easily be labelled left or right. Big centralized government is often viewed with suspicion by conservatives, yet its proponents include the Progressive Conservative Party of Ontario and David Crombie, a former mayor and federal PC cabinet member; while its opponents include Toronto’s left-leaning city council and John Sewell, a former reform mayor of Toronto and central planning czar for the province’s previous NDP government.

Conservative thought on local government stems from public choice theory, a Nobel Prize-winning doctrine which argues the merits of many small governments. With cities competing to attract businesses and residents alike, they will be inclined to keep taxes low and services high. Many small cities also provide a hothouse of experimentation, leading to successes in one jurisdiction that will be copied elsewhere, to the betterment of all.

Yet city governments aren’t ordinary corporations competing with one another, staying close to their customers by giving them the satisfaction they deserve. City governments have the power to create or enforce local monopolies, and local monopolies — whether public or private — neither compete much nor learn much from one another. No better example of this exists than right under the noses of all these Toronto-area combatants in this highbrow debate over amalgamation.

In the large Toronto suburb of Mississauga, Hydro Mississauga bears the financial burden of rapid expansion and the disadvantage of servicing a sprawling suburban territory. By all rights, Hydro Mississauga should be charging its customers much more for power distribution than does Toronto Hydro, with its many customers and compact service territory. Instead, Toronto Hydro’s costs are two-and-a-half times those of Hydro Mississauga. Innovation, rather than blossoming in a municipal hothouse of experimentation, has been embrittled in a deep freeze.

Municipally owned or regulated enterprises do not experiment, they stagnate; such local backwaters prevail in virtually all municipal spheres. A Metropolitan Toronto cab dropping someone off in Mississauga is forbidden — by monopoly law — to pick up a Mississauga resident travelling back to Metropolitan Toronto. Public transit vehicles, too, must stop at the Mississauga border, senselessly shuttling commuters off and onto buses, erecting a customs border at city limits to thwart the normal comings and goings of the citizenry. In contrast to this Kafkaesque world that our local governments construct, the real world of citizens ignores city boundaries: The majority of us who can afford private automobiles go about our work and play in a seamless city.

The costliness of the border crossings — in needless travelling time for commuters, in inefficient public transit routes and in perversely determining urban development for businesses and homeowners who take the borders into account when they consider changing jobs or homes — cries out for change. The moribund local municipalities did nothing to solve this local problem for decades, leading to pressure for amalgamation. With the province coming to the rescue by wiping out the borders, services can finally be coordinated.

In public transit, one large monopoly, if intelligently run, will always be preferable to many small monopolies. If unintelligently run, one large monopoly spells doom, as it did for Toronto’s Transit Commission after a previous amalgamation: Its densely populated, highly profitable City of Toronto routes were plundered to service unprofitable suburban routes, leading to the entire system’s virtual collapse.

Here then, is the essence of the amalgamation choice. Should citizens prefer the steady decline of services under the status quo, or risk something much worse in the unlikely event they will get something better? Faced with these imponderables, is it any wonder that Metropolitan Toronto’s residents are as confused as the politicians. Yet citizens need not choose between two evils, because there is a common-sense, proven alternative to both large and small monopolies.

Ten years ago, faced with a public transit industry in severe decline, the United Kingdom abolished public transit monopolies in most of the country, leading to wide-open competition for public transit passengers, regardless of municipal territory. With the local governments out of the way, experimentation, for the first time, thrived. It started slowly, a few bus companies daring to replace their large buses, which provided infrequent service, with modern minibuses — everything from 20-seat Ford Transits to 33-seat Mercedes-Benzes — that ran two or three times as often. To attract customers, particularly the elderly and others who were less mobile, the companies adopted new practices, like hail and ride, which enabled customers to board buses between stops. To find still more customers, the companies began venturing into the estates, the large public housing complexes that house the poor. Routes and schedules changed, too, to reflect the times and places people really wanted to travel.

The innovations turned the industry around. Passengers began coming back. Ridership is up; automobile use down. The costs of running a vehicle dropped 40 per cent. Without municipal borders putting the brakes to public transit vehicles, buses log 25 per cent more kilometres, in 85 per cent of the cases without any subsidies.

Without public transit monopolies, without the hydro and other artificially sustained municipal monopolies, the raison d’être for amalgamation — coordinating these large monopoly functions — disappears.

But cities — themselves the product of past amalgamations — have themselves often grown too large. Well-functioning cities are comprised of neighborhoods, often very cohesive ones, that organize themselves into ratepayer and business associations. At the neighborhood level, where people voluntarily come together out of shared concerns, can be found the natural levels for many city governance functions, such as the maintenance of parks and other public spaces and regulation of neighborhood standards. Neighborhoods have been demanding, and getting, increasing powers over the years, forming a quasi-level of government. And, in the final analysis, despite rhetoric about city governments being close to the people, only neighborhood democracy can be counted on to respond to community needs.

In the great tests of local democracy, local governments — when defined as city governments — rarely get passing grades. Urban renewal — the euphemism for the levelling of entire districts that city fathers deemed unworthy — was city driven, with municipal taxation perversely enlisted to coerce landlords to convert old buildings into parking lots. Urban expressways, perhaps the single-most destructive force promoting urban decline, were also local government driven — another conspiracy of city councillors against neighborhoods they viewed as expendable. In Canada’s greatest showdown over expressways — the successful battle to stop the Spadina Expressway from gutting some of the City of Toronto’s proudest districts — the neighborhoods fought all seven Metropolitan Toronto governments, including their own City of Toronto government. The neighborhoods’ salvation came when the provincial government, on the local residents’ behalf, stepped in to fight city hall.

Governments don’t set city borders, they set city limits — the territory that a city may monopolize. The real city’s boundaries are set by its citizens, who often settle just outside the city limits to escape the clutches of some of the city’s monopolies.

These new suburbanites want the city’s amenities without paying the monopoly prices. In so doing, they threaten to bring the city down by inadvertently creating a vicious cycle: Bit by bit, taxes go up for city residents to pay for the suburbanites’ uses, leading more people to choose suburbs over the city, leading city taxes to go up until the city collapses. To prevent this scenario, amalgamationists want to expand the monopoly franchise to capture new communities.

But amalgamation only creates a new city limit to draw future suburbanites, leading to new amalgamation battles down the road; it fails to come to grips with the heart of the problem — the monopolies that inevitably lead to unsustainable cities.

To stop suburban sprawl and to save the cities, amalgamationists and non-amalgamationists need not fight one another, they need only lay down their monopoly powers. The price of city services will then plummet below those of the suburbs because cities are inherently more efficient, setting off an urban migration that repopulates city centres and revitalizes city businesses — a virtuous circle that lowers further the cost of city services while restoring the tax bases of cities. A virtuous circle that creates stable, sustainable cities.

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Toll roads safer, better-maintained, expert Says

Bruce Campion-Smith
Toronto Star
November 21, 1996

Huge construction and maintenance costs may make tolls inevitable, not only on new highways but on those already in use, a Toronto conference has heard.

While this may not be popular with drivers, there is a side benefit, U.S. toll expert Robert Poole said yesterday.

Toll roads arc generally safer, he told the “Free-Flowing Roads” conference, organized by The Next City magazine.

“We find consistently that there are lower accident rates and better maintenance on roads that are tolled,” he said.

Poole is president of the Los Angeles-based Reason Foundation and has advised governments on transportation and privatization policy.

The reasons for better safety records aren’t clear, he said, but might be attributed to fewer drunk drivers, less traffic or better maintained cars.

“We don’t really know the answer. We just know that when the studies are done carefully, that’s what (they show) – a higher level of safety.”

Toll roads have fewer potholes and are in “better general repair,” Poole said, but they remain a tough sell.

The typical motorist thinks tolls are a “rip-off by someone,” he said.

“People think those roads have already, been paid for. Well, they were paid for once, but paying for their ongoing maintenance and reconstruction is very expensive and it costs more than existing tax sources will make possible.”

As a result, he said, “we’re going to start needing to add tolls to, those roads that need major reconstruction.”

“The money is simply not there without a major increase in the taxes … already, going for highways,” he said.

“The choice is not really the status quo or tolls. The choice is higher taxes or tolls…” but people don’t yet understand that,”

Tolls may a possibility for Metro as it struggles to find money needed to repair hundreds of kilometres of deteriorating roads, said Metro Councillor Scott Cavalier (Scarborough Agincourt),

“Every year there is $38 million worth of projects we should be doing … that we don’t have the money to do,” he said in an interview at the conference.

“I’m out here looking at the alternatives for our public transportation system,” said Cavalier, a member of Metro’s transportation and planning committee.

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